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Abstract 
 
In this thesis I argue that philosophy must reflect on historical experience, and must even 
consider itself a mode of such experience, if it is to remain materially grounded. 
Adorno’s enigmatic formula in Aesthetic Theory—that philosophy requires art, and that 
art requires philosophy—ought to be interpreted in the following manner: since art 
expresses history in sedimented aesthetic form, philosophy requires artworks in order to 
access the material conditions that ground its own reflective activity; and, conversely, 
since historical sedimentation may only be made critically available through 
philosophical theorizing, art requires philosophy, so that tradition’s potential for new 
directions may be rescued from its conservative and regressive tendencies. In order to 
investigate these issues, I argue also that Adorno’s aesthetic thought is indebted to Kant’s 
third Critique. Specifically, many Kantian aesthetic categories are present in Adorno’s 
Aesthetic Theory. Their presence, however, is qualified, because Adorno employs 
Hegelian determinate negation to critically examine traditional concepts. In this way, 
Adorno retrieves and reinvigorates the tradition of philosophical aesthetics while 
critically interrogating the assumptions and principles present in Kantian concepts that 
must be revised, transformed, and altered, not least in light of the catastrophe of twentieth 
century history. Kant’s categories, while emerging from the contradictions of their era, 
fail to meet the demands placed on them by modern experience; Adorno’s revised 
categories are needed in order to address the historical-social situation of modernity.  
 Many scholars and commentators have analyzed the philosophical and aesthetic 
legacy that Adorno inherits from Kant. For example, Tom Huhn argues that the Kantian 
aesthetic object is necessarily opaque, or blind to the historical and social content that lies 
within it.1 Gene Ray argues that the category of the sublime needs to be historicized in 
light of the Nazi genocide.2 Murray Skees discusses the difference between Kant’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Tom Huhn, ‘Kant, Adorno, and the Social Opacity of the Aesthetic’, in Tom Huhn and 
Lambert Zuidervaart (eds), The Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno's Aesthetic 
Theory (Cambridge and London, 1997).  
2 Gene Ray, ‘Reading the Lisbon Earthquake: Adorno, Lyotard, and the Contemporary 
Sublime’, in The Yale Journal of Criticism, 17 (Spring, 2004), pp. 1-18. 
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concept of autonomy and Adorno’s.3 Joel Whitebook addresses the dual influences of 
Freud and Kant on Adorno; he argues that the synthesis of the diffuse, in order to 
construct a coherent self, always leads to violence.4 Tracey Stark argues that Adorno 
seeks to rehabilitate Kantian reflective judgment in his aesthetics.5 Thierry de Duve 
argues that Adorno misreads Kantian categories through a Hegelian lens, and that his 
concept of reconciliation is incoherent.6 Peter Uwe Hohendahl discusses Adorno’s 
critique of Kant’s subjectivism and reviews Adorno’s reception of several categories in 
the third Critique: aesthetic autonomy, natural beauty, the sublime, and the transcendental 
subject.7 Anthony Cascardi argues that Kant’s concept of aesthetic reflective judgment 
preserves qualitative particularity in the subject’s feeling, which cannot be fully captured 
in discursive concepts; thus, he tries to redeem Kant’s concept for Adorno’s aesthetics.8 
Ross Wilson claims that Adorno rehabilitates Kant’s model of dialectical aesthetic 
experience, in which the subject tries to rescue objectivity through subjective mediation.9 
David Roberts discusses the Kantian sublime in terms of shock, which allows repressed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Murray W. Skees, ‘Kant, Adorno and the Work of Art’, Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, 37:8 (2011), pp. 915-933.  
4 Joel Whitebook, ‘Weighty Objects: On Adorno's Kant-Freud Interpretation’, in Tom 
Huhn (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Adorno (Cambridge, 2004).  
5 Tracey Stark, ‘The Dignity of the Particular: Adorno on Kant's Aesthetics’, Philosophy 
and Social Criticism, Vol. 24, No. 2/3 (1998), pp. 61-83.  
6 Thierry De Duve, ‘Resisting Adorno, Revamping Kant’, in Jay Bernstein, Claudia 
Brodsky, and Anthony Cascardi (eds), Art and Aesthetics After Adorno (The Townsend 
Center for the Humanities, No. 3, University of California, Berkeley, 2010), pp. 249-291.  
7 Peter Uwe Hohendahl, ‘Nature and the Autonomy of Art: Adorno as a Reader of Kant’, 
The Philosophical Forum, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Fall 2012), pp. 247-257.  
8 Anthony Cascardi, ‘The Consequences of Enlightenment’, in Simon Jarvis (ed.), 
Theodor W. Adorno: Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory, Volume II (4 vols, London 
and New York, 2007).  
9 Ross Wilson, ‘Dialectical Aesthetics and the Kantian Rettung: On Adorno's Aesthetic 
Theory’, New German Critique, Volume 35, Number 2, Summer 2008, pp. 55-69.  
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nature to speak, and which briefly releases the subject from her imprisonment.10 Brian 
O’Connor provides an incisive and detailed examination how Kantian and Hegelian 
concepts and principles compose and organize Negative Dialectics.11 Jay Bernstein 
provides an in depth and brilliant reading of various Kantian categories and their role in 
forming and grounding Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory.12 Espen Hammer argues that 
Adorno’s aesthetic and social theory is a unique response to modernity, and the crises 
that arise in it; he analyses Adorno’s debt to the aesthetics and metaphysics of Kant and 
Hegel.13 Kalliopi Nikolopoulou analyses Kant’s concept of sensus communis and applies 
it to the social nature of poetic language.14 Wilhelm S. Wurzer analyses how Adorno 
criticizes the Kantian transcendental subject and argues that, for Adorno, the Kantian 
imagination is the realm of nature.15 Finally, Surti Singh argues, against Albrecht 
Wellmer, that Adorno’s concept of the shudder is cognitive rather than emotional, and 
that the shudder, contrary to the Kantian sublime, reveals the finite materiality of the 
subject, rather than spiritually transcending it.16  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 David Roberts, ‘Aura and Aesthetics of Nature’, Thesis Eleven, Number 36 (1993), pp. 
127-137.  
11 Brian O’Connor, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of 
Critical Rationality (Cambridge and London, 2005).  
12 J. M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and 
Adorno, (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1992). See also J. M. Bernstein, ‘Blind 
Intuitions: Modernism's Critique of Idealism’, British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy, Volume 22, Number 6 (2014), pp. 1069-1094. 
13 Espen Hammer, Adorno's Modernism: Art, Experience, and Catastrophe (Cambridge, 
2015).  
14 Kalliopi Nikolopoulou, ‘As If: Kant, Adorno and the Politics of Poetry’, Modern 
Language Notes, Volume 121, Number 3 (April 2006), pp. 757-773.  
15 Wilhelm S. Wurzer, ‘Kantian Snapshot of Adorno: Modernity Standing Still’, in Max 
Pensky (ed.), The Actuality of Adorno: Critical Essays on Adorno and the Postmodern, 
(Albany, 1997).  
16 Surti Singh, ‘The Aesthetic Experience of Shudder: Adorno and the Kantian Sublime’, 
in The Aesthetic Ground of Critical Theory: New Readings in Benjamin and Adorno, 
Nathan Ross (ed.), (Lanham and Boulder, 2015).  
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In the course of the thesis I seek to answer three main questions: Does Adorno 
engage with Kantian categories in Aesthetic Theory? Why should we accept Adorno's 
discovery that art requires philosophy, and that philosophy requires art? And, why should 
we accept Adorno's aesthetic categories as grounded in historical experience, and Kant's 
aesthetic categories as incapable of responding to such experience? 
My own goals consist in shedding light on Adorno’s inheritance of Kant’s third 
Critique, which has not been comprehensively researched; analyzing certain categories in 
Aesthetic Theory that have only been partially examined by other scholars; demonstrating 
a unique reading of Adorno’s concept of interpretation that fits in with the trajectory of 
his philosophy as a whole; articulating a reading of Adorno’s thesis that art requires 
philosophy, and that philosophy requires art; and, finally, arguing that philosophy must 
excavate, and reflect on, historical experience if philosophy is to remain critical, and if it 
is to avoid succumbing to conservative convention, or the mere reproduction of ideology.   
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Introduction 
“One must have tradition in oneself, to hate it properly”  
--Adorno17 
 
In this thesis I argue that, in modernity, philosophical reflection is only possible if it takes 
account of, and recognizes itself as, historical reflection. I define modernity as the 
consequence of an irrational and instrumental logic18 that distorts qualitative particularity 
and leaves rational subjects bereft of their relationship to nature; thus, although 
modernity so defined stretches from the European Enlightenment in the seventeenth 
century through the horrors of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and through to the 
present, its development is jagged, rather than linear, and it is marked by the irrational 
distortion of the subject-object relationship rather than by any temporal limits. 
Instrumental reason infiltrates subjective experience and thought; in addition, it forms the 
capitalist definition of value. Philosophical idealism, broadly considered as the doctrine 
that material and particular qualities may be reduced to subjective and conceptual 
quantities, arises in modernity, and drives reason’s irrationality (in addition to 
capitalism). I define historical reflection as a form of knowledge that recognizes its own 
mode of cognizing as a manifestation of historical and social concretion or sedimentation. 
Historical reflection is, in part, historical experience, defined as the conscious reception 
of the material processes that have constituted, or destroyed, objects and concepts over 
time. Adorno claims in his lectures on ‘Metaphysics’ that “the mediatedness of thought is 
contained in this traditional moment, in the implicit history that is present within any 
cognition.”19 The history present within concepts may be neutral, corrosive, or beneficial. 
Investigation is required to ascertain how historical sedimentation affects concepts, 
objects, and experience in general. Adorno continues: 
it is also naïve to believe that it [thought] can divest itself entirely of this 
[traditional] moment. The truth probably lies in a kind of self-reflection that both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Theodor W. Adorno, MM, p. 52.  
18 Thanks to Nick Lawrence for clarifying this aspect of modernity for me.  
19 Theodor W. Adorno, Can One Live After Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader, Rolf 
Tiedemann (ed), Rodney Livingstone and others (trans) (Stanford, 2003), p. 463. 
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recognizes the inalienable presence of the traditional moment within knowledge, 
and critically identifies the dogmatic element in it—instead of creating a tabula 
rasa on both sides, as now, and thus succumbing either to dogmatism or to a 
timeless and therefore inherently fictitious positivism.20  
 
While subjectivity cannot escape history, the subject should not assume that her history is 
her destiny. It is necessary to engage with historical experience in order to become aware 
of the forces that have shaped subjectivity, and the social totality. Such traditional or 
historical experience is distilled and revealed most clearly in artworks’ expression—as 
Adorno demonstrates in Aesthetic Theory. For this reason, philosophical reflection 
requires aesthetic experience so that reflection may be grounded in historical experience.  
Since aesthetic expression is composed of materiality or objectivity, the 
experience of artworks requires philosophical reflection. Without such reflection, the 
subject would risk reproducing, or uncritically presenting, reality, rather than critically 
comprehending it.21 Such reflection begins when the subject encounters the work and 
tries to interpret it. Without such reflection, the awareness of historical suffering would 
be entangled with tradition and convention—that is, with reified experience.22 We may 
define aesthetic experience as the somatic awareness of the nonidentity of object and 
subject: the fact that reason fails to capture objectivity. The constellation of history, 
philosophy, and aesthetics requires deciphering if it is to be understood.  
Hence the thesis responds to several questions that Adorno does not resolve in his 
great, unfinished work Aesthetic Theory: What is the relationship between philosophical 
reflection and aesthetic experience? Why does Adorno assert that philosophy requires art, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Adorno, Can One Live…, p. 463.  
21 Adorno, Can One Live…, pp. 438-439.  
22 O’Connor defines reification as “a state of affairs in which there are only quantitative 
and therefore mutually translatable differences within and between objects.” See Brian 
O’Connor, ‘Freedom Within Nature: Adorno on the Idea of Reason's Autonomy,’ In The 
Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian Thought, Volume II, Historical, Social 
and Political Thought. Nicolas Boyle, Liz Disley, and John Walker (eds), (Cambridge, 
2013), p. 214. For the classical definition of reification that influenced Adorno and the 
other members of the Institute for Social Research profoundly, see Georg Lukács, History 
and Class Consciousness, Rodney Livingstone (trans), (London, 1971).  
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and that art requires philosophy? How can two different modes of cognition—one that 
operates with rational principles and the other with somatic processes—work together in 
the subject? How does history weave itself into philosophical and aesthetic cognition? 
How can the Western philosophical and aesthetic traditions continue after the Holocaust 
(as well as other modern massacres such as the trans-Atlantic slave trade in America and 
Britain, and the British Empire’s brutal legacy in India and across the globe)—which 
challenges and undermines those theories in the Western tradition that claim 
transcendence and a priori insight?  
I argue against the idea that philosophical reflection, and aesthetic experience, 
should occur without consideration for historical, cultural, or social factors. Kant, for 
instance, implicitly maintains that such factors serve to contaminate, rather than 
concretize, philosophical reflection or aesthetic experience.23 Kant’s conception of 
autonomy essentially isolates formal knowledge from material experience.24 Instead, I 
argue that the aesthetic experience and philosophical reflection may only work together 
to produce cognition if historical, cultural, and social experiences are not divorced from 
subjectivity. Aesthetic experience requires philosophical reflection because the latter 
critically investigates the historical aspects of artworks, which must be interpreted and 
encountered; in the same way, philosophical reflection requires aesthetic experience 
because the latter gives materiality or objectivity—in the form of historical experience—
to cognition. The result of the confrontation between subject and object is the realization 
of nonidentity—which forces the subject to reflect on the disintegration of reason, and 
thereby to attain a measure of self-knowledge.  
Interpreting an artwork in order to uncover historical experience, however, should 
not merely be a process of conceptualizing and systematically determining the alleged 
static meaning of a work. Instead of constructing universal categories, we must engage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Ginsborg, Hannah, ‘Kant on the Subjectivity of Taste,’ in Herman Parret (ed), 
Kant's Asthetik, Kant's Aesthetics, L'esthetique du Kant (Berlin and New York: 1998), pp. 
450-452. 
24 See Berel Lang, ‘Kant and the Subjective Objects of Taste,’ The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism, 25 (Spring, 1967), pp. 247-253.  
	   17	  
with concrete particularity: that which cannot be rationally grasped in its entirety.25 
Samuel Beckett is aware of the danger that the universal may distort the particular, as 
James McNaughton26 notes. He argues that Beckett revised his position towards modern 
art after he visited Nazi Germany in 1936 and was appalled and shocked by what he 
saw.27 McNaughton writes that Beckett came to realize that “rationalising the chaos of 
history can generate dangerously irrational historical narratives that lead from censorship 
and war”.28 After his experience in Nazi Germany, Beckett “claims that he himself has no 
sense of history and he stresses the importance of recognizing the fallibility of cause-and-
effect logic...[In addition, Beckett] appears reluctant to analyse politically his experience 
in Germany; and he puts forth as a virtue his inability to conceptualise art, history, and 
literature with master-narratives”.29 Beckett’s claim that he “has no sense” of history 
suggests that he cannot rationalize historical events, or place them in a teleological 
chain.30 History, however, must be reflectively engaged with if subjects are to become 
aware of their inheritance. Beckett comes to realize the danger of assuming that history 
operates on first principles that assign meaning and purpose to each and every historical 
occurrence in the name of a greater whole.31 Arguably, Beckett’s extreme and patient 
attention to ghastly emptiness, nothingness, and meaninglessness is an expression of his 
reluctance to impose meaning on subjects, objects, and events.32 In Germany in 1936, 
Beckett declares:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See Raymond Geuss, ‘Art and Criticism in Adorno's Aesthetics,’ European Journal of 
Philosophy, 6 (1998), pp. 297-317. “Works of art for Adorno are inherently useless 
objects which present an 'image' (Bild) of a kind of meaninglessness and freedom which 
society promises its members but does not provide...it violates the Enlightenment 
principle of universal functionalism, that is, the principle that everything must be useful 
for something, and that the meaningful and the functional are inherently connected” 
(302).  
26 See James McNaughton, ‘Beckett, German Fascism, and History: The Futility of 
Protest’, in Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd'hui 15, (2005), pp. 101-116.  
27 McNaughton, ‘Beckett, German Fascism…’, p. 101-102. 
28 McNaughton, ‘Beckett, German Fascism…’, p. 102.  
29 McNaughton, ‘Beckett, German Fascism…’, p. 105.  
30 McNaughton, ‘Beckett, German Fascism…’, p. 105.  
31 Adorno, Can One Live…, p. 428.  
32 McNaughton, ‘Becket, German Fascism…’, p. 107.  
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I am not interested in a 'unification' of the historical chaos any more than I am in 
the 'clarification' of the individual chaos, and still less in the 
anthropomorphisation of the inhuman necessities that provoke the chaos. What I 
want is the straws, flotsam, etc., names, dates, births and deaths […] I say the 
background and the causes are inhuman and incomprehensible machinery and 
venture to wonder what kind of appetite it is that can be appeased by the modern 
animism that consists in rationalising them...I say the expressions 'historical 
necessity’ and 'Germanic destiny' start the vomiting moving upwards.33  
Beckett declines to employ reason in order to justify the irrational; instead, he seeks to 
cut a path through irrationality in order to experience its contours. This method enables 
particularity, rather than universality, to speak. Beckett’s obsession with “flotsam” 
(literally, the sea-borne remnants of a shipwreck) indicates that, for him, subjectivity is 
mostly at the mercy of various currents that carry us far from our original intentions, and 
which often override our rationality, which remains a passive recipient of material; thus, 
rational reflection must not presume that it may transcend historical and social 
objectivity.34 The description of the historical situation as a shipwreck also implies that 
we cannot return to a single origin that might allow us to put the world back together 
again. As Adorno asserts,  
…it is idle and futile for thought to attempt now to appropriate metaphysics as a 
collection of pure categories that are immediate to consciousness, since 
knowledge can never disown its own mediatedness, or, in other words, its 
dependence on culture in every sense. Philosophy is itself a piece of culture, is 
enmeshed in culture; and if it behaves as if it were rendered immediate by some 
allegedly primal questions that elevate it above culture, it blinds itself to its own 
conditions and truly succumbs to its cultural conditionality; in other words, it 
becomes straightforward ideology. There is no knowledge that can repudiate its 
mediations; it can only reflect them.35  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 McNaughton, ‘Becket, German Fascism…’, p. 107.  
34 McNaughton, ‘Becket, German Fascism…’, p. 107.  
35 Adorno, Can One Live…, p. 453.  
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In order to develop Adorno’s argument that philosophical reflection is irreducibly 
mediated, I argue that Adorno’s aesthetic thought constitutes a critical reception of 
Kantian aesthetics. This specific argument grounds my broader claim in the thesis: that 
philosophical reflection must engage with artworks if it is to become aware of historical 
experience; and, that artworks require philosophical reflection if they are to become 
critically open to subjectivity.  
The question of precisely how Adorno inherits the tradition of German 
philosophy has been discussed in many different ways. For instance, Tom Huhn claims 
that Adorno and Kant both place utopian hope in aesthetic judgment: “Adorno is a 
faithful Kantian both in his elaboration of the subject of aesthetics and in the subjectivity 
he imagines is constituted by aesthetic judgment.... The most profound intimacy between 
Kant and Adorno's texts lies precisely in the inextinguishability of the aesthetic hope for 
reconciliation within human life.”36 While it is true that Kant and Adorno share a 
common belief in the power of reason, and in the force of critique, Adorno’s conception 
of reconciliation differs profoundly from Kant’s. This is the case for several reasons. 
First, Kant analyses the subject into a priori and empirical categories, which are never 
placed in their proper social-cultural context; unlike Hegel’s philosophical revolution, the 
Kantian subject is neither historical nor natural nor social. Second, Kant is highly 
uncritical towards the unethical social practices that defined the history of his own time. 
For example, discussions of trans-Atlantic slavery, or the exploitation of colonialist 
expansion, cannot be found in Kant’s political and historical writings. Indeed, for Kant, 
the transcendental subject is wholly autonomous from historical, natural, and social 
materiality—because, of course, the a priori subject itself provides the ground for the 
experience of such materiality. Such a rigid model of subject-object interaction has 
consequences for Kant’s aesthetic categories, which cannot fulfill the postulates of his 
critical philosophy while also providing a rich, complex experience of the aesthetic 
object. Finally, Kant fails to diagnose the social pathology that was already eroding 
society in the 1790s, and he fails to predict the destructive effects that the emancipation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Tom Huhn, ‘Adorno and Kant,’ in Michael Kelly (ed), The Encyclopedia of Aesthetics 
1 (2 vols, Oxford, 1998), pp. 29-32. 
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of the subject would have on material nature. These failures can be detected in Kant’s 
third Critique, and in Adorno’s amended categories in Aesthetic Theory.   
Adorno argues that reconciliation occurs when material nonidentity is allowed to 
finally be itself, and when the subject may receptively follow that material without trying 
to impose categories upon it; Kant argues that reconciliation occurs when the subject’s 
freedom is able to appear in aesthetic judgment (for instance, in the sublime, or in 
aesthetic ideas) as the opposite of natural determination. At the same time, Adorno 
recognizes that—after the trauma of modern history, from the massacres of Native 
Americans in the seventeenth century to the Nazi death camps in the twentieth—the 
European philosophical and aesthetic tradition cannot merely carry on as before: a serious 
and ground-shaking investigation into the complicity of culture with the horrors of 
history must take place. Adorno cannot inherit Kant’s concept of reason without 
repressing the violence of modern history. For this reason, Adorno’s dialectically 
critiques Kant’s concept of reason. In his lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 
Adorno remarks: “And I do indeed hold the view that the profundity of a philosophy can 
only be measured by the profundity of its errors—rather than by the smooth success of its 
harmonious conclusions.”37 Thus Adorno’s critical and negative remarks about Kant (and 
other thinkers, such as Hegel, Schelling, and Freud) must be taken in context. 
Harmonious conclusions often serve, for Adorno, to obscure contradictions in a work that 
should not be merely conjured away. Harmony is an attempt to guarantee a systematic 
method that only confronts objectivity indirectly, from above. Thus the possibility of 
error is necessary because it enables the subject to grasp, briefly, the difference between 
subjective concept and objective material, as Adorno observes in his lectures on 
‘Metaphysics.’38  
Albrecht Wellmer, in contrast to Huhn, maintains that Adorno cannot accept the 
Kantian Absolute:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Theodor W. Adorno, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Rolf Tiedemann (ed), Stanley 
Livingstone (trans), (Cambridge and Oxford, 2001), p. 219. 
38 Adorno, Can One Live…, pp. 466-467.  
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In contrast to Kant, for Adorno not only the representation and the cognition of 
the Absolute, but the mere thought of the Absolute has become problematical. 
Although Adorno follows Kant in maintaining that each thought, that the very 
idea of truth contains an unavoidable, if only oblique reference to the Absolute—
and therefore to the idea of reconciliation—at the same time he shows...that this 
unavoidable reference point of all thinking cannot itself be thought, that it defies 
the possibilities of conceptual articulation.39  
The Kantian Absolute would be the supersensible ground that both nature and freedom 
share. This ground is of course unknowable for Kant because it is inaccessible to 
empirical cognition; it is only thinkable through rational speculation. The concept of the 
Absolute has lost its authority for Adorno because the subject cannot posit a 
transcendental ground that remains independent of historical and social reality; any 
ground may only be reached through the historical mediations of that reality. Historical 
experience has altered the structure of reason, which means that freedom is limited by 
material reality. As a result, philosophical speculation cannot overlook history in an 
attempt to abstractly overcome materiality; rather, philosophy must reflect upon historical 
experience.  
 J. M. Bernstein asserts that Adorno reads Kant's aesthetic categories “as the 
historical categories of modern art” in an effort to “comprehend historically the aporia of 
Kantian aesthetics.”40 I argue a slightly different thesis: that Adorno interprets Kantian 
categories as unable to respond adequately to, or resist, instrumental reason, and that 
Adorno's critique of tradition involves the necessary transfiguration of conventional 
categories (the beautiful, the sublime, etc.) into new ones (aesthetic semblance, the 
shudder, etc.), in order to remain as close as possible to objective historical experience, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Albrecht Wellmer, ‘Adorno, Modernity, and the Sublime,’ in The Actuality of Adorno: 
Critical Essays on Adorno and the Postmodern, Max Pensky (ed), (Buffalo, 1997), p. 
113.  
40 J. M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and 
Adorno, (Oxford and Cambridge, 1992), p. 194.  
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and its possible redemption through nonidentity. I discuss Kant’s categories because they 
still appear—to many aestheticians, artists, and philosophers—as authoritative and 
timeless, and as grounded in transcendent reason. In order to perceive the historical 
experience that mediates and structures these aesthetic categories, this illusion of 
ahistorical transcendence must be shattered. As we come to know the ghostly afterlife of 
Kantian concepts, and the historical contexts that define modern experience, we will 
realize that philosophy must become aware of its own entanglement in historical 
materiality, and that art must reflect upon its implicit historical experience, if both 
practices are to dialectically present the truth and untruth of society and subjectivity. 
Hence Adorno attends to Kant not in order to resolve the “aporia” of the third Critique 
(as if problems might be identified and torn away from their historical and social 
context); rather, he aims to do justice to the way in which Kantian categories both gather 
and dissolve meaning over time.41 The categories' accrual and dissolution of meaning 
entails that their traditional names no longer apply to the experiences that correspond to 
them. 
 Peter Uwe Hohendahl claims that  
[f]or Adorno, the essential Kant is articulated in the First Critique. When it comes 
to aesthetic theory, Kant’s Critique of Judgment is recognized as an important 
text, but ultimately not as important as Hegel’s aesthetics. In other words, for 
Adorno’s own aesthetic theory the insights of Kant’s First Critique turn out to be 
more valuable and demanding than Kant’s discussion of the artwork. In the final 
analysis, Adorno fundamentally disagrees with Kant’s approach to art, which 
means that he can make only selective use of Kant’s Third Critique.42  
The problems with Hohendahl’s analysis are threefold. First, Hohendahl underestimates 
Adorno’s subtle and dialectical engagement with Kant’s Critique of Judgment. We can 
see Hegel’s presence in Adorno’s philosophy in several distinct moments: in Adorno’s 
hope that metaphysical speculation is possible; in his principle that the object expresses 	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42 Peter Uwe Hohendahl, The Fleeting Promise of Art: Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory 
Revisited (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), p. 35.  
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processes that constitute the subject; and in his method of immanent, as opposed to 
transcendent, critique. However, Adorno’s aesthetic categories, and the arguments 
delicately woven around them, are profoundly indebted to Kant—in ways that are often 
not immediately apparent or obvious. Adorno’s relation to tradition is determined by his 
ongoing reflection on the historical sedimentation that grounds experience. Thus, 
Adorno’s critique of Kant often occurs beneath the surface of his more explicit, 
exaggerated pronouncements or aphorisms. Second, Hohendahl assumes that Adorno 
cannot employ Kant’s aesthetics because he “fundamentally disagrees” with Kantian 
systematic philosophy.43 Hohendahl overlooks the fact that Adorno often engages with, 
and integrates into his writing, precisely those thinkers and artists with whom he violently 
disagrees—such is, after all, the nature of dialectical critique. Third, Hohendahl assumes, 
wrongly, that the first Critique is the ground for the third Critique—as if Kant’s thought 
proceeds in a linear or progressive fashion. On the contrary: from Adorno’s perspective, 
the Critique of Judgment repeats regressive tendencies that drive the Critique of Pure 
Reason but which are never made explicit. This is why Enlightenment cognition is 
mythical. Thus it is in the third Critique, and not the first, that we become aware of 
Kant’s unspoken historical ground.  
Adorno maintains: “What needs to be carried through is what in the theories of 
Kant and Hegel await redemption through second reflection. Terminating the tradition of 
philosophical aesthetics must amount to giving it its due.”44 Hope lies in the 
metamorphosis of the old into the new. The termination of the aesthetic tradition is not a 
violent gesture because the tradition has become ideological: Kantian aesthetic categories 
left untransformed are no longer normative for aesthetic experience. On the other hand, 
Kantian and Hegelian concepts may also be redeemed if they are critically reflected upon. 
That is, traditional concepts carry a certain potential that allows them to express modern 
experience if they are transformed through philosophical reflection. This transformation 
affects the meaning and significance that such concepts take in experience itself. In this 
thesis I seek to reflect on those concepts in Kant’s third Critique that require 
investigation—concepts that must be negated in their traditional form if they are to take 	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on animated and objective significance in late capitalist modernity. Hence what I propose 
is to critically rescue Kantian concepts through reflecting upon their appearance in 
Adorno’s aesthetics. In order to put to rest the traditional account of aesthetic experience, 
that account must be thoroughly interrogated. Through interrogation and critical 
examination, the traditional concepts may present truth content to the subject; in this way, 
they are redeemed, and become new.  
I focus on aesthetic experience because I believe that it may provide the most 
robust source of critique in modern society—one that allows subjects to experience, to 
imagine, and to reflect without coercive social influence.45 I focus on Kant's third 
Critique because certain commentators under-estimate Kant's influence on Adorno, and 
also because I find that some of the current literature on the relation between Adorno and 
Kant provides a misleading account of their relationship.46 For instance, some scholars 
assume that Adorno's main aesthetic debt is to Hegelian philosophy or Marxism, due to 
his use of the dialectical method, determinate negation, or materialist analysis; I seek to 
demonstrate that Adorno's turn towards aesthetics is also a turn back towards Kant, in 
order to critically examine his work.47 Hegel, Marx, Lukács, and Benjamin contributed 
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immeasurably to Adorno’s metaphysics, his theories of society and history, and his 
dialectical method; Kant, however, remains the ground of Adorno’s aesthetic thought.48  
My argument thus opposes various commentators, who claim that a) Adorno does 
not move beyond problems in Kant's philosophy (such as the concept of rationality);49 b) 
Adorno's conception of philosophical reflection is problematic and ill-conceived, and 
should be rejected;50 c) Adorno does, and should, allow reason priority in aesthetic 
experience;51 d) Adorno fails to properly reconcile philosophy and aesthetic experience, 
and hence critical reflection cannot fulfill the task that Adorno assigns to it (namely, to 
negate social untruth, and to indicate utopian possibilities embodied in art's semblance);52 
e) Adorno's engagement with Kant is destructive rather than productive;53 f) Kant's 
concept of aesthetic pleasure may be rescued; it is a way of reviving repressed aspects of 
experience, through which the subject relates to otherness;54 and g) Adorno's engagement 
with Kant is focused on the sublime (rather than the beautiful), and Adorno inherits 
solutions, and not problems, from Kant.55   
Another commentator, Raymond Geuss, argues that Adorno retains certain central 
elements of Kant’s aesthetics, namely his “commitment” to autonomy and to formalism.56 
Yet this account is too schematic. Geuss fails to detail the central differences between 	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Kant’s and Adorno’s concepts of autonomy, which we can only sketch here: for Kant, 
autonomy names the result of the subject’s spontaneity, and produces aesthetic judgment 
that aims to cleanse itself of material interest and sensuousness; for Adorno, autonomy is 
an aspect of the artwork that is subject to erosion as the work integrates historical and 
social material into itself. Further, Adorno argues that autonomy resists erosion through 
the work’s practice of determinate negation, or its capacity to critique social practices 
according to their own contradictions. In authentic works, immanent critique transforms 
social practices into aesthetic elements in the artwork. Moreover, Geuss’s assumption 
that Adorno is a formalist in the Kantian tradition reveals itself to be false when we 
realize that the artwork always dialectically weaves form and content: neither has 
relevance or significance without the other. 
 My aim in the thesis is to explore three main arguments. First, the logic behind 
Adorno’s argument that art requires philosophy, and that philosophy requires art, often 
appears obscure. I propose that historical experience provides the ground for Adorno’s 
proposition. Thus, I contend that historical experience, rather than epistemological or 
aesthetic considerations, lies at the forefront of Adorno’s reflections on art and culture. 
Second, I analyze Adorno’s concept of interpretation as a variety of metaphysical 
experience, thus resisting the dominant reading of it as a method of unlocking the 
artwork’s secrets, or as a subjective mode of comportment toward a passive and yielding 
object. The concept of interpretation must be considered as a way of gaining proximity to 
historical, social, and material experience—rather than a method of determining the 
artwork. Finally, I argue that many of the concepts in Aesthetic Theory owe their 
existence to Adorno’s struggle with Kantian categories. In this way I show precisely how 
the philosophical tradition appears in Adorno’s work, and I trace how Kant has 
influenced Adorno’s aesthetic thought, which had been unfairly neglected in secondary 
scholarship. I also show indirectly why Kant’s categories must be negated and 
transformed in order to correspond to modern aesthetic experience and aesthetic objects.  
 Now, let me put to rest various concerns about comparing the aesthetic categories 
of Adorno and Kant—who may appear to be wholly different philosophical animals. One 
might wonder how two philosophers who differ so substantially could be discussed at all 
in the same paragraph, never mind in the same thesis. Over 175 years separates the 
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publication of the Critique of Judgment from Aesthetic Theory. Kant practices 
transcendental idealism, which relies on reason to produce universally valid judgment; 
Adorno practices a version of dialectical materialism, which criticizes rationality for 
distorting nature’s particularity in the name of universally valid knowledge.57 How could 
we possibly decide that one philosopher has a better perspective than the other? Aren’t 
they simply espousing different conceptions of the world that are irreconcilable?  
 As it happens, Adorno and Kant are both working with the same material, and 
with mostly the same problems, and both are part of a single tradition. However, Adorno 
and Kant employ different methods because their historical situations are radically 
distinct. Kant argues that the freedom of subjectivity is vital because the French 
Revolution illuminated the possibilities of human autonomy and independence from mere 
nature or social convention. Adorno argues that aesthetics must dialectically mediate 
subject and object, because the traditional Enlightenment project lay in ruins by the mid-
twentieth century; however, Adorno maintains that Kant’s work may be redeemed 
through re-orienting traditional problems in a new light. For instance, regarding one of 
the central paradoxes in the Critique of Judgment, Adorno remarks: “Kant envisioned a 
subjectively mediated but objective aesthetics. The Kantian concept of the judgment of 
taste, by its subjectively directed query, concerns the core of objective aesthetics: the 
question of quality—good and bad, true and false—in the artwork.”58 In this manner the 
judgment of taste, which ostensibly measures subjective pleasure or displeasure, may be 
redefined as the capacity to perceive truth or falsity in the aesthetic object. Kant and 
Adorno both accept that reason is the most critical faculty in the subject; however, 
Adorno argues that reason is guilty of terrible crimes against nature, whereas Kant, 
partially because of his historical perspective, has faith that reason is able to heal all the 	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heteronomously and instrumentally determined by the needs of self-preservation”. See 
Owen Hulatt, Adorno’s Theory of Philosophical and Aesthetic Truth (New York, 2016), 
p. 8.  
58 AT p. 216.  
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wounds that it has inflicted. Adorno, emerging from the ruined tradition of German 
Enlightenment philosophy, perceives that the tradition cannot be restored to its original 
state (or rather, the ideal state that never arrived); nevertheless, the problems defined by 
that tradition have not disappeared. As a result, they must be re-articulated using different 
vocabulary, and according to distinct criteria.  
For instance, Kant’s description of the sublime might be formulated as a question: 
How is the subject to cognize experience that is incommensurate with all of her 
categories (which she assumed were universally valid)? Adorno’s answer might be 
something like the following: The subject must recognize that her cognition functions as 
a means of controlling the object, and is not merely a neutral process of cognition; thus, 
the experience of incommensurability might indicate to the subject that the object cannot 
be captured or appropriated without violence—violence that is turned against the subject 
in the experience of the sublime (or the shudder), when the object displays its own power 
of constitution. Adorno describes the truth content of the Kantian sublime as its 
presentation of the subject’s capacity to resist nature or convention through spirit 
(freedom).59 The dark side of this capacity, however, is that it very easily descends into 
the domination of subjectivity over objectivity. For this reason Kant’s definition of 
freedom ought to be amended to reflect the subject’s self-knowledge that nature is part of 
her self.  
Or, to take another example, Kant might describe his own ideal of disinterested 
contemplation as the ideal state of cognition without prejudice, and without undue 
influence from external processes that might contaminate autonomous judgment. Adorno 
might respond that, while cognition without prejudice is an admirable goal, it is 
impossible to realize without doing harm to the subject’s own internal processes (such as 
unconscious desires, wishes, biases, or natural inclinations that have hardened into 
convention). While these processes should not guide reflective thought, they must be 
engaged with rather than dismissed, because they constitute part of the subject’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 In his lectures on Aesthetics, Adorno remarks: “…it is an objective part of all beauty 
that we feel the happiness of beauty wherever we feel that, through the purpose of the 
spirit—even if we stay within a picture, within the realm of semblances—we are free, and 
stronger than the context of mere nature in which we are otherwise embedded.” See 
Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetics: 1958/59 (Cambridge and Medford, 2018), p. 29. 
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history—and the social context that forms subjectivity—and thus must be brought into 
the open in order to be philosophically examined. If Kantian interest is defined as natural 
influence or desire, and disinterest names the ideal of autonomy, then Adorno’s critique 
of Kant becomes clearer: “If the case of natural beauty were pending, dignity would be 
found culpable for having raised the human animal above the animal.”60 Thus Adorno 
reconfigures Kant’s concept of disinterest—which harms nature in the name of 
autonomous subjectivity—into the concept of natural beauty, which names the 
experience of contradiction (or nonidentity) between subject and object, and thus brings 
the subject to awareness of the object’s painful history of domination by subjectivity.  
This transformation is necessary because traditional categories are no longer self-evident 
or normative—they cannot guide subjectivity because they are part of the ideological 
collusion that harms objectivity. If the subject continues to uncritically employ concepts 
that perpetuate violence, she will continue to harm nature (both her own and that of 
objects); as a result, experience will become more abstract and lifeless. In the first line of 
Aesthetic Theory, Adorno declares: “It is self-evident that nothing concerning art is self-
evident anymore, not its inner life, not its relation to the whole, not even its right to 
exist.”61 This loss is caused by the fact that art, for Adorno, is inextricably bound up with 
rationality, which has been driven by the desire to preserve the self (rather than other 
goals such as the Aristotelian desire for knowledge or virtue).62 The desire for self-
preservation, in turn, has damaged the subject’s capacity for autonomy, freedom, 
judgment, and reason—precisely those categories that Kant assumes will procure 
enlightened moral action for as long as humans exercise rationality. Thus the subject 
must reflect on her historical experience: for instance, she must examine how self-
preservation appears across time, and become aware of nature’s expression of suffering, 
which appears mostly clearly in modern art. In his essay on Alban Berg, Adorno remarks: 
“However, at every one of its stages music suffers a loss at the hands of progress: the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 AT, p. 82.  
61 AT, p. 1.  
62 Art, however, must also express the materiality that grounds reason, as Adorno says in 
his Aesthetics lectures: “Art, then, cannot simply be subsumed under the concepts of 
reason or rationality but is, rather, this rationality itself, only in the form of its otherness, 
in the form—if you will—of a particular resistance against it.” See Adorno, Aesthetics, p. 
9.  
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increasing control of its material, the expression of the increasing manipulation of nature, 
always entails a certain violence.”63 For this reason, historical experience becomes an 
index of self-awareness, critical philosophical thought, and aesthetic receptivity.  
Thus those concepts that, in Kant, served to cover over the manipulative work of 
Enlightenment reason are rearranged, in Adorno, to reveal the power that circulates in 
apparently innocuous aesthetic categories. Adorno emphasizes that natural beauty has 
been formed by history: “But perhaps the most profound force of resistance stored in the 
cultural landscape is the expression of history that is compelling, aesthetically, because it 
is etched by the real suffering of the past.”64 This brings us back to the overarching 
narrative of the thesis: that art and philosophy require each other so that historical 
experience may attain awareness of itself, and may express suffering. Aesthetic and 
philosophical categories are validated and invalidated by history; we only discover their 
truth or falsity by measuring what they claim to be against what they actually are 
(according to their historical context), and by evaluating the historical experience that 
inheres within them. Thus Adorno tries to excavate the historical content of Kant’s 
categories in order to enable those categories to speak of their own experiences, and to 
immanently critique their own activity. As the sublime metamorphoses into the shudder, 
for instance, the category becomes aware of its own historical sediment; this awareness 
leads it to negate its traditional form, in order to articulate new content. In this manner 
tradition achieves a measure of redemption.   
Is Adorno himself affected by this dialectic? Will his categories transform 
themselves in the future in order to articulate experiences of which we, at the present, are 
unaware? Undoubtedly—no-one escapes history. But we cannot speculate on how 
experience will develop or regress. For the moment we must retain Adorno’s framework, 
because our experience remains that of a late modern subject: experience has been 
emptied of materiality, because objectivity is repressed by subjectivity. This is the same 
antinomy that occupies Kant in the Introduction to the third Critique. Kant asks: How 
might freedom become concrete? And, How can mere concretion attain universality? 
Adorno even uses Kantian language in order to diagnose social ills, as this passage from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Adorno, Can One Live…, p. 365. 
64 AT p. 85.  
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Minima Moralia makes clear: “For tenderness between people is nothing other than 
awareness of the possibility of relations without purpose, a solace still glimpsed by those 
embroiled in purposes; a legacy of old privileges promising a privilege-free condition.”65 
Adorno suggests that the utopian condition of purposiveness without purpose, or non-
instrumental thought and action, can only be negatively defined as the “awareness of the 
possibility” of human relationships that have not been corralled or distorted to serve an 
end that is external to the intrinsic value of those relationships themselves.66 In other 
words, consciousness of the lack of actuality is the only image of utopia that we may 
aspire to.  
 
An Outline of the Chapters 
Now I will briefly give a roadmap or an outline of the chapters, and the logic that binds 
them together.  
 Chapter One argues that the category of disinterested contemplation in Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment contributes to the repression of materiality, and nature, that 
produces the restricted, instrumental rationality that structures modern experience. I begin 
the thesis with this category in particular because it is among the most subject-oriented in 
all of Kant’s aesthetics. I also argue that Adorno’s category of natural beauty responds to 
the above Kantian category, but that disinterested contemplation ought to be reconfigured 
so that it may become radical and critical. In this way I argue that, when philosophy 
attends carefully to aesthetic experience, it also attends to the layers of tradition within 
such experience; and, that aesthetic experience (in this case, Kant’s) requires reflection 
on its own material conditions (history and nature) if it is to remain adequate to modern 
experience.  
 In Chapter Two, I argue that the Kantian sublime contains a redemptive moment 
within it—specifically poetic perception—that expresses a different manner of relating to 
nature. In addition, I claim that Adorno’s concept of the shudder, which responds to the 
sublime, may be considered Adorno’s concept of naturalized spontaneity—that is, 
nonviolent spontaneity that does not harm subjectivity or objectivity.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 MM, p. 41.  
66 MM, p. 41.  
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In Chapter Three, we will see that Adorno reconfigures the category of the genius 
into the concepts of expression and mimesis. Mimesis, while a necessary category, has its 
limitations: namely, it is unclear how it remains critical as well as emancipatory. 
Chapters Two and Three demonstrate that materiality is necessary for experience, and 
that philosophical reflection on artworks results in historical experience. For instance, 
Adorno’s reflection on Kant’s implicit theory of freedom expressed in the sublime results 
in his transformed concept of the shudder, which demonstrates why we require a new 
concept of freedom in late capitalist, or industrial, modernity.  
 In Chapter Four, we will explore Adorno’s concept of interpretation. This chapter 
argues that interpretation grapples with one of the most difficult problems in Adorno’s 
Aesthetic Theory: how art and philosophy relate to, and depend on, each other. I will 
argue that philosophy requires art because philosophy, if it is not to become abstracted 
from nature and materiality, requires history; and, that art requires philosophy in order to 
radicalize its own fossilized historical content, and to transform it into potentiality. 
Interpretation must be conceived of as a form of metaphysical experience, which is itself 
grounded in history, if interpretation is to relinquish its conventional definition as mere 
reflective judgment.  
 In Chapter Five, I turn to Max Ernst’s Natural History series, and Surrealism as a 
philosophical, political, and artistic current. We will see that Ernst’s techniques of 
frottage and grattage implicitly critique Adorno’s concept of technique as wholly rational, 
and that Surrealism also negates Critical Theory’s emphasis on reason as the only faculty 
capable of structuring aesthetic experience. Conversely, Critical Theory critically 
engages with Surrealism’s occasional abstract negation of history and material suffering. 
Thus this chapter contributes to the main argument that philosophy reaches history 
through art, and that art’s historical expression becomes radical through philosophical 
reflection. In other words: both extremes are required if experience is to be dialectical.  
 
Objections and Replies 
Now, consider an objection to my main argument. One might respond that to entangle, or 
confuse, philosophical reflection and historical experience is dangerous, because 
philosophy requires independence and autonomy from its object (for instance, society, 
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history, nature, art) if it is to remain critical and properly reflective. If philosophy’s 
validity remains conditional, one might object, then it is not actually philosophical 
reflection at all, because such reflection requires distance from its object if it is to remain 
neutral, and if philosophy is to retain its capacity to calmly assess, rather than to be 
overtaken by, reality. While I have sympathy with this objection—because philosophy 
must remain some distance from society in order not to become another commodity, or 
another functional instrument of pleasure or monetary gain—I think that it fails to 
consider how the relationship between subject and object ought to be modeled. Subjects 
should not consider themselves to actively constitute objects; rather, we must 
acknowledge that nature and reason, and history and reason, co-constitute one other. 
Further, those philosophers who assumed that they were neutrally assessing reality often 
turn out to be, on the contrary, guilty of violently deforming its most intricate features. 
Descartes and Bacon are among the most culpable in this respect. As we will see, 
Adorno’s practice of historical negation is a method of reflective evaluation that remains 
within the circle of the object, so to speak, while also critically engaging with it. Finally, 
without historical experience, philosophical reflection remains empty and abstract from 
its end—namely, to critically reflect upon individual experience, to investigate and 
advance natural-historical life, and to reflect upon the unrealized possibilities within 
history. If history composes the subject’s experience, it must also compose the subject’s 
reflection on her experience, because reason is intertwined with the other faculties. When 
reason becomes reified, the destruction of experience begins.  
Let me answer another possible objection to my main argument. One might argue 
that I am trying to redeem or ‘cannibalize’ any and all traditional or conventional 
material—and therefore am constructing a positive and teleological model of historical 
development. On the contrary: I am not arguing that every aspect of the past can and 
should be transformed into a new form. There are some ideas that cannot be redeemed—
such as Francis Bacon’s implicit assumption that nature exists only to serve human 
ends.67 In addition, even after traditional ideas have been dialectically transformed, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 André Krebber, ‘Anthropocentrism and Reason in Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
Environmental Crisis and Animal Subject’, Anthropocentrism, in Human-Animal Studies 
(2011), p. 330: “Enlightened perception ossified the manifoldness or multiplicity of the 
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does not guarantee philosophical, artistic, cognitive, or moral progress. That would be an 
unjustifiably Idealist principle. Rather, we can only transform those ideas that adequately 
fit into modern experience and historical-social reality. Adorno’s concepts do not 
progress or advance our knowledge compared to Kant’s concepts; rather, the former 
concepts align more closely with the reality of modern society, and the damaged 
individual’s life, than the latter concepts are able to, due to historical suffering.  
One might also wonder why I focus on the Holocaust as opposed to other crimes 
that might appear equally catastrophic, and which have arguably also affected modern 
consciousness. For instance, the massacres of Native Americans by Europeans in the 17th 
Century, or the horrors of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, or the First World War, or the 
contemporary ecological catastrophe, in which countless animals are becoming extinct, 
are all wholly unethical and horrific. It is true that there are many heinous crimes that 
demonstrate subjectivity’s degeneration due to its extreme rationalism. In this thesis I 
focus on the Holocaust because it provides the most extreme evidence in the twentieth 
century of the twisted and regressive manifestation of reason’s barbaric comportment. In 
addition, due to space, I cannot analyze all of the massacres that resulted from modern 
instrumental logic. The Holocaust, in brief, resulted from Enlightenment methods and 
rational procedures—not from the animal instincts in humankind, but rather from our 
highly developed and refined capacity to analyze and compartmentalize nature. Zygmunt 
Bauman argues: “The most shattering of lessons deriving from the analysis of the 
‘twisted road to Auschwitz’ is that—in the last resort—the choice of physical 
extermination as the right means to the task of Entfernung was a product of routine 
bureaucratic procedures: means-ends calculus, budget balancing, universal rule 
application.”68  
The Holocaust was not a deviation from the Enlightened, scientific quest to seek 
out the most efficient method of categorizing nature—and to crush apparently irrational 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
world and the differences of objects in a complementary dichotomy of humans versus 
nature that turned nature into ‘mere objectivity’.” Krebber continues: “The ‘rabbit 
suffering the torment of the laboratory is seen not as a representative [of its species] but, 
mistakenly, as a mere example.’ It is not recognised as an individual that shares certain 
commonalities with other individuals of its species, but only consists of the 
commonalities of its species. This rabbit is stripped of its individuality.”  
68 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge and Oxford: 1989), p. 17.  
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mythology. Rather, those principles that resulted from the Enlightenment, and which 
Kant often extolls, such as equality, universal rationality, the progressive mastery of 
nature, disinterested contemplation, disenchanted scientific systematization, and the 
fraternity of humankind, contributed directly to the brutal violence that was the 
Holocaust. Bauman argues: “At no point of its long and tortuous execution did the 
Holocaust come into conflict with the principles of rationality. The ‘Final Solution’ did 
not clash at any stage with the rational pursuit of efficient, optimal goal-implementation. 
On the contrary, it arose out of a genuinely rational concern, and it was generated by 
bureaucracy true to its form and purpose.”69 Bauman goes on to remark that there are 
many “massacres…[and] mass murders” that have been committed without “modern 
bureaucracy” or the scientific reason characteristic of the Enlightenment.70 However, he 
continues, “[t]he Holocaust…was clearly unthinkable without such bureaucracy. The 
Holocaust was not an irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully-eradicated residues of pre-
modern barbarity.”71 On the contrary: it resulted from those rational procedures and 
methods that developed in the Enlightenment period and that characterize modern 
scientific method, and which Kant employs throughout his transcendental idealism.72 The 
Holocaust, for Bauman, is a thoroughly modern phenomenon.73 We can now see more 
clearly why Adorno calls for a full investigation into the irrationality of reason itself, and 
why Kant’s transcendental philosophy—and its principles of universality and necessity—
should not be considered normative for modern aesthetics.  
Finally, some Kant scholars will accuse Adorno of doing harm to the immutable 
concepts and structures that compose Kantian aesthetics. First, such a charge 
underestimates the strength of Kant’s original categories. In addition, Adorno’s 
dialectical method, which he inherits from Hegel, does not throw away the negated 
patterns of knowing; instead, they are employed to attain a higher, more accurate, concept 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Bauman, Modernity…, p. 17.  
70 Bauman, Modernity…, p. 17.  
71 Bauman, Modernity…, p. 17.  
72 Bauman, Modernity…, p. 17. 
73 Bauman, Modernity…, p. 17.  
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of truth.74 More importantly, every philosopher’s work contains tendencies that may 
remain latent or unconscious, but which have the power to be reinvented, or to reappear 
in a new form, at a later historical period. To deny this is to forget not only that ideas are 
shaped by history, but also that certain ideas only come into their own because of a 
certain historical necessity, and that ideas may be disproven by the demands of the 
future—in addition to the past. To this extent, no philosopher may fully unravel the 
potentialities of their own work; that task falls to later scholars. Thus the future is 
implicitly, and negatively, present in every work of philosophy and art—even the most 
traditional. Adorno reflects, in his Aesthetics lectures, that  
…the most staggering thing about Kantian philosophy—if one is truly able to read 
it as expression, not merely as epistemology—is how, with Kant in particular, the 
power of the idea itself always extends, almost independently of the contingent 
nature of his person and even his specific experience, to all sorts of things which, 
if you will, he did not actually ‘know’ in that sense—in other words, how far 
Kant’s knowledge actually extended beyond his own knowledge. That, one could 
say, is virtually the proof of Kant’s genius….75  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Michael Forster, ‘Hegel's Dialectical Method’, in Frederick Beiser (ed), The 
Cambridge Companion to Hegel (Cambridge, 1993), p. 137. Forster describes the 
Hegelian ascension to a transcendent standpoint with the metaphor of climbing a ladder 
(137). Each non-Hegelian viewpoint (that is, each pattern of knowledge that contains 
contradictions that require resolution) is a rung on a ladder (137). The ladder may be 
ascended only through going through all of the different patterns of knowledge until the 
last pattern is reached, which does not contain any contradictions (137). Forster calls this 
“the stable, self-consistent viewpoint of the Hegelian system” (137).   
75 Adorno, Aesthetics, p. 16.  
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Chapter One: Kant’s Disinterested Contemplation and Adorno’s Natural Beauty 
Section One: Kantian Disinterested Contemplation 
 
In this chapter I argue that Kant’s concept of disinterested contemplation is inadequate 
because it is unable to express the historical suffering of nature, and because it represses 
the object’s materiality (Section One). I also argue that Adorno’s concept of natural 
beauty ought to be considered a response to Kant’s concept of disinterested 
contemplation, and, finally, that Adorno must ground the aesthetic concept of natural 
beauty in a concept of temporality (Section Two). Such temporality would be a mode of 
aesthetic experience that allows natural beauty to both critically reflect on the past—on 
the suffering and violence that historical experience expresses—and also to anticipate a 
future in which such suffering and violence do not exist, and in which difference is 
embraced rather than erased or transcended in an abstract manner. The repression of 
nature results in a forgetting of the past; it is an attempt to cover over the subject’s 
historical ground. Repression of desire results in a forgetting of the future: the subject is 
unable to imagine another world, and utopian longing is silenced.  
I call the new form of temporality that would engage properly with past and future 
metamorphic. This latter temporality appears in those objects of natural beauty that both 
call forth the suffering of history while also indicating, negatively, the promise of 
embracing nonidentity. Thus it allows the object to both embody the contradictions of the 
past through remembrance while also becoming other than itself and indicating, 
negatively, another, unknown future, that remains a placeholder for possibility and 
potentiality. Metamorphic time thus involves recollection and speculation that 
dialectically refer to each other. Such temporality challenges the subject to viscerally 
experience historical suffering, and also to imagine that another, future, society may 
overcome the contradictions that produce that suffering. When nonidentity is embraced 
rather than excluded, the subject’s experience becomes a field of tension between the past 
and the future—or materiality and possibility. The dynamic tension of metamorphic 
temporality is necessary to critique, and move beyond, the abstract and static nature of 
disinterested contemplation, as Kant conceives of it, and to suggest another mode of 
experiencing natural beauty—one that is responsive to the experience of modernity.  
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 I begin with Kant’s concept of disinterested contemplation because it anticipates 
several other issues that I will discuss in later chapters: the question of the relation of 
nature and freedom; the repression of nature in aesthetic theory, and in the subject’s 
experience generally; the question of whether aesthetic experience is static or dynamic; 
the relation of subject to object in aesthetic experience; and the precise nature of the 
queer tension that characterizes the aesthetic object. The chapter proceeds in several 
steps: first, I discuss Kant’s concept of disinterested contemplation, and the various 
reasons why it is not a valid aesthetic category in modernity; second, I discuss Adorno’s 
concept of natural beauty, and the reasons why Adorno’s aesthetics requires a theory of 
time; third, I discuss the theory of metamorphic time itself.  
 
Kantian Disinterested Contemplation 
Kant argues that disinterested contemplation is necessary in order to ground aesthetic 
judgment’s autonomy and purity, which occurs through the exclusion of sensation and 
desire. The exclusion of sensation and desire ensures that aesthetic judgment retains its 
strictly transcendental nature, which is based in the conditions of possibility for 
experience rather than empirical factors that would compromise such judgment’s 
autonomy. While disinterested contemplation may never be conclusively identified 
through introspection—since, according to some commentators, it remains a regulative 
idea rather than a constitutive mental state—it nevertheless foregrounds the ideal of a 
judgment that is stripped of materiality, that grounds itself in the present rather than the 
past or the future, and that only acknowledges the object to the extent that the latter 
reflects the subject’s abstract categories, which Kant argues are universal and necessary.  
 Kant maintains that disinterested contemplation is a regulative ideal in which 
morality, sensation, and desire are absent from aesthetic judgment. This is necessary, 
according to Kant, because aesthetic judgment cannot be dependent upon concepts (such 
as good or evil) or sensation (that is, materiality that could influence the subject’s will). 
Disinterested contemplation instead grounds itself in the subject’s judgment that has been 
cleansed of contaminating interests; this procedure ensures that she will be uncorrupted 
by external influences that might otherwise prejudice her. Interest is associated with 
fluidity, becoming, the threatening heteronomy of nature and sensation, and the 
	   39	  
breakdown of autonomous, unified and rational experience. For Kant, aesthetic judgment 
must be a priori—that is, grounded in the subject’s faculties (imagination and 
understanding) rather than the object’s fluctuating and transient nature. Kant, with his 
principle of disinterested contemplation, hopes to exclude materiality (that is, natural 
instinct, historical experience, and imaginative desire) and well as rationality (moral 
judgment and theoretical philosophical reflection) from aesthetic judgment, in order to 
insist upon its a priori nature—its freedom from external ends of any kind. Yet this 
procedure contradicts Kant’s other aim in the third Critique: to allow the subject 
transparent self-knowledge about her own nature, goals, hopes, and purposes, and to 
allow her the freedom to reflect upon, and transform, those hopes and purposes.  
Disinterested contemplation thus indirectly represses nature and history—or the 
subject’s memory of past suffering—as well as desire, which may motivate her, if 
mediated through philosophical reflection, to imagine a future in which subjects are 
capable of embracing difference or otherness, rather than fleeing it. In this way, 
disinterested contemplation attempts to erase both the past and the future from 
experience, and to preserve an eternal present that forces the subject to adopt a static and 
unchanging identity. The past, which appears to the subject as memory, acts to remind 
the subject of her nonidentity with her ideal self (for Kant, a unified totality which 
legislates to materiality or nature); further, the future appears to the subject through her 
desire, which presents an image of otherness mediated by materiality and reflection. 
When past and future are repressed in experience, the subject is forced to adopt a 
coercive stance towards her own internal composition—those needs, desires, memories, 
and hopes that constitute her capacity to experience and reflect must be placed under 
erasure.  
The result of this erasure in experience, effected by disinterested contemplation, is 
that the subject’s self-knowledge is compromised: if materiality cannot express itself, and 
if imaginative desire is cancelled, then the subject is unable to critically reflect upon her 
own experience. Moreover, she is unable to use that experience—specifically, knowledge 
of her own ideological inheritance, the memory of suffering that she has been taught to 
repress, and the desires that would provide an image of otherness—to construct a new 
relationship to materiality, history, and society. The subject may only overcome the 
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instrumentality of reason if she develops a new relationship with the past. We may define 
instrumental reason as the irrational use of reason as a tool that blindly posits, and 
achieves, certain arbitrary ends without actively reflecting upon the meaning (moral, 
philosophical, or aesthetic) of those ends, and the consequences that may attend them. In 
addition, the subject may only relate to the future if she does not repress, or forget, that 
her experience is irreducibly material; and that her desire for otherness may only be truly 
free if she is unafraid to reflect upon her own natural history—that is, the dialectical 
intertwining of reason and suffering that forms her complex experience.  
Kant’s ideal of disinterested contemplation demonstrates that he wishes to 
construct an aesthetic subject that is isolated from materiality and from speculation—that 
is, from historical and natural experience, from philosophical reflection, and imaginative 
longing. Kant’s goal is to allow the subject to feel the pleasure that results from her 
faculties’ balanced interaction in reflective judgment: the free play between imagination 
and understanding.76 Such play forces the subject to attend to her own faculties, while 
excluding the object, and the layers of sedimentation that compose it.77 As a result of free 
play, the subject herself is in danger of becoming alienated from her own historical and 
natural composition. If the object is stripped of materiality, then the former will remain a 
mere signifier that does not express its actual content (historical and natural experience); 
if the subject forgets that her reason is grounded in material conditions, then she will risk 
mistaking the formal and abstract signifiers of experience (for instance, the subject’s 
feeling of pleasure, or the play of imagination and understanding, or aesthetic ideas, 
discussed later in the thesis) for concrete, rich, and complex experience itself, which 
follows the object’s contours, and which refuses any final or totalizing synthesis. For 
Adorno, the synthetic result, as an undifferentiated totality, always remains abstract from 
the concrete and diverse particularity that it unifies, because any synthesis represses 
difference in order to attain identity, and because the divergent nature of that which is 
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77 CJ, Section 9, Ak. 218, p. 63: “…apart from a reference to the subject’s feeling, beauty 
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collected together is necessarily erased.78 The goal of the synthetic procedure—unity 
rather than multiplicity—implicitly elides diverse particularity in favor of a unified 
totality.  
For Kant, aesthetic feeling is purely subjective; it is not dependent on any feature 
or quality that the object presents.79 The subjectivity of aesthetic feeling confirms the 
autonomy of aesthetic judgment for Kant, but it also, according to Adorno, condemns 
such judgment as empty, abstract, and formal. Aesthetic judgment that is guided by the 
object immerses itself in historical and material experience; thus, it has a crucial 
advantage over judgment that remains merely subjective: the former variety of aesthetic 
judgment does not repress the object’s materiality, and so does justice to the materiality 
within the subject as well. Thus judgment that is attentive to the object demonstrates how 
a non-repressive, nonviolent, and utopian relationship between subject and object might 
unfold. Instead of mirroring the coercive relationship of determination between subject 
and object that characterizes Kantian determinative judgment, in which the object only 
attains value for epistemic cognition when it conforms to the subject’s empirical concepts 
and her logical categories, in mimetic aesthetic judgment, the object presents its features 
to the passive yet critical subject, who follows the materiality in the object without 
seeking to define it in the terms given by forms, concepts, and categories.  
For Kant, sensation involves empirical and material content, which the object 
imparts to the subject. Feeling is purely subjective; it arises when the subject’s 
faculties—imagination and understanding—freely play with each other. Thus feeling is 
not dependent on empirical causality; it is caused by the subject’s own faculties. 
Although an empirical object may occasion the judgment of taste, aesthetic judgment 
itself is independent of the sensation given directly by the object, because such judgment 
necessarily relates to aesthetic feeling, not sensation, which must be mediated if it is to 
become objective. Kant divorces subjective feeling from empirical content in order to 
preserve the a priori (universal and necessary) nature of the judgment of taste. From 
Kant’s perspective, such an a priori ground preserves the subject’s legislative validity, 	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Critique…, p. 196.  
79 CJ, Section 9, Ak. 218, p. 62.  
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and ensures that the judgment of taste avoids degenerating into mere contingency, which 
would void aesthetic judgment as mere personal opinion. However, in modernity, which 
is characterized by instrumental rationality, it is dangerous to evacuate materiality from 
experience entirely in order to preserve the subject’s law-giving capacity—and to ensure 
that the object remains a passive and willing recipient of subjective laws, principles, and 
categories. Such a strict divide between the capacities of the subject and that of the object 
lends itself to excluding materiality from the subject entirely, and from denying that 
objects (construed broadly, as nature, the historical experience within subjectivity, 
artworks, non-human animal sensation and instinct, and the psychological unconscious) 
have agency and spontaneity.  
Kant writes that “a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment and so is not a 
logical judgment but an aesthetic one, by which we mean a judgment whose determining 
basis cannot be other than subjective.”80 Kant excludes sensation from aesthetic judgment 
in order to retain the subject’s authority to determine and mediate that sensation from an 
external standpoint. If the subject contains sensation or materiality within herself, from 
Kant’s perspective, she would risk becoming determined or driven by that materiality 
rather than being able to direct or mediate it on her own terms. Of course, such 
spontaneous directionality that originates in materiality or objectivity, and which 
mediates the subject, is precisely what Adorno values, because it allows the subject to 
engage with difference or otherness without imposing her own logical categories upon it. 
Kant’s transcendental idealism necessarily aims to uncover invariant, yet fundamentally 
static, structures in experience. This principle is problematic for Adorno because it 
disregards the social and historical forces that affect the subject’s experience, and which 
circulate in apparently wholly subjective feeling and cognition.  
In the third Critique, Kant defines interest as “the liking we connect with the 
presentation of an object’s existence.”81 Liking involves desire, which originates in the 
subject’s natural and historical sedimentation, and which is thus grounded in 
heteronomous objectivity rather than purely subjective feeling. Such desire, according to 
Kant, cannot be admitted into aesthetic judgment, because doing so would automatically 	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compromise the a priori status that such judgment must have if it is to be examined 
through transcendental critique. Disinterested contemplation must contain no reference to 
an object’s empirical causality, which affects the subject contingently, through sensation; 
thus it excludes subjective inclinations, desires, fears, hopes, or any other psychological 
or somatic phenomena that could corrupt aesthetic autonomy. For Kant, a subject 
experiences interest either when sensations, given by an object, influence the subject (the 
agreeable), or when an object is connected with a purpose (or empirical concept, such as 
the morally good).82 Judgments that involve subjective desire are called agreeable: 
“Hence such a liking always refers at once to our power of desire [reason], either as the 
basis that determines it, or at any rate as necessarily connected with that determining 
basis.”83 Note that Kant assumes that interest refers to reason—he denies that reason is 
itself composed of interests, desires, or sensations. Interest, then, remains separate from 
judgment, because the former dictates the subject’s desires, and so is based on either 
concepts or sensations, but not feeling.  
Now we can begin to see why disinterested contemplation remains inadequate for 
the modern subject’s aesthetic experience. Kant’s concept results in repression because it 
subtracts from experience those elements of the object that express desire, somatic 
experience, moral judgment, and historical and natural sedimentation.84 Thus it results in 
a circumscribed picture of the object, because it only accepts those features of the object 
that accord or conform to the subject’s experience. An object of natural beauty that 
triggered the subject’s desire would not be allowed into aesthetic judgment, for Kant, 
because it would compromise the subject’s capacity to feel the pleasure generated by her 	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84 For an alternative view of Adorno’s relation to disinterested contemplation, see Tracey 
Stark’s article. She remarks: “What Adorno finds most appealing about Kant’s aesthetics 
is that it insists upon reflective judgment…in reflective judgment the universal arises out 
of the particulars. Art, when it gets to this universal moment, tells the truth about 
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retrieve the particularity in experience, instead of transcending such particularity through 
searching for universality. Further, reflective judgment remains idealistic because in the 
end it contributes to Kant’s desire to construct a coherent philosophical system. See 
Tracey Stark, ‘The Dignity of the Particular: Adorno on Kant’s Aesthetics’, Philosophy 
and Social Criticism, 24 (1998), pp. 61-83. See p. 62 for above quote.   
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faculties (imagination and understanding), and would thereby militate against the 
autonomy of aesthetic judgment. The object’s natural and historical sedimentation would 
on Kant’s account damage such judgment, because it introduces layers of content that do 
not originate within the subject’s faculties, or her feeling. Thus such sedimentation is 
implicitly heterogeneous, and any empirical content introduced entails the contingency of 
aesthetic judgment, which undercuts its transcendental status. The transcendental 
requirement of aesthetic judgment entails that the aesthetic object—whether natural or 
artistic—cannot express its own layers of historical and natural experience, because doing 
so would have a deleterious effect on the subject’s agency, which is unable to embrace 
empirical contingency without mediating it through a priori structures. The object that is 
unable to express its own layers of material content—and that cannot register historical 
experience, and the utopian desires that arise from such experience—is cut off from its 
own history, and from its grounding in empirical nature, which are both dismissed as 
merely contingent.  
The subject is also damaged by disinterested contemplation, which elides the 
historical and natural elements within experience. Thus disinterested contemplation 
constructs a severely limited picture of the human subject. For instance, the subject’s 
utopian desire for a future that would be radically other, which must arise from the 
untruth or ideology that characterizes the empirical world, has no place in aesthetic 
experience on Kant’s account, because it necessarily proceeds from empirical rather than 
subjective experience. In addition, the memory of past suffering, which historical 
experience expresses, cannot enter into aesthetic judgment for Kant, because such history 
transgresses against the principle that only subjective feeling may motivate aesthetic 
judgment. Thus two crucial sources of modern art’s critical and radical capacity for 
enlightenment are automatically discounted from Kant’s account of aesthetic experience. 
This elision ought to trouble those modern subjects who feel alienated and constricted by 
society, in which we participate, and by history, which we all inherit. The best way to 
ensure that aesthetic experience remains resolutely open to otherness and nonidentity is to 
embrace those aspects that appear to be the most difficult to formally integrate into 
subjectivity. Kant’s solution, which attempts to exclude and erase materiality, fails, 
because it damages subjectivity. Kant might respond that the subtraction necessary for 
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disinterest is in fact nonviolent, because its end is the subject’s autonomy, which is 
necessary for moral agency. However, the total exclusion of all material elements in the 
object results in the impoverishment of the subject’s experience, because subject and 
object are dialectically related. Kant makes clear that material elements should not enter 
into disinterested judgment at all.85 This principle entails that, in aesthetic experience, the 
subject’s own nature, history, and materiality are erased. Such erasure harms the subject, 
because she must deny her own history in order to be considered transcendental. Further, 
erasing materiality means that the subject’s presentation of objectivity is distorted: she 
perceives an illusory image of the object rather than its full material concretion.  
Disinterested contemplation is also inadequate in modernity for another reason. 
Since aesthetic judgment ought to express otherness or difference in order to open the 
subject to her own repressed experience, such judgment must actively embrace 
materiality, rather than excluding it. If the subject relies on feeling that is apparently 
subjective and formal for aesthetic judgment, she will miss the complex layers of 
sediment that characterize the object, as well as her own experience. Ross Wilson writes: 
“What is crucial in Adorno’s reception of Kant’s aesthetics is recognizing the 
significance of subjective aesthetic experience for any attempt to come to terms with 
aesthetic objects.”86 While I agree with Wilson that subject and object are dialectically 
related in aesthetic experience, it is important to note that Adorno’s conception of 
subjectivity differs substantively from Kant’s. For Adorno, the subject must not 
determine the object according to her own formal categories; rather, she must recognize 
the object’s materiality. Without materiality, objects cannot express their own social-
historical context, and many elements—such as historical experience, natural and somatic 
experience, and qualitative particularity—that inhere within the subject are marginalized. 
It is necessary to express historical, social, and natural experience because it remains the 
ground of subjectivity; without knowledge of its own ground, subjectivity cannot reflect 
upon its own experience. In addition, it is unethical to ignore the suffering of history, 
which appears most viscerally and powerfully in modern artworks. The artwork and the 	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object of natural beauty do not primarily reflect the subject’s categories; rather, they 
express their own layers of content, acquired through history. Kant’s principle that 
aesthetic experience involves subjective feeling rather than objective material suggests 
that subjectivity has no need of empirical content, and that objectivity primarily receives, 
rather than spontaneously structures, subjective laws, forms, and categories.87 For 
Adorno, the dialectic of subject and object entails that subjectivity is constituted by 
materiality, and that objectivity expresses its own agency.  
 Kant’s argument that sensation ought to be excluded from aesthetic judgment 
rests on an assumption that sensation is simply a passive aspect of nature which lacks 
spontaneity, and which lacks the capacity to become radically other, or to negatively 
indicate possibility. This assumption probably derives from the Enlightenment attitude 
towards animals and non-human nature in general, which regards both as mechanical, 
lifeless, and meaningless—unless human agency employs them for some useful purpose 
or end. For Adorno, this model is guilty of assuming that natural matter passively shapes 
itself to whatever form or logic the human subject imposes upon it, regardless of the 
direction or potentiality contained in the natural object itself. Nature is not simply passive 
until the subject decides to act upon it; instead, nature—both within the subject and 
outside it—has its own agency. For example, there is overwhelming evidence that 
animals experience complex emotions, can intelligently use language, feel pain, and 
mourn their dead, in nearly the same manner of human subjects.88 Additionally, thought 
without emotion or sensation would only refer to itself, and thus would be without 
content, for Adorno.89 We can see this dialectic between subjectivity and objectivity from 
two different directions: it is present whenever somatic desires or needs act upon, and 
transform, emotions, thoughts, and the capacity to reflect; and, conversely, whenever the 
capacity to reflect acts upon, and transforms, those desires and needs that are 	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marginalized as merely natural or historical, and therefore as worthless in epistemic, 
moral, or aesthetic terms. The dialectic demonstrates that subjectivity is not wholly 
spontaneous, because the subject’s agency always interacts with, and is constrained by, 
natural, social, historical, and cultural forces that she cannot control. The sphere of 
aesthetics is not wholly autonomous from these material forces, because artistic language 
and technique are entwined with tradition and convention—that is, the entire artistic past, 
which is present in society’s collective memory.90  
 Kant also maintains that cognition ought to be excluded from the judgment of 
taste because the criteria for the latter should have nothing to do with whether or not an 
object conforms to its theoretical concept.91 While it may be true that theoretical 
cognition should remain independent from the judgment of taste, because the latter 
occurs through procedures that differ fundamentally from the epistemic process of 
applying a universal to a particular, Kant’s principle that the domain of aesthetic 
judgment is primarily the experience of aesthetic feeling rather than aesthetic thought, or 
at least philosophical experience of some kind, has had serious effects for the definition 
of aesthetic experience in the post-Kantian tradition. The restriction of the end of 
aesthetic judgment as the feeling of pleasure or displeasure excludes philosophical 
reflection from aesthetic judgment—and defines aesthetics as the forgetting of historical 
and natural experience, since both of the latter modes require philosophical reflection if 
they are to become critical, and if they are to intensify the subject’s experience of 
objectivity. Some Kant scholars might argue that aesthetic ideas implicitly ignite 
philosophical thought.92 Yet, as we will see later, aesthetic ideas are divorced from their 
historical-social context, and are produced by reason alone; as a result, they are separate 
from material and concrete empirical reality. Aesthetic ideas are not subject to the 
transformative shifts effected by history; as such, they remain abstract signifiers, for 
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Kant, of reason’s speculative capacity; thus, reason may only achieve metaphysical 
experience in the realm of ideas—not in the realm of materiality.  
 It is also important to consider that reflective judgment, which Kant claims is non-
subsumptive, proceeds from particularity to universality. Even in aesthetic reflective 
judgment, which of course does not classify aesthetic objects beneath concepts or logical 
categories, the subject still aims to pacify objectivity beneath the condition of epistemic 
universality—namely, the free play of imagination and understanding, which is the 
condition of epistemic cognition, and which produces the feeling of pleasure.93 Thus 
aesthetic reflective judgment still attempts to subtract materiality from experience. This is 
evident in the subject’s avoidance of actively immersing herself in materiality (sensation, 
nature, and history), which might contaminate the a priori nature of aesthetic judgment, 
and in the definition of aesthetic feeling as purely subjective. Reflective judgment’s goal 
is to fold particulars into the subject’s system of experience, in order to ensure that they 
have transcendental, and not merely empirical, significance. Thus such judgment cannot 
explore the empirical or material significance of particulars, which is expressed in their 
natural, historical, social, and moral weight. Certain Kant scholars also claim that 
reflective judgment is open-ended; yet, this condition disappears in Kant’s description of 
the judgment of taste as a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Aesthetic reflective 
judgment is not wholly exploratory or allowed to tarry with its object in an open-ended 
manner, because it is bound by Kant’s principle of disinterestedness, which preserves the 
transcendental conditions of such judgment at the cost of losing its grounding in the past 
(historical and natural experience) and the future (material desire). Thus the subject has 
the illusion that she exists in an eternal present.  
 For Adorno, subjects lack the capacity to experience particularity in modern 
times—and they lack even the capacity to reflect upon their own absence of experience. 
Experience has been destroyed because of three main events: the repetitive and deadening 
nature of capitalist-industrial modernity; the avoidance of materiality that occurs in 
philosophical Idealism; and the catastrophic instrumentality and objectification that the 
Holocaust, as well as other atrocities in the Enlightenment period, presents. These 
lacunae in modern subjectivity means that, in aesthetic experience, subjects must actively 	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interpret and decipher their own lack of experience—as it is presented and configured 
and in artworks. Subjects’ experience is presented to them indirectly in artworks, which 
express historical and social truth that would otherwise remain forgotten. Thus subjects 
require philosophical reflection so that they may apprehend—through a form of critical 
experience that is mediated in thought but not dominated by reason—nonidentity, or 
subjectivity’s failure to fully comprehend objectivity. Artworks cannot be grasped using 
perception or intuition alone, as phenomenology hopes; nor can their meaning be 
deduced through symbolic interpretation, as hermeneutics avers.94  
In conclusion, subject and object exist on a continuum; they are not strictly 
divorced from one another. Although subject and object have been separated 
historically—in capitalism, and in Idealist philosophical theory, for instance—there is 
always a fluid dialectic between them in experience. The doctrine of disinterested 
contemplation teaches that it is possible to produce autonomous judgment that is wholly 
divested of its grounding in materiality, nature, and history. In order to overcome the 
difficulties that plague Kant’s concept, it is necessary to develop another concept: that of 
interested judgment that is mediated by reflection. If the subject is to attain self-
knowledge, to understand the past that lies in objects, and to imagine another future, then 
she cannot forget that materiality grounds experience. In other words, objectivity 
composes subjectivity—nature and history cannot be separated in experience. It is 
impossible to wholly extirpate interests (desires, irrational biases, natural instincts, 
inclinations, hopes, fears, etc.) from subjectivity. Thus the subject would do better to 
reflect upon her own interests rather than eradicating them. When interest disappears 
from experience, the subject loses its unique perspective: its concrete and material point 
of view, shaped by history, culture, and society, without which the subject would be 
empty and directionless. The attempt to subtract interest from subjectivity is similar to the 
scientist’s attempt to subtract subjective prejudice from knowledge in order to achieve an 
(apparently) absolute and objective standpoint. Yet interest, like prejudice, cannot be 
subtracted; it may only be reflected upon and exposed; such exposure reveals its falsity 
and allows the subject to partially overcome it. We may call this new ideal—of judgment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Roger Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience (Albany, 2007), p. 116. 
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that has allowed reason to work through its distorting interests, in order to make them 
transparent to consciousness—mediated interested judgment.  
It is difficult to imagine what such judgment might look like in practice, because 
society’s totalizing structure opposes any such engagement with materiality or nature, 
and because many of Kant’s principles still operate in the natural sciences, and in 
contemporary analytic philosophy, and other positivist disciplines. Adorno compares the 
repression of animals in Transcendental Idealism with the fascist hatred of difference and 
materiality:   
Ethical dignity in Kant is a demarcation of differences. It is directed against 
animals. Implicitly it excludes man from nature, so that its humanity threatens 
incessantly to revert to the inhuman. It leaves no room for pity. Nothing is more 
abhorrent to the Kantian than a reminder of man’s resemblance to animals. This 
taboo is always at work when the idealist berates the materialist. Animals play for 
the idealist system virtually the same role as the Jews for fascism. To revile man 
as an animal—that is genuine idealism. To deny the possibility of salvation for 
animals absolutely and at any price is the inviolable boundary of its 
metaphysics.95  
To engage with interest is to remember the nature within subjectivity, as we will see in 
later chapters. Thus to allow mediated interested judgment could be defined as the non-
repression of our resemblance to animals—the memory of what it was like to be human. 
This means realizing that nature is history, and that history is nature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Eduardo Mendieta, “Animal is to Kantianism as Jew is to Fascism: Adorno’s Besiary,” 
in John Sanbonmatsu, Critical Theory and Animal Liberation (Lanham and Boulder, 
2011), pp. 148, 324. The quote is from Adorno’s book Beethoven: The Philosophy of 
Music, Edmund Jephcott (trans), (Stanford, 1998), p. 8, fragment 202.  
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Section Two: Adorno’s Concept of Natural Beauty and Aesthetic Time 
 
In this section I argue, first, that Adorno’s concept of natural beauty constitutes a 
dialectical critique of Kant’s concept of disinterested contemplation; and, second, that 
natural beauty must be grounded in a concept of aesthetic time. Adorno requires a theory 
of aesthetic time because natural beauty is conceived both as a recollection of material 
history (the suffering of the past) and as a negative anticipation of utopia (or possibility, 
which arises from concrete actuality). Without a theory of temporality, natural beauty 
threatens to regress into an ideological presentation of images that may be easily reified 
by cultural institutions. The nonidentity present in natural beauty implicitly directs the 
subject to the past (through reminding her of the historical violence done to the object on 
behalf of the subject) and to the future (through allowing a glimmer of possibility to 
present itself, as nonidentity allows otherness to weave itself into experience). A theory 
of time will also emphasize the transitional and processual nature of the aesthetic object, 
as well as the fluid quality of the aesthetic subject’s experience. When these aspects of 
subject and object are elided, the enigmatic nature of the aesthetic object is not properly 
realized.  
I argue here that aesthetic experience requires reflection that engages with 
materiality (in this case, the historical sediment that alters the concept of time in 
modernity); and that materiality must be present in any philosophical theory that wishes 
to ground aesthetic experience. For example, a classical aesthetic category such as natural 
beauty must make reference to the historical sufferings of the past if it is to allow 
traditional philosophical concepts like freedom and autonomy to engage with material 
reality, and falling into ideological illusion. Adorno states: “Human beings are not 
equipped positively with dignity; rather, dignity would be exclusively what they have yet 
to achieve.”96 It is impossible to understand this sentence if the subject has not reflected 
upon her own orientation to the future, as well as the Enlightenment’s history of 
subjugation. We will only realize that freedom is a negative concept when we are aware 
that, historically, the subject has sought to control the object, and that such history is 
expressed in philosophical categories. Since some of Adorno’s concepts dialectically 	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negate Kantian concepts, historical experience is present in philosophical reflection; 
further, such experience has the power to alter that reflection itself—to change tradition 
into the new, with the aid of art.  
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory does not posit an explicit theory of time or 
temporality; thus, we must read between the lines. One could follow various 
argumentative paths: that Adorno’s intellectual friendship with Walter Benjamin directs 
him to a messianic temporality97; or that his polemical attacks on Heidegger demonstrate 
that he does not wish to privilege a temporality directed towards the subject’s anticipation 
of her own death98; or that Adorno’s analysis of the culture industry pits him against the 
temporality of aimless, empty, repetitive leisure time99; or that modern subjects are 
unable to mourn, or to realize the loss of experience100; or, finally, that temporality must 
militate against the static and substantive concept of duration that operates in traditional 
Idealist philosophy, such as Kant’s.101  
Adorno maintains that aesthetic truth content has a “temporal essence,” which 
begs the question of its definition.102 A theory of temporality will clarify the truth content 
that inheres within natural beauty, and will impart depth to Adorno’s invocations of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See the essay “On the Concept of History” in Benjamin, Walter, Selected Writings, 
Volume 4: 1938-1940, in Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (eds), (Cambridge and 
London, 2006). 
98 For excellent discussions of the complicated relationship between Adorno and 
Heidegger, see Iain Macdonald and Kryzyztof Ziarek, Adorno and Heidegger: 
Philosophical Questions (Stanford, 2008) and Duttmann, Alexander Garcia, Nicholas 
Walker (trans), The Memory of Thought: An Essay on Adorno and Heidegger (New York 
and London, 2002). 
99 Theodor W. Adorno, J. M. Bernstein (ed.), The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on 
Mass Culture (London and New York).  
100 See Rebecca Comay, ‘Adorno's Siren Song’, New German Critique 81 (Autumn, 
2000), pp. 21-48. She writes: “...Adorno relates the modern atomization of time to a 
radical failure of mourning. The hatred of the past is itself the inability to give proper 
burial. Immigrants wipe away all traces of their past life. Out-of-print books get set 
aside...” (39). 
101 For instance, Gene Ray observes that social ideology constructs a static space-time 
continuum: “the social seems to be ruled by immutable, timeless, and therefore 
'naturalized' laws, because from within society, the fact that social relations are a 
construction—historical, human, and thus alterable—is concealed from experience.” See 
Gene Ray, ‘Reading the Lisbon Earthquake: Adorno, Lyotard, and the Contemporary 
Sublime’, in The Yale Journal of Criticism, 17 (Spring, 2004), p. 12. 
102 AT, p. 37. 
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utopian hope, or longing, and the memory of past suffering, or historical experience. In 
this section I argue that Adorno’s implicit theory of temporality that structures experience 
must balance two distinct moments in the aesthetic object: it must balance experience that 
adheres, through memory, to the past sufferings of history, with experience that finds the 
truth content in that history of suffering, and uses it to follow transient utopian impulses 
that may guide us to a nonviolent acceptance of difference—and therefore to an unknown 
future. When subjects become aware of the historical experience that is present in 
materiality, and the utopian impulses that reside in everyday experience, they will 
become aware of the difference that structures identity, and the critical power that art 
expresses. Since the object’s expression changes with every new historical era, and since 
subjectivity must respond to that expression if it wishes to respond to materiality rather 
than clutch at illusory projections, a theory of time is necessary. Adorno may also employ 
temporality to critique the permanence and thing-like stability of the Kantian 
transcendental subject, which appears to be outside of historical and social change.  
Adorno calls the Kantian judgment of taste, which results in pleasure, “a castrated 
hedonism, desire without desire.”103 His argument is that the judgment of taste, while 
claiming to be grounded in pleasure, in fact cuts off the only source of pleasure that 
would remain valid for subjectivity—materiality and sensuous experience—in the name 
of a unified subject that remains free of heteronomous nature. Without a material ground, 
pleasure is not pleasure at all: it is instead abstract feeling that pretends to be concrete. 
Pleasurable longing, as Kant describes it, results from his theory of aesthetic judgment. 
Thus, aesthetic pleasure is not a concrete experience, in which the subject overcomes 
tension or satisfies her desire; rather, it remains abstract, because pleasure results from 
purely subjective dynamic between imagination and understanding, rather than an 
objective experience of otherness. The result of this abstraction in Kant’s theory is that 
pleasure—which might have inspired the subject to imagine utopian possibility, or to 
experience the traces of transcendence through memory that are present negatively in 
modern art—is bound to the present, in an eternal repetition.  
For Kant, the experience of the beautiful is self-grounding and divorced from both 
past and future: “We linger in our contemplation of the beautiful, because this 	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contemplation reinforces and reproduces itself.”104 In other words, aesthetic 
contemplation—the play of imagination and understanding that is present in the 
experience of the beautiful—does not receive materiality from the aesthetic object; rather, 
such contemplation is entirely self-motivating, and drives its own activity. The fact that 
aesthetic contemplation “reproduces” its own activity (the balance between the faculties) 
entails that it is isolated from the object that ought to guide the subject’s experience; 
without any such direction, aesthetic experience has no reference to the past (that is, the 
history expressed in the object) or to the future (since the subject need not anticipate 
anything beyond her own continuing pleasure, which is perpetuated by her faculties).105 
Pleasure on this account is not the longing for transcendence; rather, it is the subject’s 
satisfaction with what is: the shallow and empty repetition of the present moment.106 For 
Kant, aesthetic contemplation does not mediate or process aspects of the object; rather, 
the object is excluded from such contemplation entirely, in order to construct a solipsistic 
and self-enclosed account of aesthetic judgment.  
The word “reinforce” is also instructive; it shows that Kant wishes to defend 
aesthetic judgment against heteronomous influences from external forces, such as nature, 
history, or materiality. Once again, aesthetic judgment must protect the subject against 
the past—so that it is not compromised by the memory of suffering, which exposes 
reason’s violence against nature—as well as the future—so that aesthetic judgment can 
remain uncritical and inwardly directed, blissfully unaware of the need for critical 
thought and longing that reminds the subject of nonidentity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 CJ, Section 12, Ak. 222, p. 68. 
105 Ibid., p. 68. 
106 Erica Weitzman, ‘No Fun: Aporia of Pleasure in Adorno's Aesthetic Theory’, The 
German Quarterly, 81 (Spring, 2008), pp. 185-202. Weitzman writes: “For Adorno, the 
disappearance of art's negativity vis-a-vis the world is always a sign, and even a cause, of 
'philistinism': the abandonment of the capacity for critique in aesthetics and politics alike, 
and the subsequent corruption of subjectivity into a debased Massenpsychologie” (194). 
She continues: “The rejection of fun is then a preservation of the aesthetic sphere per 
so...[Fun entails] the collapse of the aesthetic into the real, and consequently, the loss of 
critical possibility as a whole” (194-195). In other words, to accept art's role as 
entertainment entails that artworks cannot distance themselves from reality in order to 
criticize it; as a result, no historical or social truth content may emerge.  
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As a transition to my discussion of Adorno’s concept of natural beauty, let us 
consider Matthias Tichy’s insightful discussion of the artwork, and its relation to 
traditional Kantian aesthetics.107 Tichy notes that Adorno argues against Kant’s 
conception of subjectivity: “Adorno's critique of the concept of the transcendental subject 
claims that philosophical cognition can only be attained by acknowledging, rather than 
abstracting from, individual experience...The possibility of moving from individual 
experience to universal cognition, therefore, lies not in subsuming experience under 
universal laws of thought, but in discovering a universal moment within individual 
experience itself...”.108 Discovering the universality within particularity does not mean 
reducing material qualities to abstract discursive concepts; rather, it means 
acknowledging that particularity has its own agency and structure that universality 
(wholly subjective, according to Kant) cannot capture. What exactly the 
acknowledgement of “individual experience” would amount to may only be discovered in 
the dynamism of aesthetic experience—experience that embraces, rather than abstracts 
from, the materiality, history, and natural character of the object itself.109  
Tichy also claims, rightly, that Adorno’s reading of the Kantian subject 
necessarily underwrites a radical temporality that argues for the dialectical nature of 
subjectivity. The subject that is materially grounded becomes other than itself through its 
interactions with the object. “Adorno's interpretation of Kant's 'intelligible character' 
suggests how we might understand realm [sic] of 'the intelligible' without pre-supposing 
the idea of self-preserving subjectivity...the individual self can change precisely through 
its experience of the other or its externalisation to the other without simply losing itself in 
the process”.110 In this way, Kant’s conception of static subjectivity, in which the 
subject’s transcendental laws and principles preserve it from objectivity, is criticized 
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immanently.111 That is, Kant’s concept of the subject claims to endure through time, and 
to produce objective judgments; however, the subject may only endure through time if it 
alters itself according to its material experiences, and it may only produce objective 
judgments if it listens to the object, rather than covering it over through judgments that 
claim a priori status.  
Tichy also observes that the artwork has a “dynamic self-identity” that develops 
and becomes other through time.112 This is because the artwork’s materials are social and 
historical in nature, and yet those materials are capable of becoming autonomous through 
the work’s formal innovations (the “specific constellation” of the artwork’s “unity”).113 
The reason why the artwork’s material, formally wrought, is experienced by the subject 
as new is due to its reconfiguration within the work itself—a reconfiguration that 
critically negates history and tradition.114  
Finally, Tichy argues that Kant’s conception of subjectivity cannot be sustained in 
light of Adorno’s insight that the object’s structure and agency is independent of the 
subject’s constituting power. Tichy writes: “It is clear that the relationship between the 
aesthetic subject and the work of art here cannot be interpreted traditionally in terms of 
an underlying subject regarded as the indispensable presupposition of anything and 
everything objective.”115 Since the aesthetic subject’s rationality has become corrupted 
through the instrumental imperative—that is, the demand to perceive objects in terms of 
value that is oriented towards practical-utilitarian ends rather than in terms of its intrinsic, 
qualitative value, which resists exploitation—it cannot be the foundation of aesthetic 	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“Adorno’s Reconception of the Dialectic.” Immanent critique assesses phenomena 
according to their own professed standards or criteria. Since this critique produces 
insights into the untruth of the phenomena, it is related to (or an early stage of) 
determinate negation (548). Determinate negation “proceeds through a rational response 
to the experience of contradiction” (548). Immanent critique proceeds through a “logic of 
disintegration,” without a positive moment (551). Brian O'Connor, ‘Adorno's 
Reconception of the Dialectic’, in Stephen Houlgate and Michael Bauer (eds), A 
Companion to Hegel (Hoboken, 2011), pp. 537-555.  
112 Tichy, ‘The Anticipation of…’, p. 233.  
113 Tichy, ‘The Anticipation of…’, p. 233.  
114 Tichy, ‘The Anticipation of the …’, p. 233.  
115 Tichy, ‘The Anticipation of the…’, p. 243.  
	   57	  
experience, which, for Adorno, ought to ground an experience of the subject’s limitations 
rather than valorizing an illusory strength.116 Tichy continues that Adorno’s “concept of 
experience”—in which particularity exposes the limitations of rationality, and expresses 
the suffering inflicted by rationality on nature—implicitly criticizes Kant’s concept of 
experience, in which the object is meaningless and chaotic without the subject’s 
principled imposition of order.117 The subject, for Adorno, must realize that the ground of 
experience is materiality (nature and history) rather than Kantian “pure laws of 
thought.”118   
 
The Temporality of Adorno’s Concept of Natural Beauty 
 
We have seen that Kant’s concept of disinterested contemplation is inadequate for 
modern aesthetic experience, which must remember its natural-historical ground, while 
anticipating an experience of otherness in the future that does not yet exist. In this section 
I argue that Adorno’s concept of natural beauty responds to Kant’s concept of 
disinterested contemplation and that the former concept is grounded in a theory of 
temporality that Adorno repeatedly evokes but does not make explicit. First, I discuss 
how natural beauty dialectically negates disinterested contemplation; second, I explore 
natural beauty’s ground in the past (natural-historical experience); finally, I examine 
natural beauty’s ground in the future (the anticipation of a utopian comportment).  
Before we discuss how natural beauty dialectically negates disinterested 
contemplation, let me discuss Bernstein’s reading of Kantian interest, which differs from 
my own. Bernstein argues that, for Adorno, Kantian 'interest' is “deforming” and 
damaging to nature: “these instrumental ways of knowing and acting, are broadly self-	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control…instrumental reason, the reduction of cognition to means-ends calculation and 
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interested, in the interest of survival, without effective concern for the well-being and 
worth of others”.119 For Bernstein, then, interest is bound to instrumental reason, which is 
unable to properly experience the qualities of the object that it subsumes. Interest harms 
the subject’s capacity to act ethically as well as her capacity to theoretically cognize 
objects. Bernstein continues: 
Those transcendental interests provide original horizons of intelligibility through 
which items light up as either knowable or as in relation to desire and worth. In 
aesthetics we must be disinterested in those very orienting interests, those ways of 
the world lighting up for us. The kind of disinterest necessary for aesthetic 
reflective judgment is thus against those determining interests that specify what 
knowing and acting are….120  
Bernstein argues that interests act to structure the world according to the subject’s desires 
and needs; on this reading, interests must be suppressed in order for the subject to gain 
autonomy from her heteronomous nature, which continually distracts reason. Yet, as we 
will see, natural desires and needs may serve to orient the subject towards the future 
(towards possibility) and towards the past (towards the suffering of nature through the 
history of reason); thus, they are necessary in order to bring the subject to awareness of 
her own history, and to grant her a brief glimpse of utopian otherness, which 
demonstrates that reason cannot comprehend the object’s materiality. The aesthetic object 
also expresses history and truth through the tension that it embodies between past and 
future.  
For Bernstein, Kantian interests are the expressions of natural impulses that 
distort reason and cause actions to be purely instrumental and goal-oriented.121 Aesthetic 
reflective judgment resists this instrumentality because it allows the subject to resist those 
natural impulses (e.g., self-preservation) that attempt to govern her rational thought.122 
Yet Bernstein’s reading forgets Adorno’s argument that natural beauty was suppressed as 	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a result of the Idealist valorization of spontaneity and lawfulness, which raises humanity 
above the animal kingdom, and above nature in general.123 More specifically, Adorno 
argues that nature should not be abstractly opposed to history: the image of nature as 
chaotic, as without agency or freedom, and as spiritless arose at a particular historical 
juncture, and for reasons not unrelated to the subject’s naïve faith in its own capacity to 
determine the world of objects through its own authority. Finally, I have argued that, 
while interests may introduce natural inclination or prejudice into experience, the most 
effective manner of encountering such prejudice is not to attempt to erase it from 
experience, but rather to carefully consider its genealogy and composition, so that the 
subject may experience her objectivity to the full. In short, only by intensifying the 
subject’s material ground, and not by abstractly negating it, may the subject rise above 
the natural or mythical element in her subjectivity, and become critically reflective.  
 We have seen that Kant’s concept of disinterested contemplation expresses a 
disregard for nature, history, and material experience. Kant argues that it is necessary to 
achieve an a priori and transcendental aesthetic judgment that remains isolated from 
empirical experience in order to ground the subject’s autonomy and spontaneity. 
However, Kant’s position brings many problems with it. In the following passage, 
Adorno argues that exalting human dignity at the expense of the subject’s material and 
qualitative experience does violence to her experience, because it abstracts from the 
objectivity that inheres within it:  
If the case of natural beauty were pending, dignity would be found culpable for 
having raised the human animal above the animal. In the experience of nature, 
dignity reveals itself as subjective usurpation that degrades what is not 
subordinate to the subject—the qualities—to mere material and expulses it from 
art as a totally indeterminate potential, even though art requires it according to its 
own concept.124  
The philosophical Idealist’s hierarchy, in which the human subject is considered to be 
above the animal, or nature, subtracts qualitative and material experience from the 
artwork and from aesthetic experience, which are assumed to require extensive mediation 	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in order to express truth or beauty. Both Kant and Hegel assume that material is merely 
chaotic and therefore incapable of structuring experience without extensive mediation by 
the subject’s formal and logical principles.125  
 Adorno argues that natural beauty presents the nonidentical—that is, the evidence 
that reason fails in its attempts to master and dominate nature using subjective concepts 
and categories. The nonidentical comes to light when the object appears as more than the 
subject’s concepts claim that it is. Thus that which escapes the subject’s concepts 
provides proof that the object cannot be determined by subjectivity alone: that it remains 
inexhaustible. This is what natural beauty expresses. However, the transcendence in 
artistic and natural beauty is necessarily fleeting, due to the coercive nature of the total 
social context, or what Adorno calls the spell: “Natural beauty is the trace of the 
nonidentical in things under the spell of universal identity. As long as this spell prevails, 
the nonidentical has no positive existence.”126 Thus natural beauty responds to Kant’s 
attempt to remove the materiality from experience in order to preserve the subject’s 
autonomy and transcendental status.127 For Adorno, the Kantian subject operates under 	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the principle that everything material must be made spiritual—except for the thing-in-
itself, which is a mere placeholder that remains indeterminate. Although Kant does not 
extend the principle of the spiritualization of nature as far as Hegel does, he still uses it to 
dominate the natural world, which is reflected in Kant’s definition of the subject’s 
autonomy.  
 Adorno inherits Kant’s claim that purposeless comportment, which is not oriented 
towards action, epistemic ends, or practical use, appears in disinterested contemplation. 
However, Adorno radicalizes Kant’s claim so that it does not result in a restrictive 
portrait of the subject as a formal shell without concrete materiality: “Nature, as 
appearing beauty, is not perceived as an object of action. The sloughing off of the aims of 
self-preservation—which is emphatic in art—is carried out to the same degree in 
aesthetic experience of nature.”128 While Kant claims to achieve a non-practical 
comportment—purposiveness without purpose—Adorno argues that such comportment 
only appears negatively in natural beauty, which modern artworks imitate. “Art does not 
imitate nature…but natural beauty as such.”129 Nature is the dialectical opposite of 
history. Thus mere nature that is unmediated by historical becoming remains static or 
merely mythical. Likewise, history that claims to be unmediated by nature remains purely 
rational, and therefore an ideological model of progress that forgets its material ground.130 
Truth lies in the dialectical intertwining of history and nature. From Adorno’s point of 
view, Kant’s disinterested contemplation is an orientation to objectivity that claims to 
isolate the subject from its roots in nature. However, the dialectic of Enlightenment 
demonstrates that any attempt to isolate the subject from nature only exposes its own 
deep entanglement in nature; thus, reason becomes irrational when it forgets its own 
natural composition.  
 Adorno’s inheritance of Kant’s concept is also evident in the dialectical reversal 
of disinterestedness that natural beauty effects. “What nature strives for in vain, artworks 	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130 See Benhabib, ‘Autonomy as Mimetic…’, p. 43: Kantian autonomy “…presupposes 
the repression of nature; the more this repression is developed, all the more does the self 
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fulfill: They open their eyes. Once it no longer serves as an object of action, appearing 
nature itself imparts expression, whether that of melancholy, peace, or something else.”131 
In other words, artworks, into which natural beauty has migrated in industrial-capitalist 
modernity, become the focal point for a new kind of agency, which resides within 
subjectivity that acknowledges the materiality within itself. The truly purposeless object, 
perceived in a non-practical and non-instrumental manner, would not be without material, 
natural, or historical qualities; rather, it would embrace its own qualitative composition in 
order to reflect on its own history, and the suffering within that history; in addition, the 
object would display its agency to the subject, in order to resist the attempt at abstract or 
external subsumption through concepts or forms. The aim of natural beauty, like 
disinterested contemplation, is an object that has been stripped of heteronomous 
determination through subjective mediation: “With human means art wants to realize the 
language of what is not human.”132 
 Finally, in a brief genealogy of natural beauty, Adorno claims that the concept 
disappeared as the philosophy of Idealism dominated theoretical debates on aesthetics. 
For instance, Kant’s heavy reliance on the subject’s freedom to ground the concept of 
dignity—although Kantian freedom is a negative concept that never enters into 
experience, but instead grounds reason as the producer of a priori moral laws and moral 
judgment—contributes to the downgrading of natural beauty.  
Natural beauty vanished from aesthetics as a result of the burgeoning domination 
of the concept of freedom and human dignity, which was inaugurated by Kant and 
then rigorously transplanted into aesthetics by Schiller and Hegel; in accord with 
this concept nothing in the world is worthy of attention except that for which the 
autonomous subject has itself to thank.133  
 Now I will turn to natural beauty’s firm grounding in the past—that is, natural and 
historical experience. The past is the first aspect of natural beauty’s rootedness in 
temporality. At the beginning of his chapter, Adorno asserts that natural beauty 
constitutes a kind of painful recollection of the violence that the artwork “inflicts” on 	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nature:134 “The concept of natural beauty rubs on a wound, and little is needed to prompt 
one to associate this wound with the violence that the artwork—a pure artifact—inflicts 
on nature.”135 He continues that the artwork and nature, although apparently in opposition 
to each other, dialectically collapse into each other, since (natural) immediacy can only 
be understood through social and cultural concepts, which are inevitably historically 
mediated; and, since the artwork (an artifact) ideally presents the subject with the 
memory of damaged nature, which modern society wishes to repress.136 The definition of 
natural beauty as, in part, the memory of past violence is important because it shows that 
the subject’s experience is oriented not towards a pure, empty, formal present, but instead 
towards a concrete (non-mythological) past, heavily mediated by the pain, guilt, shame, 
and horror that accompany the experiences of nature and of history.  
 Adorno claims: “Natural beauty…is at its core historical…”.137 Natural beauty is 
historical not just because the concept itself develops or regresses throughout historical 
time, although that is of course also true; rather, the concept is historical because it casts 
subjectivity into an abyss that causes her to experience the violence and the suffering of 
history and nature—rather like Adorno’s cryptic metaphor for the artwork as a message 
in a bottle, which is addressed to the unknown agent of the future, who will hopefully 
examine its contents with care and sympathy.138 I will discuss the future orientation of 
natural beauty later.  
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 Adorno discusses the concept of cultural landscape as an example of how natural 
beauty was subject to transformation and corrosion over time. A cultural landscape is a 
kind of constructed or semi-artificial scene that strives to integrate natural and cultural 
elements—for instance, “hillside towns that are related to their setting by the use of its 
stone.”139 Cultural landscapes, although they may seem merely conservative in their 
integration of the natural and the cultural, instead have a capacity to resist the dominant 
tendency of rationality towards irrationality and repression. Adorno details how this 
subversive tendency appears:  
But perhaps the most profound source of resistance stored in the cultural 
landscape is the expression of history that is compelling, aesthetically, because it 
is etched by the real suffering of the past. The figure of the constrained gives 
happiness because the force of constraint must not be forgotten; its images are a 
memento. The cultural landscape…embodies a wailful lament that has since 
fallen mute. Without historical remembrance there would be no beauty.140  
The memory of past suffering has the power to evoke happiness, which is always critical, 
negative, and at one with aesthetic illusion. Such happiness itself—the orientation of the 
subject who remembers the violence and pain of the past, and strives to integrate it into 
her experience, thus indirectly anticipating utopian reconciliation—is a force of 
resistance, because it constitutes both the object’s expression of suffering as well as the 
subject’s mediated reaction to that suffering.  
 Adorno confirms that natural beauty’s virtue is that it allows the subject to 
achieve consciousness of the violence of reason as it dominated, and continues to 
dominate, nature. Such consciousness enables the possibility that reflection will intercede 
in experience that is at present governed by blind and irrational forces. “Along the 
trajectory of its rationality and through it, humanity becomes aware in art of what 
rationality has erased from memory and of what its second reflection serves to remind 
us.”141 Thus, natural beauty confirms the truth content of aesthetic experience, which is 
both negative and positive: it is negative in that truth does not yet exist, and may never 	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exist due to the social context of immanence; at the same time, it is positive because truth 
always arises from untruth, or concrete historical experience; for this reason, truth is 
occasionally able to flash up in the subject’s experience.  
 Yet Adorno confirms that the awareness that the subject may gain in natural 
beauty is highly somatic and visceral—it is not merely abstract or formal, although it is 
mediated through reason: “Consciousness does justice to the experience of nature only 
when, like impressionist art, it incorporates nature’s wounds.”142 To incorporate nature’s 
wounds would be to engage with the materiality of reason—its natural and historical 
ground—instead of suspending or neutralizing it, as Kant tries to do. The subject engages 
with materiality when she remembers the suffering of the past, and when she traces the 
history present in natural beauty (whether in artworks or natural objects) through mimetic 
second reflection.  
 Adorno returns to the contradiction (which also appears in the experience of 
Dadaist and Surrealist artworks, discussed in Chapters Three and Five) that aesthetic 
experience that is appropriate to its object requires both “unconscious apperception” and 
reflective cognition.143 It is difficult to ascertain what unconscious apperception might 
amount to in practice, but it could look like a kind of comportment that is guided by 
mimetic impulses rather than self-conscious rationality.  
If nature can in a sense only be seen blindly [that is, without discursive 
understanding or determinate judgment, JNK], the aesthetic imperatives of 
unconscious apperception and remembrance are at the same time archaic vestiges 
incompatible with the increasing maturation of reason. Pure immediacy does not 
suffice for aesthetic experience. Along with the involuntary it requires volition, 
concentrating consciousness; the contradiction is ineluctable.144  
The temporality of aesthetic experience—its ground in the past and the future—
contributes to my argument, elaborated in Chapter Four, that interpretation, or 
philosophical reflection, is a necessary condition of aesthetic experience, and that 
philosophical reflection requires the materiality given in aesthetic experience. The 	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subject’s experience is held in tension between past and future; thus, it requires 
philosophical thought to remember the various aspects of the artwork, and to anticipate 
and imagine that which it only negatively indicates. This is why since aesthetic 
experience is a process, and the artwork is a force field.  
 Now I will examine natural beauty’s grounding in the future. James Hellings 
insightfully argues that the work of art may best be conceived as a message in a bottle; 
this metaphor captures the processual nature of the work, its orientation towards the 
future, as well as its dangerous and precarious life, as the work travels through history: 
“Art, then, is constructed, circulated and received as if it were a message in a bottle, 
openly addressing imaginary witnesses of an uncertain future”.145 The work, although 
grounded in history, must to an extent transcend the spell of empirical reality and look 
forward, to an imaginary audience, if it is to break the spell of past tradition and 
anticipate a new and different future. Earlier, Hellings remarks: “Art—as recollection of a 
freedom and promise of a happiness that has not and that may never come to pass—
shows the reified and administered world what it is missing, for ‘an “it shall be different” 
is hidden in even the most sublimated work of art’ (C 93)”.146 The imperative to imagine 
differently, and critically, is operative in both Dada and Surrealism, as we shall see in 
later chapters. Thus even those works that are most “sublimated”—for instance, art that 
seems to domesticate or repeat the mythic images of capitalism, like some Dada 
objects—obliquely refer to difference and otherness.147 Hellings rightly notes that the past 
recollection and the future promise of the artwork refer to each other; in addition, 
capitalism, which is mired in the present, is unable to tolerate difference or otherness: for 
this reason, its temporality remains static and repetitive. Hellings also notes that the 
enigmatic character of art is bound up with its future-directedness, and its precarious 
situation on the ocean of history. The work’s enigmatic character is lost when it becomes 
commodified or exploited by official culture. “What Duttmann refers to as art’s ‘genuine 
address’ or ‘enigmatic character or quality’ (AA 85), is that hopeless invitation made by 
messages in a bottle: toward an entirely Other, an uncertain and unknown future 	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imaginary witness. […] Unlike discursive knowledge, art does not construct concepts, 
[…] or transmit messages. […] But, art does resemble judgement, knowledge and 
language, its quasi-logic crystallises historical content in and through form”.148 The 
work’s form, not its content, expresses historical and social forces at work in the 
unconscious agency of the work; its expression is an aesthetic language that remains 
nonidentical with discursive language. Finally, Hellings notes that Adorno inherits Kant’s 
concept of enlightened maturity, but that the former wishes to integrate it into a concept 
of imaginative spontaneity and resistance: “Cultivating mature, ruthless, 
uncompromisingly critical thinkers and spontaneous, imaginative, free spirits—this was 
Adorno’s challenge…Free spirits are politically active subjects, for them society is not 
beyond re-imagining. Adorno’s social praxis made full use of both the critical faculty and 
the faculty of imagination, art, and the construction of the aesthetic, to achieve this 
change”.149 Aesthetic theory, then, must be an intellectual experience of the highest order; 
only a certain kind of artwork, that remains aware of the present situation, that does not 
forget the suffering of the past, and that is capable of speculation about the future, may 
impart such a critical experience. At the same time, aesthetic experience requires 
imagination if it is to embrace utopia: the possibility of possibility itself.150  
Adorno’s concept of natural beauty forces the subject to confront absolute 
otherness: the future, or that which does not yet exist. Natural beauty’s transience—the 
illusory image that briefly appears through the wreckage of capitalism—is an orientation 
towards utopia, which inspires longing for otherness that would be recognized 
nonviolently. This is also why natural beauty constitutes a radical critique of capitalism, 
for which every object in society must be put to some use or practical end, and also a 
critique of Idealism, for which materiality must be mediated by subjectivity in order to 
become valuable in epistemic, moral, or aesthetic terms. Adorno observes: “nature, as it 
stirs mortally and tenderly in its beauty, does not yet exist.”151 That is, natural beauty 
exists as a potential that has yet to be made actual: it is the possibility of materiality that 
would resist the subject’s desire that such materiality conform to its own formal logic. 	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Said otherwise, natural beauty is materiality that shows its own agency and logic through 
structuring itself—in a way that aesthetic second reflection, but not reason or 
understanding, appreciates.  
 Natural beauty engages with history while also extracting the utopian fragments 
from within that history. For instance, philosophical reflection tells us that “Human 
beings are not equipped positively with dignity; rather, dignity would be exclusively what 
they have yet to achieve. This is why Kant situated it in the intelligible character rather 
than consigning it to the empirical sphere.”152 Instead of reading utopian possibility in the 
intelligible sphere, however—which is what traditional philosophical Idealism did—
Adorno reads it in the “empirical sphere,” that is, in the constellation of history and 
nature that inheres within natural beauty.153  
 Natural beauty signifies the potential, which lies within objectivity, that actuality 
and possibility may be reconciled in a nonviolent synthesis. That is, natural beauty 
presents the utopian longing that arises from material experience—without sacrificing 
either materiality or possibility. Such longing is for a future that does not yet exist, as 
Adorno observes: “The identity of the artwork with the subject is as complete as the 
identity of nature with itself should some day be.”154 Adorno continues that the course of 
the spiritual infiltration of artworks, begun in the Enlightenment—the relentless 
mediation of apparently raw nature by subjectivity—preserved aesthetic autonomy 
(according to Kant and Hegel), but damaged nature’s agency in the process.155 This is 
why the dialectic of Enlightenment, which claims to be progressive and emancipatory, is 
ultimately a “course of devastation.”156  
 Natural beauty inspires the subject to long for that which does not yet exist; thus, 
even though it is mediated by society and history, it promises transcendence from the 
repetition of the social totality that subjects are caught within: “Natural beauty remains 
the allegory of this beyond in spite of its mediation through social immanence.”157 	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Adorno makes clear that aesthetic experience requires engaged subjectivity—which must 
both experience and reflect upon the object, and the layers of history and materiality that 
compose it—if it is to release objects’ potentiality: “natural beauty, the unexpected 
promise of something that is highest, cannot remain locked in itself but is rescued only 
through that consciousness that is set in opposition to it.”158 At the same time, however, 
natural beauty indicates the object’s capacity to complicate and critique the subject’s 
abstract categories. Thus natural beauty emanates from the object: “What is beautiful in 
nature is what appears to be more than what is literally there. […] natural beauty points to 
the primacy of the object in aesthetic experience.”159 The experience of the beautiful is an 
experience of possibility that is disclosed by nonidentity: the difference between category 
and particular, between abstract repetition and differentiated becoming, indicates the 
difference between the present and the future.  
 Finally, Adorno remarks that natural beauty “is suspended history, a moment of 
becoming at a standstill.”160 This cryptic line indicates that natural beauty is an aesthetic 
image of becoming-other, or dynamic transformation, which is both untethered from the 
past and yet firmly grounded in it. We may see this paradoxical movement, for instance, 
in Dada and Surrealism, which retrieve and redeem conventional or traditional elements 
in order to make them new, subversive, and transformative. The dialectic of natural 
beauty causes the past to turn into the future—and the old to become the new.161 Thus the 
notion that natural beauty imitates the actual, or literal, is inaccurate. Rather, it imitates 
the not-yet-actual: possibility. Natural beauty’s negative image of the future is nothing 
other than the mimetic drive to desire otherness in a non-dominating fashion: “The being-
in-itself to which artworks are devoted is not the imitation of something real but rather 
the anticipation of a being-in-itself that does not yet exist, of an unknown that—by way 
of the subject—is self-determining. Artworks say that something exists in itself, without 
predicating anything about it.”162 The “unknown” is “self-determining” because it 
remains independent of the subject’s projections (private fantasies, fears, and desires), 	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and the coercive social totality, and yet must respond both to the subject and to the social 
context without finding itself over-determined by them.163 The sphere of the aesthetic is 
the only site at which such a dialectical interaction may safely take place: the delicate 
balance between actuality and possibility finds its most articulate expression in the 
artwork.  
 I call the tension between the past and the future in natural beauty metamorphic 
temporality because it indicates that the suffering of the past ought to be remembered as 
we speculate, and imagine, different possible futures—or, as we remain open to the 
possibility of possibility itself. That is, the recollection of the historical past does not 
over-determine the future, or negate its radically open character; conversely, attending to 
the future should not require that we forget or repress the past. On the contrary, both 
extremes refer to each other: the past, which appears determinate, reveals aspects of itself 
that are open—that express utopian possibility; and the future, which may appear to be 
wholly indeterminate, reveals that it too refers back to historical traces, even in its most 
radical potentiality. This is why the two extremes metamorphose into each other—
without becoming identical to each other. The longing for otherness is grounded in the 
suffering of nonidentity; the memory of suffering entails that the subject desires 
possibility. Metamorphic temporality also explains the unsettling tension embodied in 
natural beauty, in which the aesthetic object presents the appearance of that which is 
more than what merely is in addition to provoking the recollection of the historical 
sufferings of nature and humanity.  
Metamorphic temporality allows aspects of the artwork to become other or 
different from what they are. Such differentiation occurs through temporal disintegration, 
which appears through processes of interpretation and mimetic perception. Thus both 
subject and artwork contribute to the unveiling of the work. In this way, aesthetic time 
acts to dissolve what formerly appears as rigid, immobile, and fixed. For example, a 
Dadaist object, such as Hans Arp’s “Entombment of the Birds and Butterflies (Head of 
Tzara),” cannot be categorized as a single symbol; its uncanny power depends upon the 
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subject’s capacity to attend to minute, seemingly insignificant details (Figure 1).164 Since 
attention is a temporal action, the experience is a process of becoming, not an isolated 
instant or motionless point. Arp’s work appears as a face without features; several strange 
or unknown animals; a beating heart; a glimpse of the starry night; charcoal and ash; a 
sleeping or dead bird; an archaic magical or spiritual object; or something else entirely.165 
A new concept of aesthetic time would foreground the artwork’s capacity to dissolve 
itself over time, and to reveal its truth content. Arp’s work might demonstrate that the 
immobility of sculpture—which imitates death, since traditionally it has been assumed to 
exist beyond time—reverses into extreme mobility, since the subject’s imagination 
subjects every detail of the work to metamorphosis. In this way, Arp tries to transform 
the experience of stasis, for instance, the reified experience generated by WWI, into the 
experience of indeterminacy, such as the possibility of a new beginning for humanity, 
and the fear that the cultural past will immolate the present. Recent history was always 
the driving force behind Dada’s various incarnations across the world. Rudolf Kuenzli 
writes: 
The artists among the dada group in Zurich also tore apart existing visual 
construction, arbitrarily rearranging the resulting fragments. Hans Arp described 
this deconstruction as his attempt to undermine ‘the trumpets, the flags and 
money, through which repeatedly killings of millions were organized on the field 
of honour.’ As the major cause of the war, Arp singled out human reliance on 
logic and reason: ‘Modern times, with their science and technology, turned man 
towards megalomania. The confusion of our epoch results from this 
overestimation of reason.’ Arp saw in the deconstruction of the cultural construct 
of reason the principle function of his and dada art and poetry.166  
 Let us return to the main argument of the thesis. Through the metamorphic 
temporality embodied in natural beauty, philosophy is able to connect to the past and to 
imagine another possible future. Thus, philosophy needs art so that the former is 
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grounded in materiality. That is, the imagination must remain connected to materiality 
rather than abstraction if it is to allow for utopian longing while not repressing its own 
ground. On the other hand, the dynamic tension embodied in metamorphic temporality 
radicalizes the aesthetic subject through causing her to both recollect the past and to 
imagine the future. In other words, aesthetic temporality allows the subject to reflect on 
the infinitely various aspects of the work, which exist in tension with each other, and 
which are always in process; thus, it allows her to accept a kind of uncertainty in her 
experience. The risk of this conception of temporality is that it would result in the 
fragmentation of the subject: experience would be held in tension between past and 
future, and the subject would remain isolated from her own spontaneity and reason. We 
may avoid this fragmentation through allowing philosophical reflection to intervene in 
aesthetic experience; the former allows perspective on the material process of experience 
itself. In addition, philosophy is necessary for art because it grounds the necessarily 
speculative, or transcendental, character of art, which always goes beyond mere 
existence, or that which is. In this way we may connect this first chapter to the main 
argument of the thesis: that art requires philosophy, which critically examines and 
intensifies the artwork’s relation to its other—society and history; and, that philosophy 
requires art, so that its speculative nature remains connected to materiality. 
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Chapter Two: Kant’s Concept of the Sublime and Adorno’s Concept of the Shudder 
Section One: Poetic Perception 
 
In the last chapter we focused on those aspects of Kant’s aesthetics which foreground the 
subject’s sovereignty. Adorno argues against Kant that, in order to attain the truth of 
subjectivity, we must first acknowledge the agency of objectivity or materiality. For this 
reason, let us now turn to those moments in the third Critique in which objectivity briefly 
appears. Adorno’s aesthetics proceeds dialectically: examining the subject entails 
examining the object. We will first focus on the sublime because it provides evidence that 
the confrontation between subject and object results in a crisis: whether to embrace 
materiality’s constitution of subjectivity or whether to claim that subjectivity remains 
independent of materiality. The first path defines subject and object as porous and fluid; 
the second path defines subject and object as static and brittle. Adorno follows the first 
path; Kant follows the second. Another way of discussing this crisis, which occurs in a 
particularly acute form in late capitalist modernity, is to ask: Can materiality be reduced 
to subjective categories, or does it instead challenge and overturn those categories? In 
other words, does historical experience change reason’s composition, or can it be 
domesticated by reason itself? I argue here that materiality certainly does alter 
rationality—in unexpected and powerful ways. Coming to grips with reason’s materiality 
necessarily means coming to grips with the history of reason itself. Reason’s 
materiality—its natural-historical ground—is expressed most powerfully in modern 
artworks.  
Adorno subjects Kant’s concept of the sublime to immanent critique: the 
sublime’s apparent allegiance to freedom is measured against its actual historical role in 
the twentieth century. While certain features of Kant’s concept of the sublime may be 
salvaged and recuperated in modernity, so that they may respond critically to capitalist 
and Idealist irrationality, other elements must be negated and transformed in order to 
retain their critical and utopian potential. Such dialectical treatment must always measure 
itself against the historical and social reality in which the concept is embedded. For 
example, we might ask whether Kant’s concept of respect is an appropriate moral concept 
for humanity in modern times, or whether it should be re-evaluated, given our knowledge 
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of nature’s repression (as it appears in, for instance, the environmental crisis), or whether 
imagination might express the unconscious desires of the subject. In Section Two of this 
chapter, I examine Adorno’s concept of the shudder, his dialectical transformation of the 
sublime.  
Before we begin, it may be useful to reflect upon why exactly the category of the 
sublime is valuable or relevant now, in the twenty-first century, and also why Adorno 
considered the category worth reviving in the mid-twentieth century. The experience of 
the sublime forces the subject to confront the fact that reason often perpetuates violence 
in its attempt to master nature. The twentieth century presents reason’s irrational attempts 
to formalize its knowledge of nature—in order to establish rational hegemony over 
nature. Reason has become purely formal: reason may analyze the most efficient means 
for attaining a goal while ignoring the goal’s intrinsic value. For example, Itay Snir 
quotes from Minima Moralia on the calculative nature of moral reasoning: “'Science in 
general,' writes Adorno, 'relates to nature and man only as the insurance company relates 
to life and death. Whoever dies in unimportant: it is a question of ratio between accidents 
and the company's liabilities.' In other words, even human life is stripped of intrinsic 
value, and regarded as a datum in the economic calculations.”167 In order to fight against 
such abstraction, Adorno argues that art must present particularity, or material quality, 
rather than universality, which subjective reason produces by abstracting qualities from 
the object. Gillian Rose, in The Melancholy Science, notes that, for Adorno, an object is 
always “the result of a process” of constitution, and therefore bound up with the social-
historical totality.168 When an object’s particularity is reduced to universality, its 
processual history is repressed, and it becomes reified or static.  
In the third Critique, Kant argues that reason and understanding perform different 
tasks: reason follows moral laws, while understanding constructs empirical concepts. In 
the “Introduction,” Kant asserts: “The understanding legislates a priori for nature, as 	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Adorno (London and New York, 2014), pp. 80, 199.  
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object of sense, in order to give rise to theoretical cognition of nature in a possible 
experience. Reason legislates a priori for freedom and for freedom’s own causality, in 
other words, for the supersensible in the subject, in order to give rise to unconditioned 
practical cognition.”169 However, Adorno argues that, in an era destroyed by imperialism, 
capitalism, and fascism, reason and understanding have both been affected by processes 
that damage experience; as a result, little difference exists in practice between reason and 
understanding, because both faculties carry out similar processes: namely, the conversion 
of quality into quantity. Moral judgment, as a result, should not be considered a faculty 
that may transcend historical causality; instead, arguably, the functions of such judgment 
are constituted by historical causality. Reason’s autonomy resulted from its ability to 
control the subject’s inner nature (drives and desires that must be sublimated so that 
reason may legislate morally); however, that autonomy has vanished now that reason’s 
control has become repressive, and without a principle that might limit it. In modernity, 
and especially in the twentieth century, reason and nature both desire to preserve 
themselves at any cost. Thus, reason cannot be considered independent of historical 
circumstances, because modern social conditions themselves enforced reason’s fearful 
desire for control. While reason for Kant may have the capacity of moral discernment, 
reason has been largely stripped of its powers in late capitalist society. In short, all of the 
subject’s faculties have been damaged by modernization. Thus, Adorno’s term 
instrumental reason arguably refers to the pure functionality of understanding and reason 
in the era of Enlightenment’s irrationality—since both operate through the subjugation of 
material difference.  
Consider our present society, in which the distortion of rationality appears in the 
public sphere, especially during times of political and social crisis. Roger S. Foster 
observes: “Politicians, Benjamin Barber notes, are ‘merchandized and sold as 
commodities to a public regarded not as a body of public citizens but as a clientele’”.170 
He continues: “A political speech is encountered today not as a single, sustained piece of 
persuasive thinking; it is dissected into isolable pieces, entirely separate from context, 	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which deliver a quantifiable ‘value,’ the agreement of the listener that can be measured as 
the pleasure of a positive response”.171 For example, during the 2008 Presidential debates, 
the news company CNN organized a tool that attempted to measure voters’ reactions to 
the candidates’ speeches.172 Each individual was given a “handset” with a knob that could 
be turned in one direction to communicate pleasure or satisfaction and the opposite 
direction to indicate displeasure or dissatisfaction with the content of the speech at any 
particular moment.173 Foster asserts that the most troubling aspect of this “device” is that 
it suggests that a political argument is “made up of discrete units that deliver a 
measurable value to the audience”.174 And yet, Foster argues, “[i]t is impossible to 
quantify the real value of a political speech that builds up a complete picture of a subject, 
carefully and incrementally, and addresses the viewer as a thinking being”.175 The device 
implies, wrongly, that experience can and should be strictly regimented and registered as 
a series of atomized responses.176 Foster concludes that the practice demonstrates the 
“schematization of experience”.177 I discuss this particular example at length because I 
think that it illustrates why the sublime—if it is truly capable of fracturing subjective 
categories and social frameworks—remains a necessary experience: the sublime object 
cannot be reduced to a discrete series of moments that may be comprehended by the 
subject; on the contrary, the object resists the subject’s attempts to absorb it into a field of 
a priori knowledge. In addition, the example shows that what might seem to be a private 
and individual experience that is controlled by reason—an individual’s considered 
response to a political argument—is instead structured and controlled by social factors 
that often remain invisible. History’s mediation of experience, and reflection, is at issue 
here.  
Adorno’s argument against the Kantian sublime is mostly persuasive: he casts the 
subject in the Kantian sublime as doing violence to nature through repressing sensibility 
and exalting rationality. Tom Huhn observes: 	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The pleasure of the sublime…[is] the moment when subjectivity 'feels' itself, the 
moment when subjectivity becomes whole and cohesive, coherent and unitary. 
[…] But the pleasure of the sublime is likewise the founding moment of 
culture….Violence and domination are the twin poles of this organization and 
foundation. Violence becomes necessary and hence legitimate as that dynamic 
according to which nature is presented as fearful in order to call forth a 
subjectivity whose own violence might oppose that of nature's. […] But pleasure 
also legitimates this elevation [the elevation of reason over nature] insofar as it 
shows the benefit and joy, the very sublimity of (this civilized) pleasure.178  
In this chapter I will supplement Adorno’s account. Thus, I argue that there is a 
redemptive feature to the Kantian subject in the sublime that Adorno does not consider, 
and that prefigures his own conception of the shudder (which both inherits and 
transforms the Kantian sublime).  
 Kant, in a brief passage in the third Critique, discusses a form of experience that 
allows the subject proximity to the sublime object without using reason or understanding, 
without repressing the material features of the object, and without attempting to use the 
object for the subject’s own epistemic or moral goals. I call this form of experience 
‘poetic perception.’ Kant does not detail its structure—either objectively (in terms of how 
it might construct the object of experience) or subjectively (in terms of how it affects the 
subject’s own feelings or thoughts). In addition, Kant does not explain why—in a section 
devoted to analyzing the sublime as a mode of aesthetic experience or reception—poetic 
perception is figured as necessary for artistic creation (or production, in Adorno’s terms). 
Is poetic perception connected with genius, hypotyposis, or the judgment of taste? Or is it 
separate from all of those experiential modes? Kant’s concept of poetic perception entails 
that his account of sublime experience must function as a mode of artistic production—in 
addition to aesthetic reception. Most importantly, poetic perception may partially rescue 
Kant’s own account of the sublime, as I detail below.  
 
Exegesis: Kant on the Mathematically and Dynamically Sublime  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Huhn, ‘The Kantian Sublime...’, p. 274. 
	   78	  
For Kant, objects characterized as mathematically sublime are formless; for this reason, 
they disrupt aesthetic reflective judgment through defeating sensibility and exalting 
reason.179 In the mathematical sublime, natural objects initially appear to be counter-
purposive; however, when reason corrects the failings of sensibility, the subject regains a 
feeling of purposive pleasure.180  
 In addition to such purposiveness, however, the experience of the sublime also 
unsettles the subject's feeling of harmony.181 Kant defines that which unsettles the subject 
as “a feeling of the sublime,” rather than a sublime object.182 However, in his descriptions 
of the mathematically and the dynamically sublime, he makes clear that the object plays a 
significant role in disrupting the subject's experience.183 The sublime object is 
“incommensurate with [the subject's] power of exhibition,” which suggests that it 
remains an intuition that cannot be comprehended.184 Kant also asserts that the term 
'sublime' refers to a particular experience:  
...we express ourselves entirely incorrectly when we call this or that object of 
nature sublime...for how can we call something by a term of approval if we 
apprehend it as in itself contrapurposive? Instead, all we are entitled to say is that 
the object is suitable for exhibiting a sublimity that can be found in the 
mind...Thus the vast ocean heaved up by storms cannot be called sublime. The 
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sight of it is horrible...the mind is induced to abandon sensibility and occupy itself 
with ideas containing a higher purposiveness.185  
Kant's principle that metaphysics as such is no longer possible (because the subject only 
knows objects through employing the forms of intuition, empirical concepts, and 
categories) entails that an object only may be considered objective when it is mediated 
through subjectivity. In the mathematical sublime, for instance, the representation of the 
object's formlessness causes the subject's faculties to fail to present the object as it 
appears through perception; in the dynamical sublime, phenomenal objects' force affects 
the subject, which causes her to become aware of her moral rationality.186 However, 
aesthetic objects (both beautiful and sublime) are united through the subject's feelings, 
which do not denote any quality in the object itself. Kant confirms this when he remarks 
that the sublime “concerns only ideas of reason, which, though they cannot be exhibited 
adequately, are aroused and called to mind by this very inadequacy, which can be 
exhibited in sensibility.”187 For Kant, aesthetic reflective judgment necessarily involves a 
feeling that the object is purposive for the subject.188 Yet if the sublime involves 
formlessness, how could such an experience be felt as purposive? 189 Kant appeals to 
reason: “the mind is induced to abandon sensibility and occupy itself with ideas 
containing a higher purposiveness.”190 For Kant, the subject's reason resolves the 
formlessness apprehended through intuition.191 In this way, the subject's experience of the 
sublime is harmonious, rather than dissonant.192  
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The Mathematical Sublime 
Kant states that the experience of the mathematically sublime involves an object that we 
perceive to be “absolutely large.”193 The judgment involves “only a subjective standard 
underlying our reflective judgment about magnitude [Grosse].”194 The pleasure generated 
in the sublime aesthetic judgment is directed at the subject, and not at the object: “this 
liking is by no means a liking for the object (since that may be formless), but rather a 
liking for the expansion of the imagination itself.”195  
In the mathematical sublime, the object of aesthetic pleasure is supersensible: the 
subject’s capacity for theoretical comprehension.196 The imagination cannot meet the 
demands of reason; hence, it exposes the limits of sensibility.197 The imagination's failure 
reveals the subject's epistemic spontaneity (though not her moral freedom, which will be 
revealed in the dynamically sublime); thus, the experience of the sublime indirectly 
furthers the subject's self-knowledge and also produces the feeling of subjective 
purposiveness.198 The experience of the sublime also reveals the division between the 
sensible and the intelligible realm. 
In Section 26, Kant describes the phenomenological experience of the 
mathematical sublime.199 Kant writes that, in order to perceive any object through 	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intuition, the imagination must both apprehend and comprehend the object.200 
Apprehension involves perceiving the object as a series of discrete parts; as a result, 
apprehension may “progress to infinity”—for instance, perceiving a tree gradually, 
moving from its roots all the way up to the crown.201 Comprehension involves grasping 
the object as a unified whole (seeing the tree’s roots, trunk, and crown simultaneously), 
and “becomes more and more difficult the farther apprehension progresses”.202 The 
subject apprehends objects using perception, but comprehends using memory; thus, if 
memory cannot hold together or recollect an object, it fails: for instance, comprehending 
10 redwood trees that were stacked on top of one another would be nearly impossible. 
Comprehension cannot grasp any object larger than “the aesthetically largest basic 
measure for an estimation of magnitude.”203 When the imagination fails to comprehend 
these objects it “sinks back into itself, but consequently comes to feel a liking [that 
amounts to an] emotion.”204 For Kant, the failure of the imagination is resolved by 
reason's success, when the formless object is grasped through a rational idea.205  
 Kant responds that the subject's reason produces an idea of “the infinite as a 
whole,” which proves that the subject's supersensible capacity transcends any sensible 
criteria or “standard.”206 Kant does not explain exactly how this transition occurs, or why 
the imagination would attempt to carry out a task that it cannot fulfill; but he suggests 
that the failure of imagination leads inevitably to the success of reason.207  
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206 CJ, Section 26, Ak. 254, p. 111. See Paul Crowther, ‘The Aesthetic Domain: Locating 
the Sublime’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 29 (Winter, 1989), pp. 29-30. Crowther 
explains that subjective purposiveness in the sublime is brought about by “a felt 
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For Kant, feeling is not sensible: the free play of the faculties produces pleasure 
that is disinterested and yet aesthetic.208 The judgment of the mathematical sublime is 
completed, for Kant, when reason contemplates its own power to rise above sensibility, 
and to grasp the object as a whole, independently of the object's material or sensible 
nature.209 Reason judges the object without imagination: “But the mind feels elevated in 
its own judgment of itself...and finds all the might of the imagination still inadequate to 
reason's ideas.”210 In the closing lines of Section 26, Kant asserts that the sublime 
indicates the weakness of sensibility and even nature itself before the power of reason: 
the mathematical sublime presents “our imagination, in all its boundlessness, and along 
with it nature, as vanishing[ly small] in contrast to the ideas of reason, if the imagination 
is to provide an exhibition adequate to them.”211  
 Kant remarks that the feeling of the sublime is “respect for our own vocation”: 
namely, the subject's capacity for rational, moral legislation.212 Kant defines respect as 
“the feeling that it is beyond our ability to attain to an idea that is a law for us.”213 In 
other words, the sensible aspects of the subject, which have no contact with the 
supersensible, have respect for those rational ideas that they must carry out, and yet 
cannot reach. The imagination exemplifies this process when it tries to exhibit a rational 
idea, and discovers that its power of comprehension is limited compared to reason's 
power of thought.214  
 Reason's success strengthens the “whole vocation” of the subject.215 In short, 
although the feeling that accompanies the mathematical sublime is one of “displeasure,” 
the subject presents such displeasure as “purposive.”216 Kant adds: “What makes this 	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possible is that the subject's own inability uncovers in him the consciousness of an 
unlimited ability which is also his.”217 That is, the shortcomings of sensibility refer to 
reason's capacity for constructing ideas.218  
The failure of the imagination is not only its inability to comprehend a nearly 
infinite manifold, or the fact that it inflicts violence on the forms of intuition when it 
attempts such comprehension. Rather, Kant suggests that imagination's failure concerns 
the fact that it can never become truly independent of sensibility—that is, imagination 
may never attain to reason’s powers. Kant closes his analysis of the mathematical 
sublime by arguing that the imagination's limitations are redeemed because they allow 
the subject to transcend her sensibility and to realize her true supersensible nature 
through reason.219   
 
The Dynamically Sublime 
In Section 28, entitled “On Nature as a Might,” Kant begins his analysis of the 
“Dynamically Sublime In Nature”.220 In a judgment of the dynamically sublime, Kant 
says, “we consider nature as a might that has no dominance over us.”221 In the experience 
of the dynamically sublime, the subject becomes aware of her supersensible freedom.222 
As a consequence, the subject becomes aware of the difference between the phenomenal 
and noumenal realms. Kant describes the experience of perceiving nature in its chaos 
(that is, nature that appears to threaten the moral and epistemic projects of human 
beings), which eventually reveals the divide between nature and freedom:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 CJ, Section 27, Ak. 259, p. 116.  
218 CJ, Section 27, Ak. 259, p. 116. See Rachel Zuckert, ‘Awe or Envy: Herder contra 
Kant on the Sublime’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 61 (Summer, 2003), 
p. 222. She argues that Herder’s account of the sublime is preferable to Kant’s because it 
involves empirical, and not only rational, cognition: “Herder's more elastic and 
incremental account of sublime experience seems preferable to Kant's exclusionary 
account: Herder allows that we may find something awe-inspiring when we know little 
about it (or see it as the 'poets' do), and that we may find it awe-inspiring (potentially 
even more so) when we have come to understand it better.” 
219 CJ, Section 27, Ak. 259-260, pp. 116-117.  
220 CJ, Section 28, Ak. 260, p. 119. 
221 CJ, Section 28, Ak. 260, p. 119.  
222 CJ, Section 28, Ak. 121-123.  
	   84	  
[C]onsider bold, overhanging and, as it were, threatening rocks, thunderclouds 
piling up in the sky and moving about accompanied by lightning and 
thunderclaps, volcanoes with all their destructive power...Compared to the might 
of any of these, our ability to resist becomes an insignificant trifle...And we like to 
call these objects sublime because they...allow us to discover in ourselves an 
ability to resist which is of a quite different kind, and which gives us the courage 
[to believe] that we could be a match for nature's seeming omnipotence.223  
For Kant, the experience of the dynamically sublime allows the subject to realize that her 
nature contains two different and conflicting elements: the phenomenal and the 
noumenal.224 The subject's reason presents a method of judging nature grounded in the 
supersensible: “For although we found our own limitation when we considered the 
immensity of nature...yet we also found, in our power of reason, a different and 
nonsensible standard...we found in our mind a superiority over nature itself in its 
immensity....”225 Reason, in the dynamically sublime, is sovereign; sensibility and 
external nature are both merely heteronomous.226 Kant separates nature and reason, which 
is necessary from his point of view if the subject is to be capable of autonomy and 
rationality.227 Subjects often (mistakenly) attribute sublimity to features of the natural 
world. Since natural objects may elicit the subject's power of reason, and consequently 
her capacity for moral legislation, they remain the starting point of the sublime judgment; 
however, Kant maintains that only the subject's mind may be considered truly sublime.228   
 The dynamically sublime reveals the sharp contrast between nature and freedom 
that Kant attempts to bridge through reflective judgment. The sublime also reveals certain 	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contradictions that threaten the order of his system. For example, the experience of the 
sublime is an aesthetic experience, yet one that gives the subject cognitive awareness 
(only negatively) of a realm that lies wholly beyond the sensible. Although Kant strictly 
refuses metaphysical speculation, his description of the sublime sometimes appears to be 
an example of purely speculative experience. I depart from those commentators who 
maintain that the third Critique does not attempt to transcend the limits of the first 
Critique, and that Kant does not attempt to answer metaphysical questions in his aesthetic 
theory.229 Aesthetic feeling, the central category of aesthetic reflective judgment, is 
sensible, and yet also universal and necessary; in this way, it seems to bridge the divide 
between the three faculties. In the final lines of Section 28, Kant notes that the experience 
of sublimity allows the subject awareness of her own noumenal freedom.230  
Hence sublimity is contained not in any thing of nature, but only in our mind, 
insofar as we can become conscious of our superiority to nature within us, and 
thereby also to nature outside us (as far as it influences us). Whatever arouses this 
feeling in us, and this includes the might of nature that challenges our forces, is 
then (although improperly) called sublime.231  
The dynamic sublime remains the subject's aesthetic awareness of the supersensible 
within her. The supersensible is the ground for the subject's autonomy, which marks her 
as irreducibly distinct from sensible nature. The subject's realization that her noumenal 
self remains superior to nature, Kant maintains, arises when her phenomenal self is 
threatened by external nature. One might wonder whether the threat (or perhaps the 
seduction) of internal nature might also cause an experience of the dynamically sublime. 
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If so, the subject would legislate to her heteronomous material self and thereby corral her 
immoral inclinations through freedom.  
 If a judgment about the sublime is to be universal and necessary, and not 
particular or contingent, then it must originate in the subject's most elementary 
“predisposition[s],” which are not affected by empirical phenomena.232 A judgment of the 
sublime “has its foundation in human nature: in something that, along with common 
sense, we may require and demand of everyone, namely, the predisposition to the feeling 
for (practical) ideas, i.e., to moral feeling.”233 Aesthetic judgments' modality—their status 
as universal and necessary—must be presupposed in order for their judgments to be 
considered pure. Aesthetic judgments' status as universal, Kant claims, allows them to 
transcend any experience that is grounded in empirical interests.234 In conclusion, in the 
mathematically sublime, the imagination cannot apprehend the object; in the dynamically 
sublime, the imagination has no power over the object.235  
 
Kantian Poetic Perception 
With this brief background discussion of the Kantian sublime, we can examine the 
concept of poetic perception, which arises out of the problem of how the subject relates to 
an object that exceeds her powers. This problem is accentuated in modern aesthetics due 
to historical experience, which breaks apart the traditional category of the sublime.236 In 
order to retain aesthetic judgment’s purity, Kant introduces the concept of what I will call 
poetic perception.237 However, this concept is not elaborated in detail.238  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 CJ, Section 29, Ak. 265, p. 125. 
233 CJ, Section 29, Ak. 265, p. 125.  
234 CJ, Section 29, Ak. 265-266, p. 125. 
235 CJ, ‘General Comment…’, Ak. 268, pp. 127-128. 
236 Ray, ‘Reading the Lisbon…’, p. 1. “That Auschwitz is sublime...In the extremity of its 
violence, in its intractable core of incomprehensibility, and in its fateful legacy for the 
future, this massively traumatic genocidal catastrophe marks a radical break in historical 
consciousness...After this disaster, human-inflicted disaster will remain more threatening, 
more sublime, than any natural disaster.”  
237 CJ, ‘General Comment…’, Ak. 270, p. 130. 
238 Various commentators have grappled with poetic perception. For instance, Rachel 
Zuckert discusses the concept of the sublime in Herder and in Kant. See Zuckert, ‘Awe or 
Envy…’, p. 222. 
	   87	  
The concept of poetic perception is elaborated in the following passage from the 
third Critique:  
Therefore, when we call the sight of the starry sky sublime, we must not base our 
judgment upon any concepts of worlds that are inhabited by rational beings, and 
then [conceive of] the bright dots that we see occupying the space above us as 
being these worlds' suns, moved in orbits prescribed for them with great 
purposiveness; but we must base our judgment regarding it merely on how we see 
it, as a vast vault encompassing everything, and merely under this presentation 
may we posit the sublimity that a pure aesthetic judgment attributes to this object. 
In the same way, when we judge the sight of the ocean we must not do so on the 
basis of how we think it, enriched with all sorts of knowledge which we possess 
(but which is not contained in the direct intuition), e.g., as a vast realm of aquatic 
creatures...for all such judgments will be teleological. Instead we must be able to 
view the ocean as poets do, merely in terms of what manifests itself to the eye—
e.g., if we observe it while it is calm, as a clear mirror of water bounded only by 
the sky; or, if it is turbulent, as being like an abyss threatening to engulf 
everything—and yet find it sublime.239  
The above passage on poetic perception unsettles Kant’s previous account of the sublime, 
which had confirmed the subject’s sovereignty over nature through her ability to 
overcome the contingency and strangeness of that which remains unable to be judged 
conclusively. In contrast, poetic perception seems to involve distancing oneself from 
determinative judgment, in order to allow the mind to associate various images together 
that might evoke or present the object. Sweet notes that the sublime object causes the 
subject to feel frustration because her powers of presentation fall short; in contrast, poetic 
perception seems to rely on a certain indeterminacy present in the nature of the image 
itself.240 Although such perception involves avoiding theoretical knowledge, which, Kant 
implies, might cloud the subject’s freedom to associate, poetic perception is not wholly 
non-cognitive, because it clearly involves reflecting upon the object’s various 
appearances. For Kant, poetic perception enables aesthetic judgment’s disinterested 	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nature; I argue instead, below, that poetic perception should remain resolutely 
materialistic if it is to present an account that does justice to the object. Some might argue 
that Kantian poetic perception remains wholly consistent with his account of reflective 
disinterested contemplation—which does not involve theoretical or practical 
knowledge—because the poet must apparently perceive an object merely in visual terms 
(stripped of background knowledge, cultural or historical influences, private prejudice or 
interest, etc.). However, I think that Kant transgresses his principle that poetic perception 
is a kind of visual perception that represents objects as they literally appear (through 
determinative judgment). In the passage above, Kant claims that the poet must view an 
object “merely in terms of what manifests itself to the eye”; however, Kant then creates 
several metaphors (for instance, “vast vault,” “clear mirror,” “abyss”) that describe what 
poets actually do: namely, produce comparisons and associations in order to construct a 
constellation of concepts that evoke and work through, rather than avoid, historical and 
social knowledge.241 These metaphors are not neutral or value-free. In the end, what Kant 
claims to be doing is not what he is actually doing.  
What Kant actually suggests is that poetic perception involves relating to an 
object in terms of its potential for metaphorical thought: the subject must attempt to 
respond to the object in a manner that it not merely literal or reductive; instead, she must 
try to see the object as more than it really is.242 This process involves freedom or 
spontaneity, which brings the concept of poetic perception close to Kantian genius. In 
poetic perception, the subject must see the object as it relates to, and is reflected in, other 
objects and relations. Kant insists: “we must base our judgment regarding it [the night 
sky] merely on how we see it, as a vast vault encompassing everything…”.243 Kant asserts 
that the poet sees the object without conceptual or moral interests—that is, non-
purposively, or non-teleologically. In this way, for Kant, the poet’s vision is clear, 
because her perception cleanses objects of their material and sensuous contingency, in 
order to arrive at a priori artistic experience. At the same time, the poet’s perception, 
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which Kant constructs as naïve, enables her to think more broadly about the object’s 
significance.  
Poetic perception also proves that historical and social consciousness of the object 
is part of aesthetic and artistic experience—although Kant aims to prohibit such 
consciousness from any role in transcendental idealism. Kant’s attempt to purify poetic 
perception should be viewed with caution because without the historical aspect of 
experience, key cultural tropes and figures cannot be identified as part of a social and 
cultural context; as a result, they cannot be properly morally evaluated, because they are 
misleadingly assumed to be merely abstract, indeterminate, or neutral terms that exist in a 
void. Kant presents his metaphors as if they were spontaneously perceived and therefore 
autonomous from history. For example, Kant’s metaphor of the ocean as a mirror clearly 
has historical and cultural roots that are not explored or unraveled. The ocean’s unknown 
fathoms must have terrified sailors and merchants in the age of Enlightenment (which 
was arguably in decline when Kant wrote the third Critique), and its seemingly infinite 
distance at least partially fueled the drive to conquer unknown lands and to tame exotic 
cultures in the ideological imagination. As a consequence of the highly speculative maps 
that were drawn of the seas in the 18th Century, the ocean possibly was considered to be 
most calming and beautiful when it simply reflected the source of humanity’s 
mythological and divine hopes: the sky. The heavens have long been the domain of the 
gods (and humanity’s highest ideals) and the depths of the sea the refuge of terrifying and 
mythological creatures (such as the Sirens or mermaids, which represent the animal or 
primal aspect of humanity). Mirrors—a symbol of subjectivity’s supposed knowledge of 
itself—thus serve to identify what is unidentifiable. If the ocean is a mirror, then the 
unknown is capable of becoming known.  
Poetic perception involves that which “manifests itself to the eye”.244 Kant 
suggests that such perception is divorced from discursive thought (which produces 
objective knowledge) in order to ground aesthetic judgment in transcendental structures 
of experience. Yet Kant’s view should be amended because it does not allow 
philosophical thought to contribute to aesthetic or artistic experience; as a result, such 
experience is emptied of its critical aspect. Kant’s view that the poet’s naïve perception 	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may immediately grasp the object’s varied aspects is based on a romantic view of artistic 
and aesthetic agency: the idea that such agency’s autonomy may protect it from political 
and social corrosion. The latter view cannot be justified, because in modern times the 
subject has been thoroughly corrupted by social and cultural structures of power. 
Although Kant insists that aesthetic judgment is not based on concepts, or on the morally 
good, such judgment must involve cognition in some manner if it is not merely to 
reproduce superficially the object’s characteristics (outlined in determinative judgment). 
Cognition allows reflection, which is necessary in order to resist the ideological or 
illusory dimension of the object.  
Kant also seems to reverse his earlier position on sublimity. Instead of 
maintaining that only subjective freedom may cause sublime experience, he now argues 
that such experience appears in objectivity too: in natural phenomena that cannot be 
controlled or contained using determinative judgment. As a result, some other form of 
non-teleological judgment is required. This is a welcome departure from his claim that 
the sublime only appears in the subject’s realization of her moral agency in the dynamical 
sublime, or that the sublime relies on ideas of reason in the mathematical sublime. Most 
commentators accept that the sublime is related to epistemic or moral mastery. For 
instance, William Desmond remarks: “I interpret Kant's view of the sublime as 
subordinating the excess of its transcendence to our ethical self-mediation and our moral 
superiority”.245 And Paul Crowther writes that, in the dynamical sublime, the subject is 
able to conceptualize sensuous objects that would otherwise overwhelm her; it is this 
ability, he claims, that causes the subject's feeling of pleasure in the dynamical sublime.246 
Poetic perception diversifies the subject’s experience of the object by examining 
its connection with other objects, and its social-historical expression; and it enters the 
object and describes it on its own terms. Yet how could such a description be possible 
unless another, wholly expressive, language exists that is unrelated to communicative 
language? How could such discursive tools help subjects to enter the object immanently?  
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In other to answer these questions, we need to look closely at what a new concept 
of poetic perception would look like, and we need to examine why such perception 
transcends reflective judgment. Examining what occurs empirically when a poet 
constructs an image may help us to reflect upon what should happen in Kant’s account of 
aesthetic judgment. A brief exploration of how poetic perception might be revised will 
accomplish two things: first, it will demonstrate how truth content may be salvaged from 
Kant’s account; second, it will anticipate the next chapter, in which we explore how 
Adorno’s concept of the shudder inherits the Kantian sublime.  
 
A New Concept of Poetic Perception 
 
“The splinter in your eye is the best magnifying glass.”247  
 
Poetic perception starts with the subject’s observations about an object. Yet, an 
observation must be tried and tested by the subject’s capacities for reflection, feeling, 
somatic impulse, and reason if it is to become objective. Thus, poetic perception should 
not be understood as an intuitive or immediate act. Instead, it involves thinking about 
materiality through somatic realization or feeling, which expresses how the object’s 
various points of reference have developed.  
Further, in poetic perception, the subject must be receptive to those aspects of the 
object that she does not immediately understand. This is why poetic perception has an 
affinity with listening, and hence constitutes a form of mimetic comportment. Andrew 
Bowie observes that interpretation, because it is mimetic, does not involve cognitive 
mastery: “The essential point is that interpretation is not just a matter of knowing how to 
do it in a technical sense [...] The 'telos of cognition' would in these terms be the ability to 
unify the general categories of thought with the particularity inherent in any specific 
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object of thought.”248 Similarly, it is through receptivity that poetic perception remains 
oriented to materiality and sensuousness.  
In addition, poetic perception involves discovering lyrical echoes in the object: 
that is, objective associations unearthed by the subject that express the object’s historical 
and cultural context and its development. It is important to pay attention to the object in 
this way because if the subject does not follow the object’s contours, aesthetic experience 
degenerates into a pleasurable game which is divorced from ethical reflection, and in 
which the subject’s feelings and thoughts remain in the center. If the artwork is primarily 
a means for generating pleasure, then it cannot uncover truth.  
Poetic perception works with images. I understand an image as an arrangement of 
elements (distributed either violently or non-violently) that either illuminate or unsettle 
some aspect of cognition. Images are necessary in order to displace the reifying force of 
discursive thought and communicative language, which may easily freeze or occlude 
certain aspects of an object in order to present it as amenable to the subject. Although 
images only constitute an incomplete presentation of an object’s qualities, they are able to 
impart a sense of the particular’s diverse aspects; in this way, an image may criticize 
cognition that fails to recognize aesthetic quality. Poetic perception’s focus on images 
entails that the object has a certain depth that cannot be described or known conceptually, 
and which escapes conclusive determination—either through rational categories, or 
through understanding’s empirical concepts. Aesthetic experience should provide a 
material critique of discursive thought; without such a critique, aesthetic experience is at 
risk of uncritically accepting philosophical categories that are assumed to be necessary, 
but which, upon closer inspection, reveal themselves to reproduce the worst assumptions 
of cultural and historical tradition. For example, we should not assume that the classical 
idea of beauty remains relevant after the historical atrocities of the twentieth century; 
instead, the meaning of beauty needs to be subject to an immanent critique that is 
historically and socially sensitive. Aesthetic experience is involved with images, which 
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employ concepts and discursive thought, but which are without instrumental goals. These 
images expand the subject’s cognitive field—that is, her conception of the object and its 
varied significance. In poetic perception, the subject explores what may be called the 
object’s resonance. Objective resonance involves subjective association; reflection; the 
history of the object; the materiality of the object; the object’s social context; other 
particulars that illuminate aspects of the object.  
Poetic perception also differs from reflective judgment. Reflective judgment 
uncovers the similarities between particulars in order to form a unifying concept that 
synthesizes them.249 While such judgment may be necessary in order to gather knowledge 
for practical use, or for theoretical cognition, it is inappropriate for aesthetic experience, 
which requires a non-violent method of gathering material, and one that adapts 
completely to its object. Poetic perception uncovers the differences between particulars, 
and exposes the fractures that compose any particular—that which cause it to diverge 
from any system of classification. Hence, particulars poetically perceived are able to 
shatter or unsettle any attempt at synthesis, unification, or assimilation.250 As a result, 
poetic perception is unable to view particulars as mere matter for theoretical cognition or 
instrumental-pragmatic action.  
Finally, poetic perception is not simply identical to philosophical thought. Poetic 
perception prepares the ground for such thought by allowing the subject to gather 
material that may provoke and incite philosophical reflection. In addition, poetic 
perception uses language in a way that transcends communication; poetic language is 
evocative, imaginative, generative of imaginative association, difficult to understand 
immediately, and expressive of historical suffering and social disorder. Yet, like 
philosophy, poetic perception must be critical if it is to avoid merely reproducing the 	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dominant and ideological motifs that circulate through hegemonic culture and which 
threaten to destroy autonomy. To be critical is to retain a certain distance between subject 
and object.  
 
Poetic Perception and the Problems of the Kantian Sublime 
 
There are several features of the Kantian sublime that Adorno cannot accept. Poetic 
perception may resolve or at least alleviate some of these issues. Through a critical 
engagement with tradition, Adorno hopes to rescue historical experience.  
In the Kantian sublime, the subject does not fully engage with otherness (that is, 
difference, materiality, nature, or nonidentity).251 The subject experiences otherness as a 
disruptive force, evidenced in the subject’s empirical fear in the face of nature, and in 
reason’s reaction to imagination’s inability to present objectivity. Albrecht Wellmer 
states that, for Adorno, in the experience of the sublime, the aesthetic subject must 
sustain an experience of negativity: “Modern art is the remembrance of nature in the 
subject, tied to the strength of a subject which [sic] is capable of sustaining the 
experience of its own finitude as spirit”.252 Kant claims that, in order to protect 
autonomous agency, and reason’s mastery over nature, the subject must reflect upon her 
own freedom—which is purely spontaneous and self-identical. For Kant, freedom and 
nature must exist in wholly separate domains. In the sublime, freedom’s repulsion of 
nature occurs when imagination is superseded by reason, and when reflection upon the 
subject’s moral agency occurs through reason alone. Further, the metaphysical picture 
assumed by Kant in the third Critique is that objectivity cannot constitute subjectivity, 
because objectivity has no agency of its own, apart from that imparted to it by 
subjectivity; although objectivity may bring about reflective judgment, it remains 
powerless to affect the subject’s capacity to judge. For this reason, subjects are viewed as 
capable of bestowing aesthetic, practical, and epistemological meaning, and objects are 
viewed as the empty bearers of such meaning.  
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Why is the Kantian conception of freedom ethically unacceptable, philosophically 
problematic, and repressive? Karsten Fischer writes that Adorno follows Freud in 
drawing out the social consequences of the domination of nature: “the internalized violent 
domination of nature also facilitates the use of force in social life. Adorno's hypothesis 
with regard to a psychology of civilization means that man's brute force against nature 
encourages him to use violence against other human beings as well.” 253 In addition, for 
Kant, the subject must falsify her own internal composition: the subject’s freedom is not 
wholly autonomous; we must overcome internal strife as our agency develops.254 Kant’s 
definition of freedom implies that the subject cannot recognize the material or natural 
elements of her self. In addition, Kant’s view, which pits subjectivity against objectivity, 
results in the reification or stultification of both poles—neither may affect the other. Such 
an account fails to explain how freedom affects nature at all, as Kant acknowledges in the 
introduction to the third Critique. Lastly, Kant’s conception of freedom retains primacy 
over nature, and hence seeks to control objectivity.255 Kant would probably respond that, 
if that moral judgment is to avoid corruption through empirical contingency (such as 
natural desires, animal inclinations, emotions, historical mediation, and social prejudice), 
freedom must remain autonomous from nature. While freedom should of course be 
distinguished from nature, the two poles are not as distinct as Kant would like. For 
freedom is historically and socially conditioned, and moral action must engage with 
natural instincts, rather than repressing them; to view freedom as an absolute force in the 
subject is to adopt a theological postulate that cannot be defended without relapsing into 
faith. Furthermore, Kant’s view of nature as a system driven by empty mechanical 
causality should be challenged: those aspects of the subject or the empirical world that 	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appear as most ‘natural’ in fact contain elements of action, agency, choice, freedom, and 
responsiveness.   
Historical events and social pressures contribute to—and even construct— the 
material that is considered either acceptable or unacceptable for philosophical 
consideration, unconscious processing, everyday reflection, or artistic production. The 
virulent nationalism and class warfare that defined the First World War and its aftermath 
arguably strengthened the natural desire for self-preservation, which was repressed and 
then returned with renewed strength, and the fear of difference, which becomes greater as 
the subject desires to control objectivity.256 The result of such nationalism and racism was 
that, among certain radical left-wing intellectuals, and Marxists, the authority of 
rationality—which in earlier centuries was unquestioned—started to wane.257 If human 
subjects all possessed reason, and all could potentially become enlightened or intelligent, 
how could European nations have fallen so quickly into such a deadly war? Ian Kershaw 
observes, “The military dead [of WWI] totaled almost 9 million, the civilian dead 
(largely caused by mass deportation, famine and disease) close to 6 million. Taking all 
the belligerents together, as many as 7 million combatants had been captured by the 
enemy and sometimes spent years in prisoner-of-war camps…”.258 In the face of such 
mass slaughter, some individuals concluded that reason had become irrational, and had 
gone dangerously off course. Traditional cultural values (such as rationality, virtue, 
honor, faith, or brotherhood) no longer seemed neutral; instead, they seemed part of a 
malignant tradition that could not be returned to.259 Yet Adorno maintains that tradition 
may be given force when its terms are redefined (through determinate negation). For 
instance, the sublime should not be wholly rejected (even if it were possible to do so). 
Rather, some of its terms should be criticized—in order to call forth a different 
perspective, and a utopian, emancipatory potential. With this focus, let us now return to 
Kantian poetic perception.  
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Poetic perception allows the subject to experience the object’s contingency and its 
internal contradictions or inconsistencies—briefly, those elements in the object which 
fracture its concept, and which threaten to disunify the subject’s experience of 
particularity. Hence it reveals another way of experiencing nature. Poetic perception also 
defines freedom differently from Kant’s conception: it forces subjects to view objects as 
harboring agency, diversity, and authority, through allowing subjects to see the depth and 
qualitative complexity of an object, and the object’s capacity to affect subjects. Finally, 
poetic perception inspires a variety of reflection that aims at exploration rather than 
mastery.  
A further issue with the Kantian sublime is that it allows imagination a merely 
derivative role in the context of aesthetic experience; the faculty of imagination is shown 
to be powerless, because it may only interpret that which understanding or reason has 
already pre-formed. One might respond that imagination is capable of synthesis on 
Kant’s account, and thus must have some agency; however, the agency required to 
synthesize material is not based in freedom, but rather in compulsion, because 
understanding forces sensibility to carry out processes of formalization. The latter view 
of imagination is demonstrated when Kant observes that imagination falls short before 
difference, because it cannot grasp an object as a totality.  
In contrast to Kant, I contend that poetic perception is an indirect or oblique 
method of seeing and interpreting objects, because an object is viewed and interpreted 
through several other objects. As such, it is dependent upon imagination, which is 
capable of a more fluid, flexible, and sensual cognition—based on what Adorno calls 
mimetic comportment. For this reason, poetic perception may shed light on particularly 
difficult and obscure objects, or those that have become damaged by history, culture, or 
prejudice, or reified through misuse, overuse, or the deadening force of habit; in this way, 
imaginative poetic perception may briefly break through tradition, and awaken the 
powers of the new.  
Finally, poetic perception may even bring out the redemptive value in Kant’s 
account of the sublime. Above I attempted to reformulate such perception in order to 
reveal its truth content, which appears in the following aspects. First, poetic perception 
allows the subject to gain closeness to the object’s particular qualities through 
	   98	  
imaginatively associating those qualities with other objects or ideas (through the use of 
figures of speech such as metaphor or simile). Second, such perception allows the subject 
to use language and conceptual cognition in a more open and free manner, through 
engaging with an object on its own terms, and towards non-practical ends. Third, the 
manner in which the subject perceives is a radical composite of a) imaginative receptivity 
(as the subject does not attempt to determine the object of experience) and b) reflective 
spontaneity (as the subject associates images or thoughts which might evoke the object’s 
complex materiality).260 Fourth, such perception allows consciousness of objective 
historical and social experience (in addition to the poet’s personal psychological 
associations). Poetic perception differs from identifying conceptualization or 
determinative judgment because it does not seek to fix the object in a classificatory 
system, or to establish the subject as an agent capable of imposing identity; rather, the 
object itself is viewed as expressing its own agency, which becomes evident as the object 
unsettles and revitalizes the subject’s faculties. For instance, Martin Seel notes that 
Adorno's concept of contemplation carries a strong ethical demand with it. 261 For 
Adorno, “an unreserved receptiveness...forms the centre of a moral attitude...a theoretical, 
ethical and aesthetic unfolding...[in which] a recognition of the particular is made 
possible, which, at the same time regards it with respect and allows it to come into 
appearance in the fullness of its presence”.262 Such receptivity gains in value after two 
world wars, in which the agency of the subject has been distorted and placed in the 
service of harming nature. Instead of administering means, the subject should listen to 
that which supposedly requires categorization and synthesis.  
 If we re-orient Kant’s account of poetic perception in order to grant the concept 
redemptive value, we achieve a more complicated view of the sublime. Poetic perception 
partially resolves the deficiencies mentioned above: it may transform the hierarchy of the 
faculties, and is capable of neutralizing the implicit violence that occurs when the subject 
attempts to define the object independently of its own autonomous expression. Perception 
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is able to accomplish this through reversing the sense of failure that the subject feels after 
imagination fails to present meaning: instead of feeling frustrated when the attempted 
unification or comprehension of the object collapses, poetic perception allows the subject 
to remain open to the various, indeterminate, and different strands that divide the object, 
and which call for various thoughts, experiences, feelings, histories, and contexts in order 
for full experience to occur. Full experience does not mean closed or complete 
experience, because no totalizing view of the object is possible; nevertheless, the subject 
may gain proximity to the object as she realizes its distance—and its alienated and 
divided nature.  
In addition, poetic perception forces us to realize that sublime experience may 
occur during artistic experience, and not only during aesthetic reception. In this way, the 
conventional view of the sublime—in which an aesthetic subject experiences the sublime 
through realizing her agency and moral obligation—is shown to be only partially true. 
Why does this correction matter to Kantian aesthetics as a whole? If artistic experience is 
potentially sublime, then it cannot be wholly active or spontaneous; in this way, we may 
criticize the Kantian-Romantic concept of the inspired genius (and the hierarchy of nature 
and freedom). The category of perception emphasizes that artistic activity is primarily 
receptive, and not inventive or productive. In addition to a measure of spontaneity, 
artistic experience also necessarily involves passivity, non-violence, patience, and self-
exteriorization.   
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Section Two: The Shudder: Adorno's Critique of the Kantian Sublime263 
 
Now that we have examined the Kantian sublime, and the reasons why it should be 
recovered and transformed, let us examine Adorno’s concept of the shudder.264 The 
shudder shocks the subject in aesthetic experience—thus forcing her to encounter 
nonidentity. I believe that the shudder may best be conceived as a modified version of 
Kantian spontaneity. In this way, the shudder demonstrates that we require a new concept 
of spontaneity that is sensitive to historical suffering and the nature within subjectivity. 
Thus the Adornian shudder criticizes the Kantian sublime, and reveals the historical 
sediment that accrues to the latter aesthetic category, proving it to be ethically 
unjustifiable.  
 This section is divided into three parts. First, I discuss the central contradiction of 
the shudder: although the phenomenon of the shudder appears to be archaic and somatic, 
Adorno’s aesthetics requires the subject to be capable of comprehending objectivity 
critically—through philosophical rationality. The shudder’s irrationality is potentially 
dangerous; however, it is also capable of cutting reason free from its static operation, 
which has become entrenched due to historical events. Second, I discuss the historical 
conditions that affect our reception of the Kantian sublime, and which Adorno responds 
to in his description of the aesthetic shudder. Third, I argue that the shudder responds to, 
and inherits, Kant’s theory of spontaneity in the sublime. I turn to the sublime because it 
demonstrates the traditional moment inherent in Adorno’s new category. The sublime 
calls for critical retrieval: its violent and repressive aspects need to be amended; however, 	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Kant’s concept of spontaneity may be retained if it is subject to historical negation. A 
new concept of spontaneity may help us to solve Adorno’s aporia: namely, the fact that 
the shudder seems to be an involuntary reaction, which conflicts with Adorno’s demand 
that aesthetic experience retain its cognitive and reflective ground in rationality.  
The shudder appears to be a spontaneous or immediate reaction to nature. As such 
it does not involve conventional, Enlightenment rationality, although such spontaneity is 
a condition for rational, philosophical thought, which must involve a moment of 
involuntary and free receptivity before the unknown. Thus the shudder is the first part of 
the two-stage process of the subject’s gradual awakening, through aesthetic experience, 
to nonidentity. The necessary second stage of such awakening involves philosophical 
reflection upon the receptivity of the shudder and its material content (repressed nature 
and history). Thus the shudder is poised on a knife-edge between regression to 
immediacy (mimetic lostness in the whole) and the awareness of mediation (which 
involves critical cognition), which occurs in and through the shudder. Without the 
shudder, reason would have no impetus or motivation to question its own instrumental 
practices, and it would not experience the suffering or harm of objectivity. Thus the 
shudder has a dual role: it both guards against abstract representation and it guides reason 
through its own history of violence, and the suffering of objects. We might compare the 
shudder to Andre Breton’s concept of automatic writing, which places the subject in an 
involuntary and trance-like state in order to reveal the damage inflicted by rationality, and 
the inexhaustible nature of her unconscious. In the same way, the shudder exposes the 
subject to the overflowing impulses of her nature, and its historical trajectory, and teaches 
her reason to carefully follow those impulses—instead of blindly controlling them.  
Under patient contemplation artworks begin to move. To this extent they are truly 
afterimages of the primordial shudder in the age of reification; the terror of that 
age is recapitulated via reified objects. […] Because the shudder is past and yet 
survives, artworks objectivate it as its afterimage. For if at one time human beings 
in their powerlessness against nature feared the shudder as something real, the 
fear is no less intense, no less justified, that the shudder will dissipate. All 
enlightenment is accompanied by the anxiety that what set enlightenment in 
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motion in the first place and what enlightenment ever threatens to consume may 
disappear: truth.265 
In this passage, Adorno describes the shudder as a “primordial” reaction: namely, the 
subject’s “terror” before uncontrollable nature.266 Such terror is a pre-rational response to 
otherness: Adorno is referring to a time, in pre-history, before reason was fully capable of 
dominating objects through discursive concepts and categories. The shudder names the 
experience of objectivity before the subject was capable of mastering nature. Yet, since 
we may occasionally experience the shudder in modern art, it must be a force that breaks 
through, or undermines, instrumental rationality. At the same time, the shudder is also 
vulnerable—it is in danger of becoming reified, and thus disappearing, as reason abstracts 
from sensuousness. This is why Adorno argues that, since artworks participate in 
Enlightenment, the shudder is an afterimage—that is, it is a historical phenomenon that 
appears ghost-like, due to the repressive effects of instrumental rationality; this is why the 
shudder is “remembered” rather than present.267 At the same time, however, the shudder 
reappears in the modern subject’s interaction with objectivity.  
 In Adorno’s account, the hegemony achieved by rationality over nature—or 
totalizing demythologization—represses the shudder, in order to extirpate sensuousness 
and materiality from the subject’s experience. Thus we can interpret the shudder as a pre-
historic phenomenon that reappears in artworks and experiences that succeed in 
challenging the abstracting and reifying mechanisms of rationality: in which materiality 
briefly resists subsumption.  
If through the demythologization of the world consciousness freed itself from the 
ancient shudder, that shudder is permanently reproduced in the historical 
antagonism of subject and object. The object became as incommensurable to 
experience, as foreign and frightening, as mana once was.268 
If consciousness apparently freed itself from qualitative experience as Enlightenment 
tightened its grip, that experience always threatens to return and haunt the subject 
whenever nonidentity appears—that is, whenever the subject acknowledges that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 AT, p. 106.  
266 AT, p. 106.  
267 AT, p. 106.  
268 AT, pp. 110-111.  
	   103	  
concepts’ attempts to control objectivity fails. The reappearance of fear signals the 
reappearance of materiality. Thus subjects felt the shudder most strongly in the pre-
historic era that preceded the Enlightenment. Their efforts to control this fear through 
magical rituals and rites reflect early forms of domination that gradually developed into 
different forms, such as the scientific method and concepts that abstracted from objective 
qualities. The shudder is an “ancient” and irrational phenomenon that demonstrates the 
subject’s immediate, natural, and somatic reaction to otherness—a reaction that is 
effectively divorced from rationality.269 Rationality feels threatened by the shudder, and 
wishes to brutally repress it, because instrumental reason is unable to recognize itself in 
the shudder, which presents materiality that has been stripped of any concepts or 
categories that might serve to contain or control it. Of course, since instrumental reason 
regresses to nature, philosophical reflection ought to recognize that the shudder is present 
in experience, since the shudder presents the violence of material nature. Such 
recognition through philosophical reflection, if it occurs in modern artworks or in 
experiences that present particularity, would cause instrumental reason to recoil from the 
true image of itself as driven by instincts and cruelty, resulting in an equally violent act of 
repression.  
 The shudder is essentially a natural reaction to otherness that eventually appears 
either in aesthetic experience (through sublimation), or in experiences of materiality 
(when the force of materiality overcomes reason’s capacity for repression). In both cases, 
we experience a dramatization of reason’s pre-history.  
Rather, this shock is the moment in which recipients forget themselves and 
disappear into the work; it is the moment of being shaken. The recipients lose 
their footing; the possibility of truth, embodied in the aesthetic image, becomes 
tangible. This immediacy…is a function of mediation, of penetrating and 
encompassing experience [Erfahrung]; it takes shape in the fraction of an instant, 
and for this the whole of consciousness is required, not isolated stimuli and 
responses.270 
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The physicality, power, and magical appearance of the shudder are all evident in this 
passage. The shudder is able to cancel repression because it effectively puts the subject’s 
ego, and her capacity for rational determination, out of action; further, the shudder enacts 
a certain violence (“the moment of being shaken”) that seems to overturn instrumental 
rationality’s utilitarian comportment.271 The shudder also reduces active subjects to 
passive “recipients” (a word that Adorno uses twice) of otherness that they cannot 
understand, much less control.272 Adorno also uses the metaphor of falling (“lose their 
footing”) to suggest that subjects descend to animal instincts, and that they feel some 
emotions associated with the dynamical sublime, such as fear, terror, and awe. He 
continues that the shudder is “immediacy [that]…is a function of mediation,” which 
means not that only reflection is able to make sense of, and halt, the regression that the 
shudder provokes.273 Of course, the shudder is not wholly immediate, because it is an 
historical phenomenon that only appears through artworks (and other encounters with 
materiality). The shudder gains in forcefulness during the twentieth century, and in our 
own time, because reason’s irrationality has reached an extreme level. Nevertheless, as 
historical, it represents the moment when nature could still breach the subject’s 
defenses—before the development of an enlightened, transcendental ego. Thus the 
shudder provides an image of the dialectical relationship of nature and history.  
 The aesthetic category of the shudder represents Adorno’s attempt to come to 
terms with a natural and somatic reaction that is capable of undermining, and revealing 
the artificial mechanisms of, instrumental rationality. It is evident that Adorno, in AT, 
struggled with the question of how precisely the shudder functions in experience. That is, 
is the shudder a wholly regressive reaction, or could it be redeemed by philosophical 
reflection? Could the shudder be considered a mode of dialectical negation? If the 
shudder is merely provoked by reification, it seems likely to provoke despair. If it is 
provoked by difference and nonidentity, however, critical reflection might result instead.  
The aesthetic shudder once again cancels the distance held by the subject. 
Although artworks offer themselves to observation, they at the same time 	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disorient the observer who is held at the distance of a mere spectator […] The 
instant of this transition is art’s highest. It rescues subjectivity…by the negation 
of subjectivity. The subject, convulsed by art, has real experiences…these 
experiences are those in which the subject’s petrification in his own subjectivity 
dissolves and the narrowness of his self-positedness is revealed.274 
The shudder cancels distance by activating natural forces within the subject that are, in 
determinate judgment, and in disinterested aesthetic judgment, repressed. Adorno’s 
assertion that the shudder rescues subjectivity through negating it suggests that he accepts 
a modified, non-positive, and wholly critical form of determinate negation. That is, 
determinate negation, for Adorno, does not entail the production of a positive pattern that 
develops the false, negated pattern; rather, it results in the mining of truth from untruth, 
or possibility from actuality.275 The “real experiences” that the subject undergoes in the 
shudder are twofold. The subject feels terror in the confrontation with nature, which 
results in a feeling of disorientation; as a result, the subject’s rational engagement with 
objects—driven by self-preservation and the desire to control—fails. The convulsion of 
the shudder produces happiness: which Adorno defines as a critical experience in which 
the subject becomes aware of the harmed natural stratum within herself. As the subject 
engages with this natural stratum, she also perceives the (future) possibility of relating to 
materiality in a non-violent way.276 Happiness, for Adorno, must involve grief if it is not 
to culminate in an empty forgetting, or in blind conformity with the status quo.277 In this 
way, past suffering must inform all utopian longing if it is to be responsible for historical 
injustice.  
The shudder has a complex relation to spirit. Although the shudder is produced by 
spirit in artworks, which present the shudder’s “legacy” or remembered history, this does 
not mean that the shudder is a wholly rational phenomenon.278 On the contrary: Adorno’s 
concept of spirit names “the self-recognition of spirit itself as natural.”279 Spirit 	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encompasses subjectivity and objectivity, which mutually condition each other. Yet this 
recognition cannot involve categorical determinate judgment, or even reflective 
judgment, because it must involve another kind of awareness—one that does not repress 
bodily and unconscious processes. “Art is spiritualized not by the ideas it affirms but 
through the elemental—the intentionless—that is able to receive the spirit in itself; the 
dialectic of the elemental and spirit is the truth content.”280 This is why art’s increasing 
spiritualization involves the integration of the nonidentical, rather than its suppression.281 
We can define the nonidentical as a complex of natural-material-objective-historical 
processes—which cause instrumental reason to fail in its attempts at systematization.  
With this background, we can see that Adorno is struggling to balance experience 
between two dialectical poles, which remain in tension throughout his work. On the one 
hand, Adorno discusses the shudder as a somatic and quasi-physical experience, which 
leads away from reflection, because it makes past suffering present; on the other hand, 
Adorno must ensure that the shudder plays an enlightened and philosophical function in 
aesthetic experience—as a force that enables critical awareness (for example, of the 
violence and suffering caused by instrumental reason). This contradiction animates the 
aesthetic category, but it also pulls the subject in two different directions.  
 
Negative Dialectics and the Primacy of Critical Reason 
 
Adorno, throughout his work but most notably in Negative Dialectics, asserts that critical 
experience—that experience capable of resisting ideological illusion—must involve the 
subject’s philosophical rationality: “The cognitive utopia would be to use concepts to 
unseal the nonconceptual with concepts, without making it their equal.”282 Since 
subjectivity has no choice but to employ rationality if it wishes to avoid empty sensory 
experience that cannot critically evaluate false claims, it must use concepts to transcend 
conceptual cognition, and to open that which expresses difference or otherness: the 
nonidentical. Adorno asserts: “Philosophical reflection makes sure of the nonconceptual 	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in the concept. It would be empty otherwise, according to Kant’s dictum; in the end, 
having ceased to be a concept of anything at all, it would be nothing.”283 Reason requires 
materiality so that it is grounded in real experience; conversely, materiality requires 
reason so that it is formed in accordance with the subject’s critical consciousness of 
society and history. Utopian cognition would therefore involve “full, unreduced 
experience in the medium of conceptual reflection…”.284 These lines make the 
contradiction referred to earlier painfully clear: if the shudder is an aspect of aesthetic 
experience that involves somatic and unconscious processes, and if critical consciousness 
is constrained by its method of operation, which necessarily employs concepts, then how 
could the shudder give rise to properly critical, mediated, and aware cognition—in which 
the subject becomes aware of herself as constituted by and through nature and history? 
The forces repressed by rationality, which arguably rise to the surface during the shudder, 
must result in the awakening or provoking, rather than the inhibiting or silencing, of 
critical reason and philosophical reflection.  
Why does Adorno retain his belief in rationality when it is responsible for such 
historical devastation? Foster argues that it is not possible to present what lies beyond 
reason, because such a position falls into either irrationalism or immanentism.285 Adorno 
“consistently refuses the temptation to present what exceeds that conception [the 
conception of disenchanted rationality] as a possible standpoint.”286 According to Adorno, 
on Foster’s account, the belief that we may transcend disenchanted or reified rationality is 
problematic because it risks falling into two untenable positions.287 The first position is 
simply irrationalism—the belief that there is a “deeper thought” that lies “beyond” 
rationality; the second position involves attempting to communicate such a “deeper” or 
transcendent reason in disenchanted or “reduced” concepts, which merely cancels the 
transcendence of the first position and returns the subject to false immanence.288 Foster 
remarks, “Adorno saw that the only way out of this oscillation between irrationalism, and 	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a reduction to what is already known, lay in a rigorous, immanent critique of our 
concepts.”289  
Before we discuss Adorno’s concept further, we should survey a few scholars 
who have written about the shudder. Julian Roberts notes that the sublime allows to 
subject to be “[l]iberated from the discursive”.290 Such discursive breakdown causes true 
experience, which occurs when “[t]he object breaks free of the constraints of intellectual 
intent and claims for itself a truth from which it is otherwise estranged”.291 The subject 
undergoes “perturbation” (Erschutterung) when she gives herself over to the object and 
“forgets herself”.292 Although Roberts rightly emphasizes the forgetting involved in the 
sublime, he also suggests that nonidentity involves the complete disappearance of 
discursive thought. Yet for Adorno nonidentity is only expressed through the mediation 
of discursive thought.293  
Surti Singh argues that the shudder offers a way of bridging the Enlightenment 
subject and an “anticipatory subjectivity” that does not yet exist.294 “The shudder, which 
Adorno defines as the act of being touched by the other, is made possible by art’s 
mimetic comportment that fosters a passivity toward the other—assimilating itself to the 
other instead of subordinating it. This experience of being touched by the other evokes a 
subjectivity that is not yet subjectivity—it is an anticipatory subjectivity that emerges 
from the momentary suspension of the dominant rationality.”295 Singh analyzes the 
complex relationship between Kant’s account of the sublime and Adorno’s account of the 
shudder. She also notes that the shudder consists in a dialectic between mimesis and 	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Enlightenment reason. That is, the mimetic shudder as it appears in the artwork criticizes 
the repressive and controlling activity of rationality. Singh rightly emphasizes the fact 
that the shudder forces the subject to encounter the nature within her, which implicitly 
reveals the Kantian concept of autonomy to be grounded in violence: “The sublime 
construction of the artwork shakes the subject’s rigid categories by making it aware of the 
suppressed otherness—nature—upon which its autonomy is based. The shudder is a 
reminder of what is sacrificed in the formation of enlightenment subjectivity.”296  
Adorno casts the shudder as a pre-reflective response. The problem with Adorno’s 
account of the shudder is that it is non-cognitive, because it erupts into consciousness 
before reason can control it. Yet, this dynamic feature may also rescue the subject—
through animating frozen faculties, and inciting philosophical thought. On the one hand, 
it is valuable to provide a refuge for a somatic responsiveness that remains autonomous 
from rationality (for instance, sensory passivity or bodily suffering). However, if the 
shudder is divorced from cognition entirely, it risks losing its capacity for critique, which 
allows the subject to reflect upon social falsity—rather than merely react to it. If aesthetic 
experience is viewed as non-cognitive, it remains constitutively unable to provide a 
critique of social and historical untruth. To sum up, in order to ensure that the shudder is 
not viewed as an irrational or immediate response to objectivity, it must be able to incite, 
and awaken, philosophical thought—while not being identical to such thought. 
 We can describe the shudder as a force that awakens and jolts the subject. In 
archaic pre-historic experience the subject felt fear; in modern aesthetic experience, 
however, the subject experiences shock, which makes a break or rupture in her 
experience. This break is not merely destructive, because it opens a space in experience 
that reflection may occupy, in order to orient itself in a way that acknowledges the object.  
The traditional account of sublime experience provides a partial model for the 
shudder. However, Kant’s model is too dependent on a redemptive hope for positive 
transcendence, which Adorno cannot share. In Adorno, the Kantian model is amended to 
reflect modern historical experience. As we have seen, in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, 	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the experience of the dynamical sublime occurs in two stages. The subject becomes 
aware of objectivity (in the failure of imagination); next, the subject becomes aware of 
her own agency (in the awareness of moral freedom). Kant maintains that aesthetic 
nonidentity may be transcended through subjective control. This occurs when the 
imagination fails, which threatens to throw the subject’s capacity for presentation into 
disarray; as a result, the subject’s reason attains sovereignty over sensibility. The truth 
content in the Kantian sublime lies in the insight that failure may enable reflection. 
However, such reflection is always negative for Adorno. Sublime experience indicates a 
crisis within subjectivity that Kant attempts to avoid. The Kantian subject conceives of 
nature as the opposite of freedom, and so remains discounts the fact that nature is 
freedom’s material condition. Nonetheless, Adorno should supplement his account of the 
shudder with the following Kantian insight: that, when experience splinters, the subject 
may become aware of the repressed object. In Kant’s theory such awareness (the 
frustration of failure) is immediately superseded by the subject’s knowledge of her 
alleged freedom (and aesthetic pleasure).  
The shudder arises historically when subjectivity is separated from nature, and 
when the subject perceives nature as a threat to reason, rather than as a part of reason. 
Subjectivity has been most traumatically wrenched away from nature in the twentieth 
century. For Adorno, the atrocities of fascism and the Nazi death camps provided a 
horrific reason why a new categorical imperative was required in the twentieth century.297 
For Adorno, philosophy and art could no longer claim that their conditions of possibility 
could transcend historical, cultural, and social experience. Philosophy that does not 
reflect on the fact that it is mediated by history, culture, and society is complicit in their 
irrationality. Thus fascism, which infiltrated subjectivity through distorting rationality, 
threatened to destroy the capacity for philosophical reflection altogether. Adorno argues 
that the extreme horrors of the twentieth century demonstrate that the subject must not 
forget her material conditions, and that reason must reflect on its goals and purposes so 
that it does not mistake unique particulars for universal signifiers. Fascist violence is a 	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direct result of the bureaucratic cruelty that valorizes action for its own sake, and 
divorces materiality from experience, resulting in pure abstraction.  
 
Kant is unable to theorize and recognize—much less diagnose—social pathology 
(historical and social illness that infects rationality). For this reason, Adorno realized, 
traditional cultural categories could not be relied upon to provide enlightening or 
progressive experience, because they are unable to critically examine their own contents. 
Thus, traditional categories must revise themselves so that they become new; these new 
categories must reflect upon society, history, and human experience.  
   
The Shudder as Spontaneity 
 
The shudder is Adorno’s negative description of spontaneity—considered as both 
historical and natural.298 This explains why it oscillates between immediacy and 
mediation: the shudder is both a historical-social phenomenon and a spontaneous 
phenomenon that arises through the dialectic between subject and object, which animates 
and revives critical agency. Thus the shudder offers a critique of Kant’s concept of 
spontaneity as spiritual autonomy, which arises from the subject alone, and which 
excludes nature or objectivity. Since for Adorno the shudder arises as the subject 
separates herself from nature, and since both history and nature constitute subjectivity, 
we may also describe the shudder as the agency within nature—which spontaneously 
reflects on itself.  
Recall the passage discussed earlier, in which Adorno maintains: “What later 
came to be called subjectivity, freeing itself from the blind anxiety of the shudder, is at 
the same time the shudder’s own development; life in the subject is nothing but what 
shudders, the reaction to the total spell that transcends the spell.”299 Enlightenment 
subjectivity—which arises out of the divorce between nature and history, or myth and 	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Enlightenment—constitutes a repression of the shudder. At the same time, the shudder 
contributes a certain agency to the Enlightenment subject—although this agency should 
not be defined in terms of Kantian spontaneity, in which the subject controls the object, 
thereby defining reason’s capacity to dominate materiality. This agency should be 
defined as a certain dynamism through which nature spontaneously reflects upon itself. 
This explains Adorno’s paradoxical definition of the shudder: it is both “life” (that is, a 
capacity for resistance that is mediated by nature and history) and a “reaction” to 
ideological reification that remains capable of transcending it.300 Rick Elmore claims that 
the shudder ultimately expresses ecological experience because it is an experience of the 
life within the subject: “The shudder or living part of subjectivity is that within 
consciousness that resists thought’s tendency to take itself as all there is or all that 
matters. It is the reminder of the objective essence of thought…”.301 I agree, but would 
add that the shudder is a force of resistance as well.  
The shudder rises above the spell of ideology because it is the natural element of 
the subject that contains the germ of reflexivity—that is, it remains a kind of agency that 
is not merely subjective, but objective as well. This natural or material agency has been 
consistently denied by the philosophical tradition, especially the post-Kantian variety, but 
it remains crucial to acknowledge it, particularly during the current historical crisis, in 
which the repression of non-human or animal nature is made possible (and more vicious) 
by the repression of human nature—and in which the survival of all nature (human and 
non-human) depends on the subject’s non-violent relationship to objectivity.  
 The shudder bridges pre-historical experience (the fear of threatening nature) with 
historical experience (the critical reflection on that fear, which involves acting 
nonviolently towards nature and therefore overcoming one’s immediate reactions). The 
shudder is also the power of the subject to react to reification without becoming 
assimilated to it—that is, without becoming reified herself. Thus the shudder names the 
subject’s capacity for resistance to reification, which has been severely reduced by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 AT, pp. 418-419.  
301 Rick Elmore, ‘Ecological Experience: Aesthetics, Life, and the Shudder in Adorno’s 
Critical Theory’, in Ross (ed), The Aesthetic Ground…, p. 150.  
	   113	  
instrumental reason but not destroyed completely. The shudder names a kind of non-
rational agency.  
 The shudder is “opposed to” lived experience [Erlebnis], in which the subject 
uncritically satisfies her desires, or gains shallow pleasure, without reflecting on the 
function of that pleasure in the social-historical context, and without using ethical 
judgment.302 The shudder is opposed to lived experience because it constitutes natural 
agency that provokes dynamic movement: movement that must be repressed or forgotten 
by the transcendental subject, but which constantly reappears in the empirical subject. 
Such movement assists cognitive reflection, although the shudder operates on a somatic 
level, because this dynamic movement resists reification, and the desire to separate 
subject from object, which is driven by the fear of otherness.   
In order to understand the difference between lived-experience (Erlebnis) and 
thought-experience (Erfahrung), we must turn to Benjamin’s essay “The Storyteller.” 
Benjamin writes that, after the First World War, shell-shocked soldiers could no longer 
communicate their traumatic experiences; as a result, narrative storytelling declined as a 
source of meaning, because the self could no longer be considered whole or integrated. 
Benjamin writes:  
…experience has fallen in value. […] with the [First] World War a process began 
to become apparent which has not halted since then. Was it not noticeable that 
men returned from the battlefield grown silent—not richer but poorer in 
communicable experience? […] For never has experience been contradicted more 
thoroughly than strategic experience by tactical warfare…bodily experience by 
mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power. A generation that had 
gone to school on a horse-drawn streetcar now stood under the open sky in a 
countryside in which nothing remained unchanged but the clouds, and beneath 
those clouds, in a field of force of destructive torrents and explosions, was the 
tiny, fragile human body.303  	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At issue for Benjamin is the individual subject’s traumatic loss of a kind of relationship 
to the world, and to the self, which results from modernity’s alienated distance from 
moral and reflective ends. Benjamin articulates two distinct forms of experience in 
modern life: unreflective and shallow experience, in which the subject is constantly 
distracted and shocked by fetishistic appearances (Erlebnis), and thoughtful and patient 
experience, which is capable of reflecting on both subject and object (Erfahrung).304  
 The shudder is a force for possibility rather than mere actuality—it is critical 
dynamism that is capable of “shattering” repetitive stasis. Thus the shudder is critical and 
enlivening simultaneously. Instrumental rationality is broken apart by the shudder, in 
order to reveal another kind of agency that is constituted by nature and history.  
For a few moments the I becomes aware, in real terms, of the possibility of letting 
self-preservation fall away, though it does not actually succeed in realizing this 
possibility. It is not the aesthetic shudder that is semblance but rather its attitude 
to objectivity: In its immediacy the shudder feels the potential as if it were actual. 
The I is seized by the unmetaphorical, semblance-shattering consciousness: that it 
itself is not ultimate, but semblance. […] This subjective experience [Erfahrung] 
directed against the I is an element of the objective truth of art.305 
The shudder is a force of “possibility”: it allows the subject to imagine that bracketing 
her determinative judgment could be possible, and thus grants the possibility of a 
different relationship to objectivity or nature.306 Thus it re-enchants subjectivity while 
also remaining critical of unethical or false instrumentality. The shudder also destroys the 
illusion that the transcendental subject grounds the empirical subject—which opens up 
the potential for another concept of spontaneity, in which the subject would not dominate 
nature, but would actively embrace the non-violent “unity of the multiplicitous.”307  
In the sublime, Kant tries to resolve imagination's failure. Kant’s solution 
however implies that only reason may synthesize objectivity. For Adorno, on the 
contrary, reason and mimesis require each other, because “thought...approaches tautology 
when it shrinks from the sublimation of the mimetic comportment. The fatal separation of 	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the two came about historically and is revocable. Ratio without mimesis is self-
negating.”308 Reason manipulates objects when it employs them exclusively as means. 
Such calculation forgets that every object is a qualitative manifold in experience.309 
Aesthetic comportment, by contrast, is the “process that mimesis sets in motion”:  
...aesthetic comportment is to be defined as the capacity to shudder, as if goose 
bumps were the first aesthetic image. What later came to be called subjectivity, 
freeing itself from the blind anxiety of the shudder, is at the same time the 
shudder's own development; life in the subject is nothing but what shudders, the 
reaction to the total spell that transcends the spell. Consciousness without shudder 
is reified consciousness. That shudder in which subjectivity stirs without yet being 
subjectivity is the act of being touched by the other. Aesthetic comportment 
assimilates itself to that other rather than subordinating it. Such a constitutive 
relation of the subject to objectivity in aesthetic comportment joins eros and 
knowledge.310  
The shudder involves “anxiety” because it is a reaction to nonidentity: the divide between 
reason and nature. At the same time, the shudder develops into true subjectivity, or 
spontaneity—the capacity to overcome the fear of otherness, and to embrace the nature 
within reason. In modern times, this development appears only in works of authentic art. 
Adorno writes that the shudder is “life in the subject”, which suggests that it is a force of 
resistance, capable of animating frozen nature.311 In this sense, the shudder both reacts to 
and transcends “the spell”—reified illusion.312 Finally, the shudder constitutes a kind of 
agency that exists before subjectivity is fully developed—that is, before reason learns to 	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repress nature. Such agency appears in the encounter with otherness, but it is not merely a 
reaction to that otherness. Instead, the subject embraces nature. This act is both active 
(because it is initiated by forces in the subject) and passive (because it does not involve 
determinative judgment). The subject that is able to assimilate herself to objectivity 
instead of merely mastering it is truly liberated: because the natural-historical 
sedimentation within her reason is not repressed, and because she recognizes that she is 
animated by the same agency that animates objectivity.313 In this way, the shudder should 
be defined as a kind of spontaneity that is material and non-subjective, and which is 
continuous with, rather than separate from, objectivity or nature.  
Adorno re-names the relationship between mimesis and rationality “eros and 
knowledge” for two reasons.314 The shudder, which brings the subject closer to the object, 
allows each to gain awareness of the other. For this reason, the relation is epistemic. On 
the other hand, the shudder cannot separate itself from those somatic and natural desires 
that compose subjectivity, and reason itself. Thus eros—or desire, which Adorno also 
names Kantian interest—is a driving force within aesthetic experience. Adorno observes: 
“One can say that precisely in the taboo placed on desire by the work of art, precisely in 
the refusal of every work to be touched, consumed or in any way appropriated, lies that 
element of nature that was present in desire—but now sublated in its negative form.”315 In 
other words, the artwork sublimates desire in order to carve out an autonomous realm for 
itself. Sublimation, however, causes pain, because it distances the desiring subject from 
the object of her desire; thus, beauty expresses suffering for Adorno.316 Finally, in 
dialectical fashion, sublimation cannot help but express remnants of that which it tries to 
transform. As we have discussed earlier, interest cannot be eradicated in an attempt to 
purify judgment; instead, it must be embraced and reflected upon in order to dissolve its 
regressive and blind directionality. The shudder returns the subject to her own nature, in 
order to demonstrate how reason arises out of natural impulses. Knowledge of objectivity 
only occurs through mimetic comportment, which follows desire instead of repressing it.  
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We can now see that the question discussed above—how the shudder may be 
considered merely sensory or somatic and yet able to bring the subject to conscious 
awareness of external and internal conditions—may be resolved. The shudder, considered 
as spontaneity, names the animate potential within nature that allows subjectivity to 
embrace difference. As a dynamic force, the shudder is neither mimesis nor reason, 
considered as isolated poles; rather, it is the tension that holds them apart.  
 The shudder, finally, responds to the Kantian sublime in several different ways. 
The shudder is an experience of spontaneity described negatively—a recollection of the 
pre-historic past that points towards future possibilities. The spontaneity of the shudder, 
however, appears through nature, rather than through the transcendental subject. In 
addition, the shudder, like the sublime, dramatizes the encounter between objectivity and 
subjectivity, in order to clarify the subject’s relation towards difference or otherness. The 
shudder and the sublime both describe nature, and the subject’s relation to the natural 
world. For Kant, nature must be organized and mastered in order to produce it as 
cognitive material; for Adorno, nature must be listened to and accepted so that the subject 
does not repress and imprison her own impulses. Adorno’s description of the shudder 
indicates that nature may animate itself. For this reason, the shudder is a force of 
resistance—which allows subjectivity to transcend reified illusion towards freedom.  
 This allows us to return to the guiding claim of the whole thesis: that 
philosophical reflection requires historical experience if it is to avoid reification. The 
shudder demonstrates that another, non-subjective, concept of spontaneity must be 
developed from out of historical experience—namely, reason’s domination of nature, and 
the abstraction of subject from object. In addition, art requires philosophy so that the 
historical experience within it may be radicalized: in the same way that the shudder 
develops its agency or spontaneity through moving between nature and sprit, or subject 
and object. Thus the shudder is neither wholly sensuous nor wholly cognitive; it exists as 
the animating force that guides both of those extremes.  
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Chapter Three: Adorno’s Concept of Mimesis and the Kantian Imagination  
Section One: Expression, Mimesis, and Reification 
 
“The inextricability of reification and mimesis defines the aporia of artistic 
expression.”317 
In the last chapter I discussed that aspect of aesthetic experience that may be considered 
objective: the sublime, or the shudder. This chapter continues our investigation of 
objectivity. In the first section of this chapter I will discuss Adorno’s accounts of 
mimesis, and his account of aesthetic expression. I begin with Adorno’s account of 
mimesis, and argue that its proximity to reification presents a challenge for any critical 
theory of aesthetics. Then in the second section I turn to Kant’s account of imagination, 
and the artistic genius, in order to argue that they provide the fertile ground from which 
Adorno’s theory of expression develops. For Kant, genius rests on the concept of nature; 
likewise, for Adorno, mimesis rests on the experience of otherness, or nonidentity. As we 
become aware of the genesis of Adornian concepts, we may judge them more fairly; in 
addition, we may come to know the concrete consequences of the historical distance that 
separates Kant and Adorno for any theory of aesthetics. For these reasons, historical 
analysis is a necessary aspect of philosophical reflection.  
 Reification is an invaluable concept for any Marxist social critique. Yet its precise 
definition is controversial. For instance, Hulatt claims that reification should not be 
considered objective; rather, it is a subjective feature of experience that conflates the 
subjective concept and the material object.318 For this reason, according to Hulatt, identity 
thinking is itself reification. Hulatt writes: “Reification, for Adorno, is the propensity of 
the individual to accept concepts as exhaustively modeling their object.”319 Hulatt argues 
for a Kantian reading of reification as an “epistemological tendency”—in which the 
subject’s distorted experience forces her to perceive objects in a distorted manner, similar 
to transcendental illusion. The problem with Hulatt’s definition is that it cannot explain—	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and even avoids—Adorno’s concept of damaged life: the fact that nature (the objectivity 
within subjectivity) is violently harmed by rational practices. Such practices, which result 
in reified life, do not merely distort perception: they damage objectivity itself. If Hulatt’s 
definition were correct, reification would disappear when true experience (or that which 
anticipates it) occurs. But this is not the case. After listening to a Beckett play, reification 
does not disappear—although suffering may be alleviated, as damaged subjects express 
their pain. For these reasons, I do not think that Hulatt’s definition is accurate. Reification 
is objective; it is caused by violence; and it results in the freezing of fluid dynamism: 
death.  
Recall that, for Kant, imagination mediates between the faculties, which are 
isolated from one another, in order to bring freedom and nature together.320 Dusing claims 
that the free play of the faculties “rests on” the rational idea of the supersensible substrate 
of humanity; as a result, aesthetic judgment allows the subject to bridge nature and 
freedom.321 In the same fashion, for Adorno, mimetic comportment allows the artist 
proximity to social-historical reality, and grants her an experience of nonidentity. Peter 
Osborne observes: “Adorno defines mimesis as 'the non-conceptual affinity of a 
subjective creation with its objective and unposited other'. It is this non-conceptual 
character that is crucial to art's metaphysical role as a 'spokesman for repressed nature' 
(the nonidentical)”.322 
Adorno’s concept of expression is grounded in his concept of mimesis. Yet the 
diverse functions of mimetic comportment are startling: Adorno argues that it remains a 
subjective faculty that may express objectivity; a quasi-rational faculty that escapes the 
irrationality of instrumental reason; a cognitive mode of perception that appears in 
aesthetic experience; and a mode of behavior that originated in an archaic or pre-historic 
time, which is capable of resisting the coercion of Enlightenment reason.323 It is not 	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possible to unify these aspects—but their paradoxical nature may be instructive. In this 
section I’d like to focus on one particular point of tension. Adorno does not explain how 
mimesis may both present empirical reality while also separating itself from that reality’s 
toxicity. The method of imitating empirical reality in order to present social falsity means 
that mimesis must identify with the defects within that reality. As a result, mimetic 
comportment must become indistinguishable from the distortions of empirical reality, and 
the “pathology” of reason itself.324 Michael Cahn describes the problem as follows: 
“When art has finally surrendered, however mimetically, to the principle of rationality, 
then the only conceivable cure of society/nature would have to follow the pattern of 
disease curing disease...'heal the wound by the spear which caused it'...”.325  For this very 
reason, artworks seem unable to transcend history.326 Artworks only express the reified 
nature of experience through sacrificing their mimetic impulses to rationality: “Modern 
works relinquish themselves mimetically to reification, their principle of death”.327 
Miriam Bratu Hansen connects this phenomenon to Freud, zoology, and instrumental 
reason:  
To the extent that it is patterned on zoological forms of mimicry, Adorno's 
concept of mimesis involves the slippage between life and death, the assimilation 
to lifeless material (as in the case of the chameleon) or feigning death for the sake 
of survival. This paradox, indebted to Freud's theory of the death drive, structures 
the dichotomies of the mimesis concept in significant ways. In an unreflected 
form, mimesis as mimicry converges with the regime of instrumental reason, its 
reduction of life to self-preservation and the reproduction of domination by the 
very means designed to abolish it. In that sense, mimesis entails what Michael 
Cahn calls 'a deadly reification compulsion' […]. In the context of aesthetic 
theory, however, this mimesis onto the reified and alienated (“Mimesis ans 
Verhartete und Entfremdete”), the world of living death, is a crucial means of 	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negation available to modern art—as an “admixture of poison,” a pharmakon that 
allegorizes the symptoms though it necessarily fails as a therapy.328  
Thus we might ask several questions: How can mimetic comportment avoid the danger 
that it will regress into false life? Is it possible for mimetic comportment to identify itself 
with reification and avoid regression? And, how does mimetic comportment’s practice of 
identification affect the self in aesthetic experience?329   
Adorno reflects: “There is no general test for deciding if an artist who wipes out 
expression altogether has become the mouthpiece of reified consciousness or of the 
speechless, expressionless expression that denounces it. Authentic art knows the 
expression of the expressionless, a kind of weeping without tears.”330 An artwork without 
expression might reflect more directly the totally integrated and rational nature of society, 
or it might be a failed work, one that has not allowed mimetic impulses to emerge. As 
Cahn argues, the subject should not attempt to avoid rationality; instead, she must try to 
use reason to illuminate, rather than to control, an object. For Adorno, “the subject [must] 
assume an involved attitude in the process of imitation as an adaptive 'identifying with' 
which is 'guided by the logic (Logik) of the object.”331 
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Mimetic comportment entails a loss of selfhood332 that may integrate the subject 
within the social whole. In order to avoid this danger, I propose viewing mimesis as an 
aspect of philosophical reflection. Adorno's solution—to balance mimesis with 
rationality—falls short, because rationality and mimesis are two separate poles of 
experience; they do not affect each other. Bernstein argues that “[m]imesis is 
appropriation without subsumption; in it the appropriating subject likens herself to the 
object, reversing conceptual appropriation...”.333 The problem with Bernstein’s reading is 
that it reduces the dialectical interaction between mimesis and construction, and fails to 
acknowledge that social-historical forces, and not only epistemic considerations, are at 
work in Kant’s distinction between them. Rational construction cannot rescue mimesis 
from assimilation. Thus, mimetic comportment must become philosophical if it is to 
resist reification.   
My argument will proceed in several steps. I argue first that Adorno’s concept of 
mimesis entails its identification with the pathology of rationality and the abstraction of 
the social whole; second, I claim that Adorno’s concept of expression parallels Kant’s 
concept of the artistic genius; finally, I propose a solution that enables Adorno to 
overcome the troubling features of mimetic passivity.  
 
Adorno’s Concept of Mimesis 
 
Several commentators acknowledge the difficulties that attend Adorno’s concept of 
mimesis (see discussions of Cahn and Hansen, above). Rudiger Bubner explains that 
“…[t]he recourse to a mimetic perspective is intended philosophically to repair the 
damage that has been wrought by the sovereign domination of the concept...Through 
mimesis the human mind restores an almost pre-historical attitude to things. We thus 
make intimate and unforced contact with things other than ourselves and relinquish our 
demand for control for the sake of concrete experience.”334  	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Cahn emphasizes the critical and dynamic elements of mimesis, but he downplays 
the fact that mimesis can lead to abstraction and reification as well as to critique. Hansen 
emphasizes the connection between mimesis and Freud’s concept of the death drive, but 
she does not propose a solution to the problem of abstraction. Hansen also does not 
explain how mimesis can be both a “preverbal” kind of knowledge—an automatic reflex 
or survival mechanism that descends from our animal nature—and a reflective or 
dialectical form of “negation,” a description of deathly symptoms that alleviates but 
cannot cure.335 Other commentators pass over the fact that mimesis may become 
authoritarian, and that it is bound up with death.336  
 Adorno confirms that the artwork must “absorb” or accept that which threatens to 
destroy it if is to avoid obliteration by commodification.337 “But the artwork must absorb 
even its most fatal enemy—fungibility; rather than fleeing into concretion, the artwork 
must present through its own concretion the total nexus of abstraction and thereby resist 
it”.338 That is, artworks must avoid becoming fungible or exchangeable. When this 
occurs—for instance, when works are commodified—they no longer express objectivity. 
The work must adapt itself to totality in order to present, and therefore neutralize, its 
most violent features. This occurs through aesthetic form and technique.339 How can 
modern art remain a powerful source of resistance if it aspires to become unified with 
domination? Martin Jay observes: “In the case of Adorno, mimesis becomes problematic 
when it is in league not with reason per so but with the instrumental rationality of the 
modern world. Then what it imitates is the nature morte of a world of reified relations, in 	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which the suffering of both humans and nature is no longer expressed”.340 Adorno argues 
that artworks may only criticize reality through a thorough knowledge of the violence and 
suffering that such reality produces. Adorno explains that modern art is dark for historical 
reasons: “Art is modern art through mimesis of the hardened and alienated; only thereby, 
and not by the refusal of a mute reality, does art become eloquent; this is why art no 
longer tolerates the innocuous.”341 Art’s capacity for expression is connected with its 
capacity to imitate reality and to present suffering. Other artworks or artists contend that 
mere refusal is sufficient to criticize reality; Adorno argues against this solution, because 
it violates the principle of dialectical critique, which must remain close to its object in 
order to know it on its own terms.  
 The formal violence practiced on material follows the material’s resistance to 
formal subjugation: 
The violence done to the material imitates the violence that issued from the 
material and that endures in its resistance to form. The subjective domination of 
the act of forming is not imposed on materials but is read out of them; the cruelty 
of forming is mimesis of myth, with which it struggles. […] If in modern artworks 
cruelty raises its head undisguised, it confirms the idea that in the face of the 
overwhelming force of reality art can no longer rely on its a priori ability to 
transform the dreadful into form. Cruelty is an element of art’s critical reflection 
on itself; art despairs over the claim to power that it fulfills in being reconciled.342  
The first two sentences in this passage appear to be at odds with each other: how could 
violence “done to the material” not be “imposed on” that same material?343 However, I 
think that Adorno is arguing that, since artistic form constitutes an imitation of the 
violence practiced against the material (“subjective domination…is read out of 
[material]”), the violence is not imposed upon the latter from above; rather, the formal 
violence occurs mimetically, through following the experiential impulses of the material 	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itself. According to Adorno, aesthetic form and material must use violence as a 
productive practice. This principle is clearly at odds with Adorno’s desire for non-violent 
synthesis: the search for a method of composition that listens to the material instead of 
submitting it to external organization. Adorno seems to justify such violence by arguing 
that “cruelty” is rendered impotent when it is translated from the empirical to the 
aesthetic sphere.344 Yet aesthetic violence has a definite impact on subjectivity. And 
psychological violence is just as pernicious as physical violence. Modern artworks should 
not merely “transform” suffering: such transformation amounts to silencing suffering 
instead of expressing it.345 Yet art’s identification with violence entails that even 
philosophical reflection is contaminated, because the act of reflection must imitate 
instrumental rationality in order to avoid it. Adorno seems to suggest that there is no 
aspect of the artwork that is not implicated in domination, and that the only way to avoid 
empirical violence is to use a modified form of violence that is carefully measured or 
controlled. This method is troubling, for it suggests that there is hardly any difference 
between the artwork’s technique and the social-historical practices that it seeks to present 
and reflect upon. Jay writes that, for Adorno, “aesthetic illusion…resists mimetological 
closure, or what he calls the ‘general mimetic abandonment to reification, which is the 
principle of death’”.346 Adorno notes that works’ organizing principles are affected by 
reality; for instance, artistic montage emerges from society’s brokenness.347 The spectre 
that the world has become a closed totality—that is, immune to possibility or 
difference—is what forces artworks to imitate, rather than attempting to transcend, 
reality.  
That art, something mimetic, is possible in the midst of rationality, and that it 
employs its means, is a response to the faulty irrationality of the rational world as 
an over-administered world. For the aim of all rationality—the quintessence of the 
means for dominating nature—would have to be something other than means, 
hence something not rational.348  	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In other words, philosophical reason is oriented towards critique, which tries to uncover 
truth; instrumental reason is driven by its own capacity for domination. For this reason, 
instrumental reason is irrational, because it cannot perceive or posit ends. Mimetic 
comportment reveals reason’s irrationality through becoming like its object: hardened, 
dead, and mechanical. Yet the danger of such a method is that its proximity to death will 
overcome and eventually destroy the agent that tries to employ it. For instance, one could 
argue that Dada—the artistic movement that railed against the destruction of the First 
World War, and the hypocrisy and injustice of bourgeois capitalist society—eventually 
succumbed to the same nihilistic violence that it attempted to expose.  
 Adorno states that, although art and empirical totality both use rationality, the 
latter uses it for violent ends while the former uses it to expose violence.349 Figal argues 
that interpretation relies on mimesis: “Interpretive mimesis is also a pre-rational 
relationship to the object, one that helps to resolve the enigma by tracing the immanent 
structures of the work of art to the point at which they break down”.350 The problem with 
this argument is that there seems to be no clear way of ensuring that artworks will 
critique, rather than promote, violence. At what point should the mimetic method 
withdraw from its object in order to begin reflecting upon its brutality? How is it possible 
to reflect philosophically if reason must become irrational? Furthermore, artworks must 
hold themselves at a distance from social untruth in order to be autonomous. How may 
Adorno’s demand that the artwork become autonomous be reconciled with his demand 
that mimetic comportment absorb reification? The principle that the artwork has two 
aspects—heteronomous and autonomous—does not resolve the issue, because they 
operate at different levels. According to Cahn, artworks are mimetic through their 
relation to artistic material: the “historically mediated 'words, colors, sounds, forms and 
procedures' […]. The mimetic behavior towards the material implies accepting and 
cherishing it, being 'guided by its logic'...Mimesis, paradoxically oscillating between 
advertisement and critique, places art in the dilemma of affirming what it negates: 
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rationality”.351 For Adorno, the attempt to isolate art from rationalization must fail, 
because art cannot divorce itself from modern history:  
Art is a stage in the process of what Max Weber called the disenchantment of the 
world, and it is entwined with rationalization; this is the source of all of art’s 
means and methods of production; technique that disparages its ideology inheres 
in this ideology as much as it threatens it because art’s magical heritage 
stubbornly persisted throughout art’s transformations. Yet art mobilizes technique 
in an opposite direction than does domination.352  
Technique is able to differentiate its activity from the domination of nature because the 
aesthetic domination of material through technical procedures occurs in a realm partially 
autonomous from society; thus, such domination may be reflected upon, which 
effectively strips aesthetic violence of its aura of inevitability or authority. Still, Adorno’s 
reassurances that the violence of art is qualitatively different from the violence of society 
occasionally sound hollow, because the coercion of particulars takes place in both 
cases—whether in society or in the artwork. Adorno admits: “the fatality of all 
contemporary art [is] that it is contaminated by the untruth of the ruling totality”.353 
Adorno might respond that, since there is no sphere that is able to remain free of 
domination, it would be untruthful of art to pretend that such purity exists; for this reason, 
violence must appear in works of art, in order to remind the subject of its repressed 
history. Mimesis remains the remnant of pre-historic, archaic, and magical practices that 
allow an agent to identify with an object in order to know it. Hence mimesis practices an 
alternative form of identification: instead of determining an object, the agent merges with 
or enters an object, thereby sacrificing its own identity. This is a dangerous course 
because—although it doubtless enables the agent close proximity with objectivity—it 
risks blurring the line between agent and object. At its worst, such blurring may destroy 
the agent’s capacity for reflection, which depends on retaining a distance between subject 
and object. In addition, the object’s tendencies—which due to fascism and capitalism are 
increasingly irrational and authoritarian—may infiltrate the agent.  	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 Is mimesis an irrational method for attaining truth? Or is mimesis a variety of 
philosophical reflection? Adorno seems uncertain of the answer. The question is 
important because it determines whether or not mimetic comportment wholly identifies 
itself with its object, and the extent to which such comportment may provide a critique. 
Bernstein rightly connects mimesis and expression: “The expressiveness of objects is part 
of what is lost as they become conceptualized by idealist principles and positive science. 
Mimesis in artworks, Adorno claims, is [one] of the expressive features of objects that the 
world no longer contains”.354 Adorno does not provide enough assurance that mimesis 
may reflectively uncover the object. Yet such reflection is necessary if art is to avoid 
reproducing those categories that it seeks to escape from. Mimesis is a rational method 
that aims to uncover the irrational: 
The survival of mimesis, the nonconceptual affinity of the subjectively produced 
with its unposited other, defines art as a form of knowledge and to that extent as 
‘rational.’ For that to which the mimetic comportment responds is the telos of 
knowledge, which art simultaneously blocks with its own categories. Art 
completes knowledge with what is excluded from knowledge and thereby once 
again impairs its character as knowledge, its univocity.355  
In this definition, mimesis is a method that pulls subjectivity towards objectivity. The 
virtue of mimesis is its acceptance of otherness. Yet, as mentioned above, this force 
should be treated with caution, since it has the power to dissolve identity—in the same 
way that magical practices in pre-history brought out the latent nature within subjectivity 
in order to heal it. Adorno writes: “The surrender of art, pulled between regression to 
literal magic or surrender of the mimetic impulse to thinglike rationality, dictates its law 
of motion; the aporia cannot be eliminated. […] Art is rationality that criticizes rationality 
without withdrawing from it…”.356 For Adorno, the artwork is a kind of “force field” that 
is caught between mimesis and rationality.357 Further, “To survive reality at its most 
extreme and grim, artworks that do not want to sell themselves as consolation must 	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equate themselves with that reality. Radical art today is synonymous with dark art; its 
primary color is black.”358 Weitzman interprets the artwork’s blackness as its “refusal” to 
mean anything determinate; I suggest instead that we should read it as an indication of 
the work’s reified interior.359 Yet in order to critique rationality while remaining rational, 
some operation must occur that enables the agent to be both external and internal to the 
totality. Perhaps this is the power of mimesis: it enables independence and dependence at 
the same time. Yet what needs to be explained is how precisely art’s “law of motion” 
may be controlled: for instance, what keeps the language of the work from degenerating 
into ideology or false illusion?360 A Dada collage by Kurt Schwitters may literally cut out 
parts of the empirical world and re-organize them in order to turn violence against itself 
(Figure 2). Yet unless the empirical world somehow can reflect on the suffering that it 
produces, it is difficult to understand how aspects of that world could become 
progressive. Max Paddison confirms that mimesis involves merging with the 
environment or totality:  
Callois argues that mimicry cannot be explained merely as a defence mechanism 
to protect creatures—especially insects—from predators, because it often does not 
prevent them from being consumed as prey. He proposes that it is also to do with 
ritual and 'magic,' an assimilation by and surrender to the environment combined 
with a corresponding loss of self. It is indeed a reversal of the 'life instinct', and a 
regressive move towards loss of identity and assimilation to nature.361 
 
Adorno tries to justify mimetic comportment by arguing that its survival acts as a critique 
in itself.362  
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Art is motivated by a conflict: Its enchantment, a vestige of its magical phase, is 
constantly repudiated as unmediated sensual immediacy by the progressive 
disenchantment of the world, yet without its ever being possible finally to 
eradicate this magical element. Only in it is art’s mimetic character preserved, and 
its truth is the critique that, by its sheer existence, it levels at a rationality that has 
become absolute.363  
This argument is compelling because it does not force mimesis to take on the 
instrumental method of modern reason in order to critique it—mimesis provides an 
alternative vision merely through remaining autonomous. However Adorno still needs to 
explain how mimetic comportment can critique irrationality while simultaneously 
becoming irrational. Paddison regards mimesis as opposed to reason: “Mimesis in this 
sense may be regarded as a pre-rational, or not-yet-rational, mode of behaviour, with an 
affinity towards the sensuous and embodied, non-conceptual re-enactment of cognitive 
processes.”364   
 The concept of mimetic comportment may be strengthened if it is conceived of as 
a reflexive practice. In short: mimesis should become philosophically reflective if it is to 
avoid regression to the totality. Such reflection cannot remain above the fray because 
both objectivity and subjectivity has been damaged through capitalism, and through the 
Idealist doctrine that concepts describe the empirical materiality they cover. Yet in order 
for the artwork to critique the totality, it must employ reflection to supplement mimetic 
comportment. As Tichy claims, “...the experience of the work itself cannot be grasped as 
a simply immediate one. On the contrary, the experience of the work must begin from the 
distance between the hearer or beholder of the work of art.”365 Although mimesis involves 
surrendering the instrumental rationality of the subject, it must also involve the capacity 
to reflect upon objectivity through a different kind of reason. Yet subjects only grasp the 
significance of mimetic comportment when they emerge from the encounter with 
objectivity and are able to reflect on the emotions and feelings that the encounter 	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provoked—and on the layers of experience expressed by the object. Thus cognition is a 
necessary aspect of aesthetic experience: “…Philosophical or 'second' reflection is 
constitutive of authentic aesthetic experience”.366 
 One might object that my argument merely reproduces the dialectic of 
enlightenment: after all, instrumental rationality displaced mimesis through distancing 
subject from object. My demand that mimesis should become philosophical or reflective 
is an example of the disenchantment of the world—the increasing rationalization of 
subjectivity. Mimesis, in Adorno’s words, must remain “unmediated sensual 
immediacy”.367 Yet this objection does not consider the fact that artworks’ agency 
requires autonomy, which only arises through subjectivity. Subjectivity may be rescued 
through reflection; otherwise, the artwork merely reproduces the empirical world 
automatically. Since reflection is the most effective means of producing autonomy, it 
must supplement mimetic comportment if the work is to remain critical. Of course, I am 
not arguing that mimetic comportment must sacrifice its roots in magical or sensory 
experience; merely that such experience should incorporate thought within itself. 
Thought may balance sensory experience in the same way that form balances material in 
a nonviolent manner.  
 Now, let’s return to the overall argument guiding the dissertation. Our discussion 
of mimesis allows us to conclude that the artwork requires a balancing act between 
diverging forces: on the one hand, the artwork must cognize the illusory power of 
ideology or totality in order to rescue itself from dissolution; on the other hand, the 
artwork must recognize that it remains immanent to those social forces that promote 
untruth. The artwork’s immanence or closeness allows it proximity to historical 
experience, and the work gains distance from ideology when it reflects on its own 
historical conditions. These two contrasting processes may be translated into the language 
of the thesis as a whole: To avoid the dangers of reification or abstraction, artworks must 
employ philosophical reflection; conversely, in order to avoid becoming artificial or 
formal, philosophical reflection must act mimetically and should immanently embrace 	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the historical experience that artworks express. Thus this section articulates the claim that 
historical experience is expressed in artworks, which require philosophy to interpret 
them, and that philosophy requires artworks so that it may be grounded in historical 
experience. Adorno writes: “A liberated humanity would be able to inherit its historical 
legacy free of guilt. What was once true in an artwork and then disclaimed by history is 
only able to disclose itself again when the conditions have changed on whose account 
that truth was invalidated: Aesthetic truth content and history are that deeply meshed”.368 
Freedom, then, is partially determined by the past, which directly affects the present; in 
this way, both aesthetic truth content and subjective spontaneity are conditioned by 
history and the immanent context of society. Truth content will appear only obscurely, or 
not at all, if the proper historical conditions are inadequate or morally false.  
Why must philosophical reflection cognize historical experience in order to access 
truth? One might assume that philosophy’s autonomy, which Kant carefully sought to 
ensure, allowed it to resist Fascism. Yet, philosophy must reflect upon history for the 
same reason that artworks must reflect upon the false society, which approaches through 
mimetic comportment. If artworks and philosophical thought are to avoid regression to 
ideology, then they must become self-aware; such self-awareness occurs when both 
become cognizant of the historical experience that mediates and conditions their 
existence. Without historical self-awareness, art and philosophy become instruments of 
power and unreflecting tools of domination. An example of this in twentieth century art 
history could be the Italian Futurists’ political convictions; although the Futurists created 
avant-garde art, which arguably was not altogether different from Dadaist and Cubist art, 
their leader, Marinetti, remained a stalwart defender of the First World War, and glorified 
Fascist violence and destruction in the most morally reprehensible and shocking terms.369 
Dadaism, and later Surrealism, although each employed different techniques and modes 
of expression, used form to reflect upon history and society. Such reflection always came 
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before political reaction. Tristan Tzara’s poetry and manifestoes, for all their outrageous 
bombast and nihilistic fury, are grounded in the untruth of history and society.370  
 
Rigor Mortis: The Poetics of Tristan Tzara 
 
We have been discussing why artworks must, in light of the modern historical crises, 
imitate reification in order to critique it, and the dangers that arrive with that practice. 
Which artistic movement best embodies the principle of imitating death in order to 
protest against it? Dada. Surrealism’s methodology also comes close through the use of 
chance, which embraces irrationality and the unconscious. Here I briefly discuss Tristan 
Tzara’s (1896-1963) Dada manifestoes.371  
 The various artists and thinkers who came together to create the Dadaist 
movement had different goals, hopes, and fears. But they arguably agreed on one thing: 
that the various systems that compose society (cultural, moral, political, aesthetic, and 
economic) had to be destroyed. The First World War crushed any illusion that the old 
order might be restored. Michael Richardson and Krzysztof Fijalkowski explain that the 
“[e]xperience of trench warfare led to a real sense of disgust with the society responsible 
for it that was so strong it left many people with a real sense of loathing that would never 
be assuaged.”372 They continue: “The First World War may be said to have exposed the 
raw nerves of middle-class France by giving the combatants in the war such an 
experience of rage in an immediate way.”373 Richard Sheppard observes: “The negativity 
for which Dada is best known derived most immediately from the Dadaists’ sense of 
traumatized outrage at the unprecedented, senseless slaughter of the Great War together 
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with the civilization that had allowed it to happen and been unable to stop it.”374 With this 
violence came revulsion, but also the glimmer of hope that a new, better world might be 
constructed. In a fleeting moment of optimism, Tzara proclaimed: “After the carnage we 
are left with the hope of a purified humanity.”375 Dada’s most lasting legacy, however, 
was to expose and overturn dead tradition. Sheppard continues: 
Tristan Tzara was quite adamant that Dada was born out of a sense of disgust at 
the war. […] All the Dadaists … formed the conviction that the epoch that had 
begun with the Renaissance, flowered during the Enlightenment, and culminated 
in modernity in its contemporary form had come to an end. […] On 18 September 
1916, Ball…noted in his diary that the Germany of Idealism had all but 
disappeared and that the whole of Western civilization had been an illusion…376  
The Dadaists hated stale bourgeois moralizing; they were committed to techniques of 
violent shock and tastelessness in order to reveal the horrors of the war, and to provoke 
the desire for change. However, Dada’s nihilistic fury could not wholly separate itself 
from the society that sought to assimilate everything. In order to accurately present the 
compromised nature of traditional art, the machinery of war, and the blindness of 
nationalism, Dada had to immanently embrace society’s destructive powers. Kuenzli 
reports that one of the founders of Dada in Zurich, Hugo Ball, 
…wrote in his diary on 16 June 1916: ‘The ideals of culture and of art as a 
programme for a variety show—that is our kind of Candide against the times. 
People act as if nothing had happened. The slaughter increases, and they cling to 
the prestige of European glory. They are trying to make the impossible possible 
and to pass off the betrayal of human beings, the exploitation of the body and soul 
of people, and all this civilized carnage as a triumph of European intelligence.’377  
The Dadaists felt betrayed by reason, by high art and cultured taste, and by journalism 
and the mass media; thus Tzara, and other artists, viewed the work of Dada to be negative 
and destructive—to clear a path through the wreckage of tradition. Consider the 	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following passage from Tzara’s “Dada Manifesto on Feeble Love and Bitter Love” (from 
1920): 
A priori, in other words with its eyes closed, Dada places before action and above 
all: Doubt. DADA doubts everything. Dada is an armadillo. Everything is Dada, 
too. Beware of Dada.  
 
Anti-dadaism is a disease: selfkleptomania, man’s normal condition, is DADA.  
But the real dadas are against DADA.378  
Tzara’s positive statements become negative, because it is impossible to realize them 
logically. They are primarily provocative: Dada—which forces the subject to be 
skeptical, and therefore to reflect on her condition—is a condition of health in a disease-
ridden society, yet we should also “beware” of Dada, in order to guard against false 
hopes that may be exploited by the status quo.379 Tzara continually steps back from his 
own practice, which allows him the distance afforded by irony; in this way, he 
demonstrates Dada’s powerlessness in a violent and immoral society:  
I’m writing this manifesto to show that you can perform contrary actions at the 
same time, in one single, fresh breath; I am against action; as for continual 
contradiction, and affirmation too, I am neither for nor against them, and I won’t 
explain myself because I hate common sense.380  
Tzara’s manifesto has a theatrical dimension—it is not purely literary, because one of 
Dada’s aims was to destroy the assumption that words could refer to reality immediately. 
Kuenzli observes that this concept grounds the Dadaists’ attacks on the mass media and 
communicative language.381 Tzara’s 1920 Manifesto states: “ ‘To launch a manifesto you 
have to want: A, B & C, and fulminate against 1, 2 & 3 […] I am writing a manifesto and 
there’s nothing I want, and yet I am saying certain things, and in principle I am against 
manifestoes, as I am against principles.’”382 Tzara knew that Dada must be anti-
systematic; only in this way could it avoid exploitation by society’s official culture. At 	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the same time, Dada had to take on the whole of modern society, because that society’s 
very foundations were rotten. Yet the very things that the Dadaists despised in society—
mechanization, immorality, misogyny, racism, bureaucratization, chauvinism, patriotism, 
war, violence, heroism—all had to be integrated within the artwork. Only in this way 
could the work reveal them to be false. How could any artwork accomplish this without 
falling into ideology, or simply disintegrating? The work itself had to imitate the false 
society that sought to embrace and assimilate it. For instance, the Berlin Dada group 
employed commercial language, and even pretended to be an advertising agency, in order 
to subvert and expose the predominant commercial culture of post-war Germany.383 
Another example is the Zurich Dadaists’ embrace of performance art (dance, theatre and 
cabaret). Ball’s record of the events of 1916 in his diary is astounding:  
Janco has made a number of masks for the new soiree…. They are reminiscent of 
the Japanese or ancient Greek theatre, yet they are wholly modern. […] We were 
all there when Janco arrived with his masks, and everyone immediately put one 
on. Then something strange happened. Not only did the mask immediately call for 
a costume; it also demanded a quite definite, passionate gesture, bordering on 
madness. […] The motive power of these masks was irresistibly conveyed to us. 
[…] The masks simply demanded that their wearers start to move in a tragic-
absurd dance.384 
Of course, this mimetic method entails certain risks. The so-called Neo-Dadaists and Pop 
Artists who modeled themselves after Dada, in the 1960s and after, arguably capitulated 
to capitalist ideology; instead of being critical of society, they embraced it.385 Andy 
Warhol, asked to define Pop Art, replied simply, “It’s liking things.”386 This affirmation 
would have been anathema to the Dadaists—and to Adorno. Kuenzli responds, “It is this 
fetishizing and aestheticizing of ordinary life that Duchamp described in his letter to 
Richter [when asked to comment on Neo-Dada as an artistic movement].”387 Let us return 
to Tzara’s 1918 Manifesto: 	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I assure you: there is no beginning, and we are not afraid; we aren’t sentimental. 
We are like a raging wind that rips up the clothes of clouds and prayers, we are 
preparing the great spectacle of disaster, conflagration and decomposition. 
Preparing to put an end to mourning, and to replace tears by sirens spreading from 
one continent to another. […] I destroy the drawers of the brain…. Everything we 
look at is false.388  
Like Adorno, Tzara accuses society of moral bankruptcy. Tzara also recognizes that 
traditional culture cannot be resurrected; after the violence of World War I, the hope that 
cultural categories (such as “Progress, Law, Morals”) could safely guide society to 
deliverance was shattered.389 Tzara concludes that art may only regenerate through 
negating its own immoral hypocrisy—that is, through destroying tradition and becoming 
anti-art. If society is “false,” then those individuals and artworks caught up in social 
structures must become aware of the ways in which their experience has been distorted.390  
 If we accept Tzara’s statement that, in place of traditional art, Dada will seek to 
present “disaster, conflagration and decomposition,” then we might wonder what role the 
work of art will play in this “spectacle”.391 How could the artwork possibly be regarded as 
autonomous—which is necessary if art is to critically evaluate social convention, and if 
semblance is to appear—if there is no difference between an artwork and an ordinary 
object? Tzara declares: 
The poem pushes or digs a crater, is silent, murders, or shrieks along accelerated 
degrees of speed. It will no longer be a product of optics, sense or intelligence, but 
an impression or a means of transforming the tracks left by feelings.392 
Consider the verbs that Tzara lists. He argues that Dadaist art should not be constricted 
by aesthetic judgment or taste, as Peter Dayan explains: “Any taste that you can define by 
critical or rational means is by definition a prison for poetry, that stops poetry advancing 
freely and prevents true creation.” This is why Dada poetry is a method of altering the 	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aftereffects of feelings—rather than being directly related to feeling or taste.393 Further, 
although art for Tzara is autonomous, subjects cannot rationally articulate anything about 
its autonomy.394 As a result, Dada is an anti-linguistic and anti-rational practice that aims 
to transcend any barriers that reason and culture might construct—barriers that ultimately 
strangle creativity and true freedom.395  
 Dada provided a historical—not a logical or transcendental—condition for the 
emergence of Surrealism. As Sarane Alexandrian observes,  
Without the Dada experience, surrealism would not have existed in the form in 
which we know it. It ran the risk of being a continuation of symbolism topped up 
with polemic. During the two years of Dada, the surrealists underwent a physical 
and spiritual training which allowed them thereafter to confront problems 
equipped with a knowledge of avant-garde struggle which they had not previously 
possessed. It is not true to say that surrealism was born after Dada, like a phoenix 
arising from its ashes. It was born during Dada, and became aware of its resources 
while it was in public action. Surrealism acquired a need to relate verbal or 
graphic delirium to an underlying cause, one less gratuitous than the total 
negation of everything.396  
The problems that Alexandrian alludes to have their origin in the historical conditions of 
the times: the relation of form to material, the question of social conformity, how art 
should resist and negate its inheritance, the relation of art historical tradition to present 
reality, the feeling of collective social guilt, the question of how rationality could 
sanction social violence, and so on.397 Dada and Surrealism are often related to one 
another as the negative and positive poles of a magnet: one cannot have one without the 
other. Instead, it seems more accurate to view each movement, using Adorno’s language, 
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as a force field that responded to its historical conditions with spontaneity, imagination, 
and insight.398  
 We have been discussing how Dadaist method (or anti-method) must work 
immanently within the totalized society in order to transform it, through allowing social 
awareness of the reified life that circulates in apparently innocuous tradition. Yet this 
account raises a question: how might Adorno’s strict injunction that the modern artwork 
must remain autonomous cohere with those avant-garde movements that insist on anti-
art’s capacity for negation—which necessarily explodes the illusion of aesthetic 
autonomy, in order to transform life through aesthetic experience? Stewart Martin has 
grappled with this question, and many others, in his article “Autonomy and Anti-Art: 
Adorno’s Concept of Avant-Garde Art.”399 His discussion demonstrates that philosophy 
requires art so that the former may test its own concepts and methods against the 
historical reality that artworks register and express. In the same manner, art requires 
philosophy so that artistic methods and techniques, often generated blindly or without the 
aid of rational reflection, may acquire experimental rigor, thus imparting to art an 
intensified power to resist and critique reality. This power arises when art becomes 
conscious of its own historical expression.  
 Martin observes that Adorno’s principle that modern art must remain autonomous 
from society apparently would place such art against the “claims of anti-art.”400 However, 
Martin continues, aesthetic autonomy is itself “mediated” by anti-art, and requires the 
latter for its “reflexive form.”401 Most importantly, Martin argues that, if aesthetic 
autonomy is not to be merely beholden to tradition, it must acquire a critical capacity for 
the radical refusal of ideology—specifically, determinate negation—which is present in 
the avant-garde’s anti-art. Martin writes: “In relation to art’s autonomy, the new is the 
site of the constitution of art’s autonomy through the determinate negation of tradition. 
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[…] Despite its ambivalence, the new presents a critical impulse against this ideology of 
traditionalism…”.402  
 Martin argues that autonomy, if it is to resist the authority of tradition and become 
a critical force able to produce new art, must employ the negation present in anti-art—
even if such anti-art also involves a claim to “anti-autonomy,” or heteronomy—namely, 
the deadly exposure to social poison that we may discern in Dadaist works: “Anti-art is 
the anti-traditional form which art must necessarily risk if its autonomy is not to depend 
merely upon the authority of tradition.”403 Martin suggests, correctly, that aesthetic 
autonomy that merely reproduced what was already present in tradition would be the 
death, and sterilization, of new art, since the new must critically hold to account, and 
negate, the reified life that congeals in culture that strives to repress actual historical 
experience. Thus, if aesthetic autonomy is to resist tradition, and the totalized society, it 
must contain its own antidote within itself: the radical negation of anti-art.  
 Martin’s analysis suggests that modern art must carry out a delicate balancing act 
between its power to remain independent from society and its power to immanently 
critique society through proximity. Yet balance is only achieved (in Hegelian fashion) 
when the artwork works through its extremes—rather than attempting to find a moderate 
compromise. Autonomy becomes a force of conservative ideology when its commitment 
to independence is untethered from any critical and interrogative force; for this reason, 
modern art must be guided by anti-artistic impulses.404 Anti-art becomes regressive, 
however, when it denies that the sphere of the aesthetic has its own logic, and when the 
particularity of the artwork is coerced by the social totality.  
 Martin analyses Dada’s impulse toward disintegration and renewal as two distinct 
forms of anti-art: “anti-art as the affirmation of non-art” and “anti-art as anti-tradition.”405 
The first form demonstrates that Dada has a positive moment. Dada’s positivity, 
however, is only perceived via negation; like Adorno’s concept of utopia, its primary 
value is to illuminate the shocking reality of false life that governs the social totality. The 
second form of anti-art, anti-tradition, is necessary so that Dada is not perceived as an 	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arbitrary, irrational, or spontaneous outpouring of vitriol, untethered to the ideology of 
the past; on the contrary, Dada’s anti-traditional stance demonstrates the historical 
experience which anti-art manifests—as well as its critical and focussed expression, 
which philosophy clarifies and reflects upon. Martin quotes from En Avant Dada: Eine 
Geschichte des Dadaismus, cited in eds. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, Art in Theory 
1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 259-60406: 
Dada foresees its end and laughs. Death is a thoroughly Dadaist business, 
in that it signifies nothing at all. Dada has the right to dissolve itself and 
will exert this right when the time comes. With a businesslike gesture, 
freshly pressed pants, a shave and a haircut, it will go down to the grave, 
after having made suitable arrangements with the Thanatos Funeral 
Home.407 
We can perceive the anti-artistic impulse of Dada, as well as its autonomous and critical 
capacity, in these lines. Dada is figured as the proto-typical bourgeois male businessman: 
the investment banker or stockbroker who calculates his own demise with rational and 
unemotional precision. Such a submission to nature is permissible only through 
civilization: immaculate trousers, “a shave and a haircut.”408 This gesture demonstrates 
the mimetic nature of Dada, which identifies with the social poison against which it 
protests. At the same time, the lines confirm that anti-art contains a hidden and deadly 
critical means: the affirmation of death, which expresses that even the reign of the 
capitalist bourgeoisie, which seems eternal, will eventually die. Dada’s anti-artistic stance 
is also confirmed through its nihilism. Dada’s death will signify “nothing”—because such 
death is nothing other than Dada’s commodification and assimilation to convention.409 In 
anticipating such assimilation, Dada implies that its death will be necessary in order to 
escape becoming what it most despises: stale and static tradition or convention.   
 Martin’s discussion of the composition of avant-garde art explains how the 
mimetic impulse of anti-art toward society is able to retain its critical and autonomous 
stance towards social evil—and, conversely, how modern art’s autonomy determinately 	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negates tradition. Martin thus explains how avant-garde art relates to the past; in this way, 
he develops an account of aesthetic temporality that shows how art may both remain 
within tradition, in order to imitate it, while also seeking to explode the false security and 
empty consolation that tradition imparts. Aesthetic autonomy must not merely 
recapitulate the claims of the past; new works demand a new kind of autonomy:  
Rather than abstractly negating art’s autonomy, anti-art’s rejection of its 
consolatory function actually converges with the critical emancipation from 
authority that is the original impulse of art’s autonomy. Through this 
convergence, anti-art is integrated as a critical mediation of art’s autonomy, which 
is crucial if autonomy is to avoid reverting to tradition and thereby betraying its 
critical impulse in the manner outlined in the Dialectic of Enlightenment….410  
Martin also delimits the historical composition of those works that mediate anti-art and 
autonomy. We call these artworks modern because it is only with the onset of a 
particularly virulent form of instrumentality that anti-art is called upon to negate 
conventional autonomy; and, only in modernity would artworks’ autonomy be subject to 
determinate negation:  
The idea that art must negate itself in order to maintain itself institutes the 
insistent anti-traditionalism of Adorno’s concept of avant-garde art’s historical 
temporality: its modernism. For Adorno, the new transforms traditionalism’s 
foundationalism of the past into the paradoxically anti-foundational foundation of 
the destruction of tradition. In this sense, the new becomes normative for art.”411 
The new thus does not merely indicate an empty place in the future, and it is not simply 
the transference of genius from the subject to the object. Rather, the new negates the past: 
it preserves and transforms those aspects of tradition that still breathe, and it orients the 
subject’s reflection on artworks produced in the shadow of the past.412 In this sense, anti-
art is able to produce a new form of “critical autonomy” that allows artworks to remain 
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porous to the threatening social whole while at the same time capable of resisting it.413 
Thus, in Hegelian fashion, art must transcend its concept in order to remain true to it.  	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Section Two: Kant’s Concepts of the Creative Imagination and the Artistic Genius 
 
Now, we must return to theoretical issues. We can now examine Kant’s concept of genius 
and the productive imagination, which Adorno responds to with his concept of mimetic 
comportment. While Adorno recognizes that there must be a particular orientation that 
the artist takes towards the object, he does not want to privilege a kind of orientation that 
ignores the unique qualities of the material in order to advance her own ends. William 
Desmond, in his article “Kant and the Terror of Genius: Between Enlightenment and 
Romanticism,” draws our attention to a central paradox in Kant’s philosophy: “How can 
nature be both: Given the law and yet law-giver? How can the self be both: Giver of the 
law, and agent of the law-giver as other? If we give the rule to nature, how then can 
nature out of itself give rules to us?”.414 In other words, Kant’s concept of nature appears 
to oscillate between activity and passivity. In this section, I will examine this tension. 
Desmond argues that the Kantian subject is irreparably split into two factions that cannot 
cooperate with each other: reason actively legislates, while nature remains merely 
passive. Kant might answer this objection by remarking that such a divide simply 
describes the composition of the subject, which is necessary in order to construct 
knowledge of appearances; and he might remark that the split is partially overcome 
through the mediating activity of the productive imagination, which acts to bridge the 
faculties.415 Adorno might contend that the divide clearly indicates the subject’s 
repression of internal nature, which damages subjectivity.416 Kant might attempt to 
assuage Desmond’s worry by granting understanding certain powers that sensibility 
cannot have: for instance, the power to form experience, and to restrain reason’s 
extravagant musings on the unconditioned. In other words, the faculties are unequal in 
power: lawful reason controls unlawful nature.  
Desmond goes on to argue that the subject may produce otherness or difference 
from within herself. In this manner, according to Desmond, the experience of genius, or 	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the creative imagination, may subvert the Enlightenment principles procured by 
understanding and reason: “The terror of genius surfaces relative to the emergence of 
some power that does not fit into this way of thinking...genius seems to erupt into the 
self-sufficient circle of self-defining autonomy, as a kind of emissary of something 
other”.417 That is, the subject may have a metaphysical experience through unleashing the 
productive or creative imagination. Although Desmond places too much faith in the 
Kantian productive imagination—which ought to be amended to an account of how the 
imagination may receive the unconscious in striking and unpredictable ways—I think that 
his account of otherness within the subject is plausible.  
Kant’s idea that the artistic genius may express spontaneity through spirit has not 
fared well in the twentieth century. In the face of the various social maladies of modern 
history—mass murder, torture, prejudice and racism, war, and technological 
advancement that increases humanity’s destructive potential—the notion that the subject 
may attain metaphysical knowledge of her own spiritual freedom seems archaic and 
hopelessly naïve. Of the First World War, Kershaw writes: “More than any other conflict, 
[World War One] was a war of industrialized mass slaughter. Human flesh stood against 
killing machines. Facing soldiers were heavy artillery, machine guns, quick-firing rifles, 
trench mortars, high explosives, grenades, flamethrowers and poison gas”.418 In the face 
of such terrifying technology, the traditional virtues of courage, sacrifice, honor, and 
patriotic duty seem obsolete and empty. The concept of individual freedom fails to take 
into account the crushing forces of society and culture that repress human conscience, 
and which all too often dictate human behavior and action.  
Philosophical thought must acknowledge historical experience because, without 
historical experience, philosophy would remain unaware of the historical and social 
forces that direct rationality. So, let us briefly turn to Friedlander’s account of Nazi 
Germany in the 1930s. Friedlander fights against reification by foregrounding the 
individual and personal stories of the victims and survivors of Nazi Germany.419 This 
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constitutes part of his method. Friedlander recognizes that individual voices are more 
powerful and expressive than statistics: 
From the moment the victims were engulfed in the process leading to the ‘Final 
Solution,’ their collective life—after a short period of enhanced cohesion—started 
to disintegrate. Soon this collective history merged with the history of 
administrative and murderous measures of their extermination, and with its 
abstract statistical expression. The only concrete history that can be retrieved 
remains that carried by personal stories. From the stage of collective 
disintegration to that of deportation and death, this history, in order to be written 
at all, has to be represented as the integrated narration of individual fates.420  
 
Individual stories are not mere illustrations or examples; rather, they form the qualitative 
and material current that binds historical experience together. Friedlander observes that, 
after Hitler ascended to power on January 30, 1933, 
[t]he philosopher and literary critic Walter Benjamin left Berlin for Paris on 
March 18. Two days later he wrote to his colleague and friend, Gershom 
Scholem, who lived in Palestine: ‘I can at least be certain that I did not act on 
impulse…Nobody among those who are close to me judges the matter 
differently.’ […] The conductors Otto Klemperer and Bruno Walter were 
compelled to flee. Walter was forbidden access to his Leipzig orchestra, and, as 
he was about to conduct a special concert of the Berlin Philharmonic, he was 
informed that, according to rumors circulated by the Propaganda Ministry, the 
hall of the Philharmonic would be burned down if he did not withdraw. Walter 
left the country.421  
Art was traditionally conceived of as a refuge for qualitative uniqueness and sacredness. 
However, in Nazi Germany, and late-capitalist America, qualitative experience was 
severely damaged. After slavery, imperialism, capitalism, fascism, and the two world 
wars—among the most harrowing historical crises in nineteenth and twentieth century 	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modern life—the subject who denies that history affects subjectivity, and that 
philosophical reflection is constrained by historical events, effectively denies her own 
experience. Further, what is often described as elite art and high culture cannot escape 
reification and commodification; thus the idea that the genius is unaffected by historical 
and social forces is another example of reification. Let us now turn to Kant’s concept of 
the genius in the third Critique.  
For Kant, freedom is a regulative idea that guides action; as a result, the subject 
cannot experience freedom in the empirical world.422 Kant conceives of freedom as a 
supernatural or noumenal causality that allows the subject to found moral laws (and to act 
in accordance with them), to make moral judgments, and to act spontaneously (that is, 
without any sort of heterogeneous determination that might restrict her will). In addition, 
freedom (which manifests itself in artistic experience as genius) allows the artist to break 
with tradition or convention and to create new rules, which may establish new models for 
other artists to follow.423 The concept of genius perpetuates a dualistic model of the self 
that does not allow for any interaction between subject and object. Further, Kant’s 
concept of genius reifies freedom and nature, because it claims that they are 
metaphysically or substantially identical to each other. Such identity is static because 
Kant claims that the genius remains independent of any material conditions that might 
affect, cause, or cooperate with it. So freedom cannot change (either positively through 
becoming or negatively through regression); it remains a metaphysical postulate that is 
immune from challenge. For this reason, political freedom—the freedom of a society—
and historical freedom—the freedom that grows or is limited as natural, historical, and 
social conditions also change—cannot be meaningfully described for Kant, since they 
exist in the merely empirical realm. As a result, freedom remains totally abstracted from 
the material domain, and becomes an empty concept, without any empirical or intuitive 
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content. If freedom is without concretion, it can neither resist nor affect materiality, and 
hence remains unaltered by anything except its own abstract activity.424  
 In the third Critique, Kant states: “Genius is the talent (natural endowment) that 
gives the rule to art. Since talent is an innate productive ability of the artist and as such 
belongs itself to nature, we could also put it this way: Genius is the innate mental 
predisposition (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art.”425 Both talent and 
genius are given by nature to subjectivity; both are “productive” or spontaneous abilities, 
and hence are not merely mechanical or material, according to Kant.426 Genius is not a 
skill that can be taught; it is a purely innate capacity.427 The last sentence in the passage 
means: through genius, nature produces a rule or criterion for artists; in this way, nature 
proves its freedom, because the rule is not determined by any previous rules or by any 
material context. Nature provides a model for artists to imitate (in artistic creation) in the 
same way that (in moral judgment) subjective freedom gives the rule to nature. So 
although genius is a “natural endowment,” it is liberating rather than restrictive, contrary 
to Kant’s earlier casting of nature as inherently empty of cognitive significance or 
subjective agency.428  
 Kant continues: “Genius is a talent for producing something for which no 
determinate rule can be given, not a predisposition consisting of a skill for something that 
can be learned by following some rule or other; hence the foremost property of genius 
must be originality.”429 In this passage, Kant confirms that genius is nothing other than 
the spontaneous production of a rule. Genius cannot be mechanical, and hence cannot 
derive from empirical factors, on Kant’s account, because in that case the rules produced 
by genial activity could be predicted or calculated in advance, and could not be 
considered products of freedom.430 Kant is wrestling with the problem of how subjectivity 
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could interact with objectivity if freedom and nature are considered metaphysically 
distinct. The latter problem plagues transcendental idealism because Kant’s system 
recognizes two different domains of experience that are necessarily divorced from each 
other. Kant’s solution, in the Introduction to the third Critique, is to propose a form of 
judgment that is reflective.431 Kant retains his definition of freedom: a rational idea that is 
completely spontaneous, independent of materiality and empirical content, and yet which 
is capable of affecting empirical phenomena. The account of reflective judgment does not 
amend the fact that the subject remains able to constitute the object, which is conceived 
of as lacking agency.432 Kant obscures the actual composition of nature and freedom, and 
therefore entrenches the divide between the phenomenal and noumenal realms. A better 
solution, elaborated by Adorno in his concept of natural history, would be to view 
freedom as partially composed of materiality, and as inextricably bound up with 
empirical contexts; and to view nature as composed of spontaneity, and as inextricably 
bound up with freedom. In other words: freedom is not wholly spontaneous, and nature is 
not wholly mechanical—they are instead interrelated. This solution is admittedly 
dialectical, and so relies on principles that Kant would not accept. However, Kant’s 
system produces contradictions that cannot be reconciled with each other, or even 
properly reflected upon using the methods of transcendental idealism (because 
philosophical reflection for Kant employs reason, which must be immanently criticized if 
it is to enable mimetic comportment), and so another model is necessary.433 Kant’s 
concept of freedom can no longer be defended, because materiality remains a condition 
of subjective experience. The attempt to subtract materiality from philosophical cognition 
is unethical after the historical catastrophes of the Enlightenment period—and our own 	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431 Matthews, ‘Kant’s Sublime…’, p. 166. She argues that judgments of the sublime and 
judgments of taste both involve reflective disinterested judgment. In this way, both are 
bound to moral judgment.  
432 Desmond, ‘Kant and the Terror…’, Mapp, ‘No Nature…’, Huhn, ‘The Kantian 
Sublime…’.  
433 For an excellent analysis of the antagonisms and contradictions in Kant’s third 
Critique, and an overall argument about agency in aesthetic experience, see Ayon 
Maharaj, The Dialectics of Aesthetic Agency: Reevaluating German Aesthetics From 
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time; it amounts to repressing suffering. Kant cannot account for the fact that objectivity 
is capable of expression (that is, it has agency of its own), while remaining distinct from 
subjectivity, and also that freedom is partially natural, and not only spontaneous.434  
Desmond alludes to a related paradox in Kant’s concept of the genius but does not 
pursue it. The paradox is that Kant’s concept of the creative imagination contradicts or 
subverts his concept of taste or aesthetic judgment. If creative imagination is able to 
spontaneously produce new artistic forms or models, then it must have an unlimited 
power to generate images that may overwhelm aesthetic judgment. Since aesthetic 
judgment by definition is constrained by the interplay or balance between imagination 
and understanding—that is, by maintaining stasis and harmony—then it will be unable to 
resist the imagination’s power of production, and to respond to the new.435 Desmond 
indicates this when he writes about the “terror” of genius, but he doesn’t discuss the 
relation of imagination to taste.436 If creative imagination is spontaneous, then it must 
continually challenge taste to accommodate its new forms or models. What if taste falls 
short—just like imagination in the judgment of the sublime? What happens when 
aesthetic judgment cannot rationally determine new imaginative forms? Does the subject 
then experience the sublime, or simply disorientation or terror? The confusion generated 
by this problem constitutes another reason why Kant’s model of creative imagination and 
taste are incompatible, and why the model of harmonious aesthetic judgment does not 
allow true artistic freedom.  
One might argue that Kant recognizes the artwork’s capacity for truthful 
expression in the doctrine of aesthetic ideas. Let me argue briefly against this claim. An 
aesthetic idea cannot count as expression in Adorno’s sense.437 Also, aesthetic ideas 	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correspond to rational ideas, and so are dependent upon that which they should, ideally, 
critique. In other words, aesthetics should extend philosophy through showing its 
limitations: its dependence on nature. Aesthetic ideas cannot criticize the hegemonic 
influence that certain forms of rationality have imposed on nature because they 
participate in the same instrumentality. For instance, the aesthetic idea of an eagle might 
correspond to the rational idea of patriotism. How would such an aesthetic idea reveal 
that the rational idea to which it corresponds is an illusion, or has become meaningless in 
modern times, because it is subject to ideological distortion (for instance, the fact that 
patriotism and nationalism are both grounded in xenophobia and racism)? Is there any 
way that an aesthetic idea might reveal a rational idea (for instance, freedom, love, 
humanity, beauty, truth) to be empty, corrupted, or a mere placeholder for its opposite 
(hatred, inhumanity, coercion, ugliness, falsity)? Finally, aesthetic and rational ideas must 
not be susceptible to historical or social influence, and so they remain, according to Kant, 
eternally valid—the products of sensibility and rationality that cannot reflect on their own 
capacity. For this reason aesthetic and rational ideas cannot manifest or illuminate the 
subject’s particular experience, which remains historical, social, cultural, and natural to 
the core.  
Adorno’s Concept of Expression 
Given the difficulties with Kant’s concept of the creative imagination, we must now turn 
to Adorno’s concept of expression. The concepts of expression and creativity, although 
opposed in many ways, share several features: both describe a kind of comportment 
towards aesthetic material; both examine the relations between the artist, the artwork, and 
historical techniques; both are grounded in nature; and both remain the locus of freedom 
in aesthetic experience.  
“Art is expressive when what is objective, subjectively mediated, speaks, whether 
this be sadness, energy, or longing.”438 Expression does not refer to the mental state of the 	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artist or the aesthetic subject; on the contrary, it names historical and social layers that 
attempt to break through the confinement imposed upon them. For Foster, expression 
indicates that concepts and artworks may show more than they can say.439 Because 
concepts and artworks accrue historical and social meaning as they exist in the empirical 
world, such concepts and works manifest layers of experience that may be expressed but 
which cannot be conceptually or discursively represented: “The expression of 
experiential substance in concepts is concerned with the intrinsically historical meanings 
that are picked up by the concept via relations of contiguity and proximity.”440 Expression 
occurs when the artwork registers the divide between subject and object in experience: 
“Expression is the suffering countenance of artworks. They turn this countenance only 
toward those who return its gaze.”441 The feeling of pleasure is replaced by the awareness 
of suffering. Although the artwork may allow the subject a glimpse of happiness, the end 
of aesthetic experience is not pleasure.442 The subject must follow the object: “If 
expression were merely the doubling of the subjectively felt, it would be null and 
void...Rather than such feelings, the model of expression is that of extra-artistic things 
and situations. Historical processes and functions are already sedimented in them and 
speak out of them”.443 Artworks that merely reproduce empirical reality are uncritical and 
therefore are void of truth.  
There are several other parallels between Kant’s concept of the creative 
imagination and Adorno’s concept of expression.  
First, Kantian imagination manifests the subject’s freedom and spontaneity. Kant, 
in Section 49 of the Critique of Judgment, discusses the imagination's role in artistic 
creation: 
Spirit [Geist] in an aesthetic sense is the animating principle in the mind. But 
what this principle uses to animate [or quicken] the soul, the material it employs 
for this, is what imparts to the mental powers a purposive momentum, i.e., imparts 	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to them a play which is such that it sustains itself on its own and even strengthens 
the powers for such play.444  
Spirit is a capacity that enlivens the mental powers and places them in motion.445 Such 
animation allows reason the freedom to reflect on indeterminate objects, and allows 
imagination to produce aesthetic ideas.446  
For Kant, the subject's creative imagination expresses spontaneity; for Adorno, 
the object's voice expresses historical experience, and traces of unrealized possibility. 
Adorno emphasizes that mimetic comportment, which results in expression, relies on 
spontaneity that is always directed by objectivity (defined as historical and social 
experience). Thus mimesis reveals the aesthetic object’s capacity for agency and 
freedom, which is expressed negatively in truth content. The concept of expression 
redirects the concepts of creativity and productivity away from abstract subjectivity and 
towards the historical material within the subject. In the end, however, despite his 
insistence on objectivity, Adorno validates subjectivity more truthfully than Kant does, 
because, for Adorno, expression can only be realized when the traces of objective 
damage within the subject are acknowledged and reflected upon. That which Kant calls 
subjectivity is in reality nothing more than a façade: freedom that distances itself from its 
own conditions of possibility. Adorno suggests that the artist must divest her will of 
rational control, and must renounce her claim to actively determine the object; instead, 
she follows the object’s direction. Zuidervaart confirms that the artist's “[u]nconscious 
experience” involves “spontaneity” which is “a sediment of collective reactions”.447 Thus 
individual freedom depends on social and cultural freedom. Adorno writes: “Aesthetic 
rationality must plunge blindfolded into the making of the work rather than directing it 
externally as an act of reflection over the artwork”.448 For Kant, creative genius is nature 
in the subject; for Adorno, expression involves technique.449 According to Bernstein, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 CJ, Section 49, Ak. 313, pp. 181-182.  
445 CJ, Section 49, Ak. 313, pp. 181-182.  
446 CJ, Section 49, Ak. 313-314, pp. 181-183. 
447 Lambert Zuidervaart, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion 
(Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 116-124.   
448 AT, p. 151.  
449 AT, p. 149.  
	   154	  
“Technique is the explicit means by which the mimetic impulse is released...Art is 
mimetic only as objective expression.”450 In other words, mimetic comportment requires 
rationality in order to achieve expression in the artwork. Thus mimetic comportment 
expresses nature through artifice; it cannot be conceived as entirely spontaneous because 
it is always engaged in evaluating how the weight of tradition may give rise to new 
techniques and configurations of material. 
  Second, the Kantian imagination is creative; yet Adorno’s concept of expression 
is receptive. Adorno inverts tradition because the Kantian concept is overly subjective; 
thus, the concept of expression must be oriented towards the object. Kant holds that 
“imagination ([in its role] as a productive cognitive power) is very mighty when it 
creates, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it.”451 Thus, 
the productive imagination is able to transform or “restructure” intuition in a certain 
way.452 The result of such transformation is that intuition cannot be determined by the 
understanding. The power of the imagination does not involve its receptivity to the 
object; rather, it overrides the object’s voice in order to impose its own narrative upon the 
object. This is why the creative imagination ultimately supersedes objectivity, and why 
Adorno cannot accept Kant’s account. Kant suggests that the intuition is structured into 
an extremely rich or dense material that may be considered akin to rational ideas. The 
transformed material provokes the subject to try to exhibit its infinite meaning (that is, to 
connect intuition and concept in order to produce knowledge). What results is an 
aesthetic idea.  
For Adorno, aesthetic expression manifests truth through the artwork’s imitation 
of objectivity (namely, historical and social experience that has been repressed). Mimetic 
comportment allows the artist proximity to social-historical reality, and forces her to 
encounter otherness or nonidentity—that which transcends social immanence. 
Engagement with repressed material gradually allows the subject a measure of freedom; 
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instead of forcing her faculties to act in rigid and habitual ways, the subject opens herself 
up to new experiences.  
Third, both Kantian aesthetic imagination and Adornian mimetic comportment 
seek to present something that understanding or reason cannot comprehend. Kant 
describes the interaction between imagination and reason: 
Now if a concept is provided with [unterlegen] a presentation of the imagination 
such that…it prompts…so much thought as can never be comprehended within a 
determinate concept and thereby the presentation aesthetically expands the 
concept itself in an unlimited way, then the imagination is creative in [all of] this 
and sets the power of intellectual ideas (i.e., reason) in motion….453  
In other words, the imagination procures an image that exhibits a concept. The image, 
however, is not exhausted in the exhibited concept; instead, the image is so powerful that 
it causes reason to think.454 Rational cognition, which cannot be exhibited or 
conceptualized, enlarges the concept. The imagination is thus creative because it does not 
proceed according to the understanding's rules or according to reason's demands, but 
produces images from out of itself.455 The imagination, in this sense, is able to think.  
For Adorno, expression unearths the “nonsubjective in the subject”.456 Hence it 
relates to objectivity—repressed nature and forgotten historical or cultural experience.  
Expression approaches the transsubjective; it is the form of knowledge that—
having preceded the polarity of subject and object—does not recognize this 
polarity as definitive. Art is secular, however, in that it attempts to achieve such 
knowledge within the bounds of the polarity of subject and object, as an act of 
autonomous spirit. Aesthetic expression is the objectification of the non-
objective...457 
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Artworks trace possibility through technique. Expression reveals what is not identical 
with the subject’s categories. The result of expression—the formed material of the 
work—is not formed by subjectivity, but social-historical spirit: “However much the 
expressed resembles the subject, however much the impulses are those of the subject, 
they are at the same time apersonal, participating in the integrative power of the ego 
without ever becoming identical with it.”458 Expressive impulses, mediated through the 
subject, reflect objective factors: the constraints of tradition, historical violence, social 
oppression, and the obsolescence of culture.459 The impulses are not identical with the 
subject's ego because they signify what cannot be integrated within it: unconscious 
nature. 
 
Adorno's Argument Against Kant's Doctrine of Imagination 
 
The concept of expression critically responds to Kant’s idea of the imagination, in both 
its reproductive and productive variants. Instead, for Adorno, aesthetic imagination must 
be mimetic, or receptive to the object.460 Adorno's critique is important for several 
reasons. 
 After the horrors of the twentieth century, and its failed social revolutions, only 
artworks may critique ideology: philosophy remains bound to conceptuality; moral 
judgment is entangled with power and violence; and political reason is instrumental 
rather than utopian.461 Thus, Kant’s principle that the creative imagination remains 
ahistorical and anti-cognitive should be challenged. As argued above, aesthetic 
experience incites philosophical thought because the subject grasps nonidentity through 
reflection. Thus, in order to attain aesthetic truth through philosophical thought, we must 
embrace Adorno's critique of Kant. The imagination is related to philosophical reflection, 
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and to receptive experience, rather than to subjective creativity or productivity. Kant's 
conception of the productive imagination claims to be concrete, because aesthetic ideas 
express a manifold of intuition that is incomprehensible to understanding or reason. For 
Adorno, however, the Kantian imagination is abstract, because it cuts itself off from 
historical experience, and because it covers over its object through willful invention. For 
instance, according to Kant, aesthetic ideas symbolize rational ideas (such as freedom, 
God, immortality, love, death). Yet rational ideas may easily become ideological because 
they are never tested against the reality of human experience itself; they remain isolated 
from social-historical materiality. As long as rational ideas are invoked as ideals, they 
cannot represent historical experience in late capitalist modernity. As a consequence, 
aesthetic ideas are constructed at a distance from such experience itself. Productive 
imagination only ‘produces’ that which the subject already knows: that which she tries to 
theorize by applying metaphors to reason’s speculative thought, which remains empty, 
even when the rational ideas are represented aesthetically. In addition, for Kant, 
objectivity must be excluded from aesthetic experience in order to preserve its autonomy. 
Kant’s philosophy claims to ground the subject's freedom; in reality, however, such 
freedom represses material impulses, which reason cannot account for. Imagination 
manifests the subject's freedom; thus it cannot be driven by natural impulses.  
 Kant's philosophy is caught in a contradiction: on the one hand, the subject 
requires materiality so that experience has content; on the other hand, Kant is forced to 
exclude materiality from experience, because it remains outside the realm of appearances. 
Adorno notes that, for Kant, “[t]he possibility of the objective knowledge of things really 
leads to an insight into constitutive subjectivity, and conversely, you arrive at the 
objective existence of things only through these subjective factors.”462 This idealist 
approach is not appropriate, because it leads to formalism and to a model of reason that 
damages itself. Reason without nature is formal: that is, it cannot cognize intrinsic value, 
and it denies its own composition. Yet reason is affected by nature and history.  
 Creativity for Kant brings about pleasure and harmony: the imagination and 
understanding freely play with each other, as in the judgment of taste. Kant’s ideal of 
harmonious interaction ignores the reality that, due to the alienation effected by 	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capitalism, the faculties have been wrenched apart from each other, and cannot attain a 
reconciled synthetic bond, in which each faculty responds cooperatively with another. 
The mind has been divorced from itself.  
Although the Surrealists emphasized the marvelous, they were acutely aware of 
the hellish crises of the twentieth century. For example, consider Andre Breton’s 
discussion of how a poetic image is constructed: “man does not evoke them [Surrealist 
images]; rather they ‘come to him spontaneously, despotically. He cannot chase them 
away; for the will is powerless now and no longer controls the faculties’.”463 Breton 
continues that the imagination, when it constructs a poetic image, has “seized nothing 
consciously. It is, as it were, from the fortuitous juxtaposition of the two terms that a 
particular light has sprung, the light of the image…. The value of the image depends on 
the beauty of the spark obtained; it is, consequently, a function of the difference of 
potential between the two conductors.”464 Breton’s use of electrical and mechanical 
metaphors signal that he is attempting to use the fixtures of industrial-capitalist society 
against itself—to incite the social totality to self-consciousness. Surrealism acquired this 
method from Dada. For Breton, the subject is not in control of herself; she is haunted and 
pursued by poetic images that appear in defiance of her rational will, and which assert 
connections between items of experience untethered by rational or logical grounds. The 
“value of the image” does not depend on anything that the subject might grant or impose; 
rather, it depends on the objective potentiality of the image itself: the layers of material 
history, and unconscious associations, embedded in each term.465 The “light of the image” 
is free from the subject’s creativity, or her rational cognition; the subject merely “tak[es] 
note of, and apprec[iates], the luminous phenomenon.”466  
By contrast, Kantian pleasure amounts to empty consolation because the subject is 
not engaged in historical reality.467 Adorno and Kant have different accounts of how 
subjectivity and objectivity interact. For Kant the creative imagination is spontaneous; for 	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Adorno expression involves mimetic comportment.468 Kant argues that genius must be 
conceived as nature because it grounds freedom, and is capable of originating new 
techniques. However, for Adorno, the subject’s artistic activity should not be considered 
entirely spontaneous because it is always engaged in evaluating the weight of tradition 
(artistic material) with various impulses toward new techniques and configurations. That 
is, history and society constrain and guide the artist’s hand, and limit her productive 
freedom. Wellmer469 explains that Adorno responds in different ways to Kant’s 
conception of nature:  
The 'remembrance of nature in the subject' which the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
had already postulated as a figure of reconciliation between spirit and nature, 
assumes an ambiguous meaning in the later Adorno's critique of Kant's critical 
metaphysics. This 'remembrance' no longer only signifies the emphatic hope for a 
resurrection of nature in the medium of spirit, but also, at the same time, man's 
being 'surrendered' (verfallen) to nature, that is, the fragility, finitude, and non-
utopian materiality of spirit.470 
Kant and Adorno have fundamentally different conceptions of nature. Kant conceives of 
nature as a heterogeneous force, as well as the ground of freedom; Adorno conceives of 
nature as the realm of instincts and desires—that is, it is a material source that reason 
cannot control without harming itself. Kant is unable to account for the complex 
relationship between reason and materiality because he reduces the object to a mere 
product of subjective activity. In addition, Kant retains a naïve conception of nature in the 
section on the artistic genius: that nature is fundamentally pure and unmediated by 
reason, culture, or history. This positivist conception of nature relies on the reductionist 
assumption that biological reality is autonomous from social and historical reality. In his 
lectures on Aesthetics, Adorno examines the contradictions within the artwork: “…[o]n 
the one hand, art exits the realm of nature, and in that sense constitutes the absolute 
opposite of everything merely natural. […] On the other hand, art is itself the 
manifestation of nature in a world where nature has alienated itself through a mighty and 	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irreversible process. It is…the self-alienated manifestation of nature…”.471 Nature only 
appears within the artwork as mediated by history and reason—that is, as damaged, 
suffering particularity. Adorno continues: 
…one of the substantial intentions of important works of art is not only to push 
nature away, to distinguish themselves from nature, to distinguish themselves 
from the merely natural through sublimation, but also to give nature back what 
belongs to it. […] every dissonance is a small remembrance of the suffering 
which the control over nature, and ultimately a society of domination as such, 
inflicts on nature, and only in the form of this suffering, only in the form of 
yearning—and dissonance is always substantially yearning and suffering—only 
thus can suppressed nature find its voice at all.472  
 
Thus, the modern artwork must relate to nature in two contradictory ways—which both 
follow and break from Kant’s conception of nature.473 First, the artwork must sublimate 
(that is, transform or metamorphose) the merely natural (that is, ideology, or convention 
that has been uncritically inherited) through reflection; second, the artwork must present 
nature’s suffering (which results from nonidentity), so that reason may reflect on its own 
repressive activity. Adorno's argument against Kantian autonomy recognizes how the 
relationship between the individual and society has changed in the twentieth century. In 
order to criticize Kant's conception of experience, it is necessary to overcome it by 
employing Kantian methods against Kantian aims.  
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Chapter Four: Interpretation as Metaphysical Experience  
 
“Involuntarily and unconsciously, the observer enters into a contract with the work, 
agreeing to submit to it on condition that it speak. In the pledged receptivity of the 
observer, pure-self-abandonment—that moment of free exhalation in nature—
survives.”474 
Adorno’s engagement with the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophical tradition allows 
him to invert that tradition’s significance for modern philosophical aesthetics. In this 
chapter we will focus on Adorno’s concept of interpretation, and on the question of how 
philosophy and art relate to each other—and why they must relate to each other in order 
to articulate the crises of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The concept of 
interpretation and the question of the philosophy-art relationship do not respond to any 
specific Kantian category. Nevertheless, we will see that the issues and problems 
generated by these two themes are symptomatic of many elements of Kant’s philosophy 
that Adorno discusses. That is, the guiding thread of Adorno’s discussion of 
interpretation, and the relation between art and philosophy, is determined in part by his 
reception of the Kantian tradition. In this chapter we will discuss why philosophy 
requires art, and art requires philosophy; why artworks’ expression of historical 
experience is necessary for philosophy; and why philosophy’s radical reflection is 
necessary for artworks. These questions may be explored through unpacking Adorno’s 
category of interpretation.  
Throughout Aesthetic Theory, Adorno insists that philosophy and art require each 
other. Yet Adorno does not explain why philosophy and art are both necessary in 
aesthetic experience. For certain philosophers this balance would appear difficult to 
sustain: for some, the two poles of reason and sensuality automatically repel each other 
like opposing magnetic fields; for others, the two poles collapse into a single unity. 
Recall that, for Kant, philosophical reflection involves reason, while aesthetic experience 
involves judgment and feeling. Kant strenuously tries to deny the natural aspect of 	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subjectivity, and he excludes rational cognition from aesthetic judgment. Kant’s refusal 
produced a fragmented subject that we are still trying to suture together today. Adorno 
acknowledges475 that Kant’s philosophy vacillates between a commitment to freedom and 
repressive instrumentality: on the one hand, the nonidentical is preserved because the 
Kantian subject “is not satisfied by reducing everything that exists to itself”; on the other 
hand, the Kantian subject is guilty of reducing particularity to universality, because all 
particulars must be reduced “to an analysis of the consciousness of the subject”.476 
Adorno asserts: “…the belief that the object can be made to coincide entirely with the 
subject…is itself false”.477 Now, I will briefly discuss various German Idealist attempts to 
explain how philosophy and art relate to each other. Then I focus on Adorno’s analysis of 
the contradiction.  
Hegel acknowledges that aesthetic experience involves rational and sensuous 
elements; however, he attempts to reduce natural materiality to rational spirit through 
sublation.478 The experience of beauty involves an “identity” of nature and spirit.479 This 
is what Hegel means by reconciliation.480 For Hegel, freedom involves reducing what is 
different (otherness) to identity, or mediating difference through spirit (so that the 
external becomes internal).481 Beauty for Hegel is expressed when spirit and nature are 
reconciled or “united”--but this unity is caused by spirit itself.482 For Hegel, thought and 
being are identical.483 In the Phenomenology, the subject attains truth in the process of 
knowing itself—the process of each epistemic pattern's transcendence and resolution into 
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another pattern.484 Yet Hegel never adequately explains, according to Andrew Bowie, 
how the subject may transition from infinity (spirit) to finitude (nature).485 Hegel’s 
method consists in overcoming oppositions or contradictions through a process of 
dissolution and unification.486 For Hegel art must be subordinated to philosophy: “...it is 
only the overcoming of the sensuous that is its truth”.487  
John McCumber relates Hegel's aesthetics and Schiller's aesthetics to German 
Idealism as a whole.488 He also provides a brief account of Romantic disenchantment with 
Kantian transcendental idealism.489 For Schiller, the modern subject has “turned against” 
the sensuous world of nature, in order to dominate it and focus on speculative 
rationality.490 Artworks, which are both rational and sensuous, may restore “self-unity 
without sacrificing modern morality” because the aesthetic unity is “a set of sensory 
materials intelligently arranged for a purpose”.491  
For McCumber, Hegel's aesthetics follows Schiller's aims quite closely: artworks 
may “achieve the 'reconciliation' of sense and intellect, by giving epiphantic sensory 
expression to a guiding conceptual truth”.492 For Hegel and Schiller, however, Adorno's 
thesis that true experience occurs when object and concept collide (or when the subject's 
categories are confronted with material particularity) is false, because “our concepts do 
not refer to objects,” and so “the question of whether they accurately mirror the nature of 
things outside us recedes: a concept tends to be judged not by how it captures some 
nonconceptual reality, but in terms of how well it coheres with other concepts and with 	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the laws of reason itself”.493 Thus, German Idealism argues that Kant's idea of the thing-
in-itself must be mediated through the subject.494 Finally, Julian Johnson notes that Hegel 
defines beauty as “'the semblance of the Ideal in sensuous form'” and names art “the 
reconciliation of spirit and materiality”.495  
Adorno is resistant to the synthetic solutions of Transcendental Idealism and 
German Idealism. Yet Adorno must answer several questions: What would art or 
philosophy possibly need from each other? What could philosophy possibly learn from 
art? How could art remain illusory after philosophy’s rigorous interrogation? How might 
two opposing methods be reconciled, or even work together? As I have tried to argue, if 
philosophy is to avoid repressing materiality, it must reflect on historical experience, and 
must become aware of its own historical-social ground. Historical experience is 
expressed in modern artworks. Conversely, if artworks are to remain critical expressions 
of history, and revitalizing harbingers of possibility, then they require philosophical 
reflection in order to decipher their enigmatic appearance. Philosophical reflection 
analyzes the historical content of the work. As David Cunningham and Nigel Mapp 
argue, “...the individual work's 'truth' is generated, not by authorial intention alone, but by 
the artwork's own singular configuration of its materials; materials which have forms of 
historical 'experience' sedimented in them”.496  
Adorno’s account in Aesthetic Theory lacks a description of how the subject 
might begin to relate differently towards objects. We might wonder: If Kant’s and 
Hegel’s solutions require transformation, how should the subject relate to objectivity? Is 
there a kind of agency within aesthetic experience that would enable the subject to re-
orient towards the object? And, how may the aesthetic object reveal its own agency and 
experiences to the subject? Finally, how might the subject remain both passive (in order 
to experience materiality) and active (in order to critically reflect) in aesthetic 
experience? In the final aphorism in Minima Moralia, Adorno writes: “Perspectives must 	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be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and 
crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light. To gain 
such perspectives without velleity or violence, entirely from felt contact with its 
objects—this alone is the task of thought.”497 As Gerhard Richter observes, “a relentless 
thinking through of thought's impossibility is the condition of possibility for striving 
toward what is possible”.498 For Richter, Adorno seeks to think through “...possible 
redemption, as the engine and arbiter of undeconstructible concepts such as freedom and 
justice, even if these have not been achieved and even if they remain the property of a 
negative otherness that is the homeland where no one has even been.”499 Certain basic 
moral concepts cannot be subjected to further analysis because they define the conditions 
of critical thought. Without them, criticism would degenerate into bare assertion and 
would lose its grounding in moral judgment.  
Adorno places a nearly unbearable demand on thinking. He asserts that affective 
experience (that is, an aesthetic experience, rather than an ethical or cognitive experience) 
may alter the subject’s rigid rational framework—even though it has hardened into 
bedrock. Yet how may thinking, which seems bound inextricably to the violence of 
identification, transcend its own limitations? Is it possible that “felt contact” with objects 
could reveal to the subject the damage that instrumental-utilitarian reason has inflicted 
upon objects?500 Zuidervaart argues that subjects must imitate the artwork’s objective 
contours rather than attempt to represent it using discursive reason: “only when recipients 
reproduce the artwork from within an experience immersed in the artwork will the 
artwork be understood (183-84/176-78). The proper path into an artwork is by way of 
imitation: qualified interpreters mime the work itself”.501 If Zuidervaart is correct, then 
presentation, rather than representation, allows the subject to cognize the work’s negative 
truth—its nonidentity. In line with Zuidervaart, I will argue that one possibility may help 
at least to shift the subject’s stance towards objectivity.  	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I propose that the concept of philosophical reflection or interpretation may 
provide a way out of the aporia. Interpretation is not only a tool or method through which 
the subject may think abstractly about the artwork—which is how most commentators 
describe it. For example, Lydia Goehr argues that interpretation attempts to reveal truth 
content in the work.502 The work’s “pure sensuous form” can “show” or express truth 
content; only philosophy, however, can “say” or explain truth content in conceptual 
terms.503 Goehr is correct, however, that interpretation allows the subject to “move 
closer” to the object by allowing the former to be affected concretely—that is, in terms of 
social-historical determination—by the latter.504 The suffering of particular objects 
remains incomprehensible until the subject engages with particularity—through reflection 
upon the materiality within experience. For this reason, interpretation must be a form of 
metaphysical experience that appears through aesthetic experience. Metaphysical 
experience is composed of historical-social experience. Thus, philosophical reflection is 
intertwined with historical experience in aesthetic experience. I define metaphysical 
experience as reflection that is itself a form of experience. Such experience reveals the 
materiality of an object—that is, its natural and historical ground. Interpretation requires 
the subject’s passive engagement with objectivity (so that the subject’s drive to dominate 
and utilize objects for self-preservation momentarily ceases). Such passivity allows a 
different relationship to the past, in addition to objectivity: instead of automatically 
obeying past practices out of habit, the subject reflects upon the past’s relation to the 
present; in this way, she gains distance from the past, without disavowing it entirely, and 
becomes open to a wholly different—and unknown—future. Interpretation becomes 
metaphysical through this critical transformation of tradition, which carves out a space 
for the new. The new is precisely that which promises to alter the subject’s experience 
through “displac[ing] and estrange[ing] the world”.505 Martin explains: “For Adorno, the 
new is the promissory, even utopian impulse of something different erupting out of the 
present”.506 Martin’s description is important because it defines the ‘new’ both as a 	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subjective experience (a “utopian impulse” that transcends instrumental reason) and as an 
objective process (“something different” that breaks the reified space-time continuum 
constituted by natural history).507 Martin also emphasizes the future-oriented 
directionality of the new.508  
 
 
Adorno’s Concept of Interpretation 
Adorno maintains that art and philosophy are intertwined, and that each requires the other 
in modernity: “All aesthetic questions terminate in those of the truth content of artworks: 
Is the spirit that a work objectively bears in its specific form true?”509 In other words, the 
subject who interrogates the artwork must employ philosophical reasoning as a method 
with which to explore it. Many commentators assume that the relation between art and 
philosophy is a purely epistemic one. Geuss, for instance, writes: “art needs philosophic 
interpretation as its necessary complement to develop its critical impetus into full-blown 
truth-telling...”.510 On this reading, art’s deficiency lies in its inability to articulate its own 
experience; philosophy is necessary so that it may render the inexpressible concrete using 
language. The problem with this reading is that it contradicts Adorno’s own principles 
regarding the difference between poetic and communicative language, and it reduces the 
artwork to an object without agency—rather ironically like Kant’s epistemic distinction 
between subject and object.511 This predominant reading rests on the assumption that 
philosophy’s role is primarily to clarify what remains unknown. Yet this assumption has 	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its roots in the analytic tradition, and should not be uncritically accepted without 
awareness of its consequences. Much analytic philosophy accepts the false clarity or 
brightness of communicative language instead of interrogating the need to employ such 
language itself, which betrays a blind faith in rationality. On the contrary, philosophy 
does not only clarify or enlighten: it also deepens, darkens, obscures, and thickens the 
texture of objects, and of subjective experience. In short, philosophical reflection may 
extend that which we do not know—rather than curtail it. This dark aspect of cognition 
has been repressed within the philosophical tradition for a long time, but it is necessary if 
the subject is to avoid becoming over-exposed to anti-historical philosophical methods.  
Thus the artwork does not require translation into concepts; rather, it requires an 
adequate, non-violent, reception at the hands of subjectivity. Bernstein affirms that 
philosophy cannot communicate that which artworks express (that is, truth-content, 
attained through expression and mimesis).512 However, philosophy may provide the 
means to reflect upon artworks, which is the condition for works' disclosure of truth.513 
The practice of reflecting philosophically allows the subject to challenge reification, 
which closes down her capacity to experience. As we shall see, however, philosophical 
reflection, or the practice of interpretation, is more than a mere method for recovering 
truth: it constitutes metaphysical experience—the experience of otherness, as well as the 
hope of preserving it—as well. Such experience itself allows a form of knowledge that is 
non-discursive and materially grounded.  
 Bernstein argues that, since philosophy must operate using discursive concepts, it 
cannot escape violently distorting particularity.514 This is true, although Adorno avers that 
there are different ways of using concepts. Artworks are artifacts that use non-conceptual 
“techniques” in order to become autonomous from empirical society.515 Autonomous 
artworks use the method of determinate negation to critique society, but they cannot 
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speak their truth without philosophy.516 Philosophy, instead of merely organizing and 
communicating aesthetic content, deepens it in an expressive way; thus, philosophy 
avoids structuring (and therefore falsifying) the artwork in accordance with the subject’s 
ideological expectations. Philosophy, Bernstein notes, must be renounced as a discursive 
practice if it is to avoid “complicity with domination”.517 Philosophy escapes such 
complicity through interpreting artworks and through engaging with their aesthetic 
character. How do these practices uncover truth content? Nicholsen writes that the 
subject must both actively reflect (which involves association, fantasy, and speculation) 
and passively immerse herself in the object (which involves mimetic imagination) in 
order to attain aesthetic experience that grasps truth content.518 This is a good account of 
the process of attaining truth content, because Nicholsen emphasizes the opposing poles 
of experience: both reason and imagination are required for aesthetic judgment.  
In addition, Cunningham and Mapp allude to the fact that interpretation involves 
imitating the historical contours of the artwork, yet they do not develop or elaborate this 
thought: “Adorno thus makes the bold, and easily misunderstood, claim that works of 
literature and art stand constitutively in need of philosophical interpretation or criticism. 
This does not mean, however, that they are in simple need of paraphrase—of translation 
into concepts—but that only through interpretation of their 'immanent movement', and its 
historical logic, can their properly critical potential be unleashed (NL2: 97)”.519 More 
specifically: aesthetic truth must be conceived of as the expression of experience—
specifically, historical and social experience. Experience reveals the past and indicates 
possibilities that lie in the future. This explains why truth content is bound together with 
spirit (the critical and intellectual power of the work, which allows the work to transcend 
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given empirical conditions) and objectivity (the work’s reference to material historical 
experience).520  
 In the same way, the spirit of an artwork is both utopian (oriented towards 
possibility) and material (oriented towards past and present experience). Thus the work’s 
truth content is both negative or critical and speculative or transcendent. In order to 
unravel and reflect upon this truth, the artwork requires philosophy, because the 
experience contained within the work cannot express itself, and because philosophical 
reflection rescues aesthetic material from becoming entangled in tradition. Bernstein 
develops this claim; he maintains that philosophical reflection is also necessary for 
aesthetic experience because subjects may only realize how artworks critique and disrupt 
conventional rationality through reflection: “art's categorial self-consciousness, and its 
reflective displacement of enlightened categorial articulations, only register if they are 
discursively, philosophically, interpreted. Adorno...must attempt to generate a logic of 
parasitism, a logic of interaction between art and philosophy. And for him too art exceeds 
philosophical discursivity”.521 In the same way, philosophy only realizes that the artwork, 
and its own capacity to reflect, is historically situated through engaging with aesthetic 
expression, which is grounded in historical experience.  
Arguably this is how we should understand Adorno’s cryptic thesis that “The 
truth content of an artwork requires philosophy. It is only in this content that philosophy 
converges with art or extinguishes itself in it.”522 Since truth content contains historical 	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experience, which must be known if tradition is to be critically reflected upon, the 
artwork must somehow relate its experience to a subject. The only way that a subject may 
grasp an artwork’s historical experience is through philosophical reflection. How does 
truth content allow philosophy and art to “converge[s] or become “extinguishe[d]”? 
Philosophy and art identify with each other (without actually becoming identical) when 
each engages with historical experience. More specifically, both art and philosophy 
become sites of historical experience, and thus allow the subject to become aware that its 
spirit is composed of nature. For this reason, the subject’s aesthetic and philosophical 
experiences are to an extent passive, because they are dependent on materiality. Replying 
to Simon Jarvis, Bernstein writes: “...substance/otherness is preserved as the material 
inscription of semblant otherness, as art. Hence, the speculative proposition animating 
Adorno's project, his conception of subject and substance, is 'philosophy and art are one,' 
with the dialectic of substance becoming subject the matter of Adorno's Aesthetic 
Theory”.523 Bernstein grasps the dialectical interaction between art and philosophy; 
however, he suggests that Adorno’s rationale for balancing art against philosophy (and 
philosophy against art) was purely philosophical (namely, that the two forces require 
each other so that they may remain in perpetual motion, in accordance with the Hegelian 
process of experience) rather than for material reasons (that is, reasons that emerge from 
our present historical crisis). I argue, modifying Bernstein’s formulation, that art and 
philosophy should be joined because we must attend to historical experience using reason 
and imagination if subjectivity is not to negate its own material ground. Artworks express 
and reflect upon experience, and philosophy works to uncover its own historical 
experience, so that it may understand its reflection in a deeper way. This entails that 
philosophy’s traditional function—to isolate itself from materiality and otherness—is 
exposed as harmful, and that art’s apparent self-evidence (its value for itself) is unsettled, 
in the work’s expression of history. Jarvis notes that “Adorno's thought comes to rest in 
the idea of restless testimony to its own conditionedness. Thought insists on its own 
conditionedness in order to bear witness to what it lives off; but whenever this insistence 
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comes to rest it blocks comprehension of the conditions to which it would do justice”.524 
The subject’s conditions include social-historical materiality and natural materiality. In 
order to experience such materiality, however, history and nature must not be turned into 
categories that impose a narrative; rather, the true experience of suffering must be fought 
for. Knowledge of the subject’s conditions, for Jarvis, is the same as the unsettling 
experience that reason is material rather than infinite.  
 Art and philosophy, like body and mind, are traditionally foes: 
The dilemma of aesthetics appears immanently in the fact that it can be 
constituted neither from above nor from below, neither from concepts nor from 
aconceptual experience. The only possibility for aesthetics beyond this miserable 
alternative is the philosophical insight that fact and concept are not polar 
opposites but mediated reciprocally in one another.525  
The argument, discussed earlier, that philosophy breaks the artwork’s code, and unravels 
aesthetic illusion in order to attain essence, cannot be accurate, because it re-inscribes the 
conventional hierarchy between reason and sensibility that Adorno questions. A better 
explanation would be that art has access to truth that philosophy requires but cannot grasp 
on its own; and, that philosophy’s rationality is conditioned and limited by its own 
historical experience—experience that is also expressed in artworks. When reason 
reflects upon its own conditions, it may break the natural desire for self-preservation that 
forces reason to commit authoritarian acts. Adorno’s statement in the passage above that 
fact and concept are “mediated” in each other can only mean that materiality produces its 
own structure, through the expression of historical experience, and that rationality is 
grounded in material and finite conditions, which must be reflected upon if reason is to 
achieve a measure of self-knowledge.526 Self-knowledge is crucial if reason is to avoid 
destruction. We will see that the Surrealists desired above all to know this material 
ground within rationality.   	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It is important not to interpret Adorno’s concept of mediation in terms of 
epistemic principles alone; rather, the mediation between fact and concept (or art and 
philosophy) is a historically necessary act. It is necessary because, in modernity, reason 
must come to terms with nature if it is to escape authoritarianism, and art must express 
historical experience, which challenges convention (or second nature). Some 
commentators assume that Adorno is falling back upon one of Kant’s first principles: that 
sensibility always requires understanding, and that understanding requires reason. This is 
not the case, for it is only in modernity that philosophy and art require each other. For 
instance, Bernstein argues that the Kantian divide between concept and intuition is 
replicated or redescribed in Adorno as the divide between construction and mimesis (in 
artworks' creation).527 The sign (which signifies universality, identity-thinking, science) 
has come to dominate the image (particularity, aesthetic experience, material objects).528 
Bernstein continues that art needs philosophy because its “expressivity is discursively 
mute—it cannot articulate what its expression means”.529 Philosophy needs art because “it 
cannot express, that is, cannot give experiential meaning to the very thing on which it 
pivots”.530  
Some of Adorno’s formulations suggest that philosophy interprets art in the same 
way that the concept determines intuition: “What is mediated in art, that through which 
the artwork becomes something other than its mere factuality, must be mediated a second 
time by reflection: through the medium of the concept”.531 Yet it is misleading to interpret 
the relationship between philosophy and art as epistemic. In fact, Adorno’s principles are 
based upon historical and social experience—not a priori epistemic conditions. As Gene 
Ray observes, “It would be this myth of progress…that the Nazi genocide would seem to 
have killed off, along with the targeted victims...Adorno argues that at the end of the line 
in Auschwitz, history finally undid the claim of traditional metaphysics to be able to 
recuperate evil as a moment within the unfolding of a greater good”.532 Aesthetic 	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experience requires both an “element of receptivity” and “projection”—that is, both the 
“self-denial of the observer, his capacity to address and recognize what aesthetic objects 
themselves enunciate and what they conceal” and a certain “primacy of subjectivity” or 
reflective thought.533 Art and philosophy share these attributes: art is receptive through its 
expression, which cannot always articulate itself, yet is able to spontaneously process 
material; philosophy is receptive because it requires experience in order to reflect, yet 
also spontaneous through its capacity to interpret. Adorno writes: “Understanding has as 
its idea that one become conscious of the artwork’s content by way of the full experience 
[Erfahrung] of it”.534 Thus activity and passivity are interwoven in philosophy and art.535  
 
Interpretation as Metaphysical Experience 
Michael Rosen provides a clear and detailed account of the activities that interpretation 
achieves.536 Although Rosen’s account is admirably lucid, it assumes that interpretation is 
a wholly active or spontaneous activity practised by a subject upon an object. Thus it is in 
line with Kant’s assumption that nature must be formed in order to become objective—
and with Hegel’s principle that nature provides the raw material for spiritual form, and 
that the subject invariably organizes the object.537 For Rosen, Adorno’s concept of 
interpretation spans a wide array of activities: it is cognitive and yet non-subsumptive; it 
secularizes objects; it discovers the 'more' in the object (qualitative particularity)—and 
thus indicates utopia; it uncovers the mediations of history; it reveals and releases 
objective content; it constructs models and constellations; and, finally, it criticizes and 	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decomposes reified empirical society.538 Rosen’s account is nearly exhaustive, but he 
seems to forget Adorno’s injunction to encounter the object, and his emphasis on the 
processual nature of experience. The object does not require the subject to draw out its 
potentiality: it has the power of expression. So why is interpretation necessary at all? 
Interpretation is not only an active deciphering or decoding; rather, it is itself a 
mode of receptivity, which allows the subject to listen to the experience within the 
artwork. As such it should be considered metaphysical experience—that is, the 
experience of an object’s materiality that expresses traces of history and nature—rather 
than a process of subjective or autonomous reasoning that confronts the work externally. 
Interpretation’s receptivity demonstrates why philosophy requires art. Adorno repeatedly 
foregrounds the subject’s imbrication with the object:  
Critique is not externally added into aesthetic experience but, rather, is immanent 
to it. The comprehension of an artwork as a complexion of truth brings the work 
into relation with its untruth, for there is no artwork that does not participate in the 
untruth external to it, that of its historical moment.539  
The first line suggests that the artwork itself may criticize its own experience. This occurs 
when form acts on material. The artist does not decide herself how form should adapt to 
accommodate material; rather, the historical and social situation forces a certain change 
or development to occur. If the artist ignores the historical situation, the form and 
materials remain regressive, and the work reproduces ideology, or remains stuck in past 
conventions. It remains illusion—in the bad sense. This is why Adorno insists that “Not 
experience alone but only thought that is fully saturated with experience is equal to the 
phenomenon”.540 Artists must attend to historical experience if they want to construct the 
most advanced form, and to employ materials that have not become stale. Foster notes 
that, for Adorno, interpretation provides a way to unseal concepts in order to recover their 
material conditions of possibility:  
...dialectical interpretation dissolves the concept into historical experience, 
bringing to awareness the dependence of the concept on what cannot be 	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assimilated within its categories as a conceptual concept...the nonconceptual [is 
attained] in the unfolding of the social, historical, and human significance of an 
experiential item...the object is to be understood as a site that accumulates 
meanings in its movement through historical time.541 
Adorno also provides a nuanced description of the relationship between art and 
philosophy. Artworks require philosophy so that their expression is not uncritically 
reproduced as ideology; at the same time, philosophy requires art, because without the 
knowledge of its own historical experience, philosophy becomes abstract and reified, and 
cannot accomplish its aim, which is to critique society.  
Lived experiences are indispensible, but they are no final court of aesthetic 
knowledge. Precisely those elements of art that cannot be taken immediately in 
possession and are not reducible to the subject require consciousness and 
therefore philosophy. […] Art awaits its own explanation. It is achieved 
methodically through the confrontation of historical categories and elements of 
aesthetic theory with artistic experience, which correct one another reciprocally.542  
Philosophy’s categories are challenged by artworks’ material experience, which is in turn 
challenged and interpreted by critical thought. The process is reciprocal because neither 
philosophy nor art holds the upper hand. Chua notes that composition and reflection are 
both forms of experience: “This means that the musical score is no different from the 
philosophical text: they both demand analysis”.543 He continues: “If music is philosophy, 
then it must exist, for Adorno, as an objective truth and not a subjective state.... Analysis 
must lead to critical interpretation; truth must be teased out of technique.”544 Thinking 
must be redefined as a receptive experience, and experience must be redefined as a 
process of comprehension that does not achieve epistemic closure. How could philosophy 
give up its stake in determination? And how could art give up its principle that expression 
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and comprehension are separate processes? The best way is to consider interpretation as a 
mode of metaphysical experience. Adorno alludes to the fact that philosophical 
comprehension must confront aesthetic objectivity—objectivity that does not merely 
disappear when philosophy interprets it: “The task of a philosophy of art is not so much 
to explain away the incomprehensibility, which speculative philosophy has invariably 
sought to do, but rather to understand the incomprehensibility itself”.545 If the phrase 
‘understand the incomprehensibility itself’ is not to remain a mere paradox, we must 
redefine what philosophy and art signify, and avoid their conventional definitions. The 
subject only understands the incomprehensibility of the object when philosophy realizes 
its own finitude (reason’s historical conditions), and art realizes the depth of its own 
knowledge (historical experience).  
 
Philosophy, Art, and Metaphysical Experience 
In Adorno’s final lectures on ‘Metaphysics,’ he discusses how the concepts of 
metaphysical experience and metaphysical thought have changed in modernity.546   
Metaphysical experience involves objectivity; it does not result from reason’s 
power to abstract from material reality and ascend to a realm of pure ideas.547 For 
Adorno, the subject’s confrontation with otherness—which, in modernity, is nothing 
other than the forgotten suffering of history—forms the starting point of metaphysical 
experience. It is necessary to confront otherness if reason (history) is to acknowledge its 
own role in suppressing and damaging its material conditions (nature). This confrontation 
is especially urgent today because, after Auschwitz, “the assertion of a purpose or 
meaning that is formally embedded in metaphysics is transformed into ideology, that is to 
say, into an empty solace that at the same time fulfills a very precise function in the world 
as it is: that of keeping people in line”.548  
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We may conclude that metaphysical experience is composed of historical 
experience.549 In opposition to modern philosophy (as practiced, for instance, by Bacon 
and Descartes), Adorno argues that tradition and history are conditions of cognition: 
“…the traditional, that is, the historical moment, not only permeates supposedly 
authenticated knowledge…but actually makes that knowledge possible.”550 Thus we 
should not revive allegedly pure categories, such as freedom, beauty, the good, death, or 
fate, without radically interrogating how those categories have been appropriated and 
transformed in modernity. For instance, Adorno discusses how the experience of dying 
has been altered by society and recent history.551 He observes: “But the less people really 
live…the more they become aware that they have not really lived—the more abrupt and 
frightening death becomes for them, and the more it appears as a misfortune. It is as if, in 
death, they experienced their own reification: that they were corpses from the first. […] 
The terror of death today is largely the terror of seeing how much the living resemble 
it.”552 Metaphysical experience must be grounded in historical and social experience, 
because traditional philosophical disciplines or fields—such as ontology, epistemology, 
morality, and aesthetics—have all been affected by the destruction of cultural tradition 
caused by twentieth-century events.  
Metaphysical experience for Adorno, however, must not assume that mere 
existence (the nature of things) has a positive meaning or purpose. On the contrary, 
metaphysical experience presents the experience of emptiness or nothingness (for 
instance, in Beckett’s work).553 For Adorno, the subject may no longer assume that the 
nature of existence—the traditional object of the metaphysician’s inquiry—has a positive 
or “affirmative character”.554 This is because historical experience has migrated into 
metaphysical experience and altered its very essence.555 Adorno remarks: “In the face of 
the experiences we have had, not only through Auschwitz but through the introduction of 
torture as a permanent institution and through the atomic bomb…in the face of these 	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experiences the assertion that what is has meaning…becomes a mockery; and in the face 
of the victims it becomes downright immoral.”556  
Philosophy seeks to understand that which is—not merely to repeat it.557 
Understanding, however, cannot remain distant from its object, as mimesis demonstrates. 
Adorno observes that “…the joy of thought…is simply the joy of elevation, the joy of 
rising beyond what merely is. […] If the pedestrian replacement of knowledge by the 
mere registering, ordering, and summarizing of facts were to have the last word against 
the elevation of thought, truth itself would really be a chimera...[no more than the] 
arranging of the merely existent.”558 Thus metaphysical experience must transcend the 
sphere of immanence (empirical reality).559 For this reason, metaphysical experience must 
be conceived as a kind of philosophical thought that uncovers, and interprets, objectivity. 
At the same time, philosophical thought must immerse itself in the immanent context that 
imprisons it before it can contemplate rising above that context. Thus Adorno’s utopian 
hope that philosophy might transcend the false world is always tempered by the 
knowledge that one can never entirely escape ideology.  
Finally, the possibility of metaphysical experience constitutes a promise that is 
broken.560 This is why Adorno describes such experience as radically fallible and as open 
to failure.561 He states: “…only what can be refuted, what can be disappointed, what can 
be wrong, has the openness I have spoken of; that is, it is the only thing that matters. It is 
in this concept of openness, as that which is not already subsumed under the identity of 
the concept, that the possibility of disappointment lies”.562 Adorno recalls that, in his own 
childhood, he experienced the names of distant, unknown villages as promising 
enchantment and magic, in a manner that Proust vividly presents.563 However, the 
imagined promise of fulfillment conjured by the names is always disappointed by the 
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empirical reality of the towns themselves.564 Thus, to sum up, metaphysical experience 
involves both the presentation of suffering (immanent historical reality) and the 
presentation of the impulse to transcend that suffering (the utopian impulse towards 
difference and otherness).565  
Subjects may become aware of ideology and metaphysical experience through 
reflecting on history. Ray writes: “Adorno...carries out...that 'determinate negation' that 
confronts the traditional category of the sublime with the material disaster of 
contemporary history...The legacy of Auschwitz is that there is no safe place from which 
to observe and reflect on this event”.566 In other words, reflection cannot distance itself 
from its object; the subject remains caught up in the forces of history. In order to break 
the hold of the past on the present, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms that 
allow tradition to repeat itself. Artworks force the subject to confront some of their goals, 
beliefs, and values that have not been properly reflected upon, and which may harden into 
an inflexible ideological structure if they remain unconscious. Since metaphysical 
experience calls upon the subject to interpret objectivity, aesthetic experience must 
involve knowledge: “Because the element of truth is essential to artworks, they 
participate in knowledge, and this defines the only legitimate relation to them.”567 The 
knowledge that arises from artworks however is elusive: it cannot be simply 
conceptualized or determined, because it involves truth content, which involves utopian 
possibility as well as the expression of historical suffering; and it expresses historical 
experience, which is known somatically as well as intellectually.  
Bubner argues that philosophy performs the work of dialectical negation that 
constitutes art’s resistance to empirical reality, and also its presentation of truth: 
“Philosophy itself introduces something that is not actually contained in the innocent 
works of art themselves, and could never be contained there: namely the negation of 
existing reality”.568 However, the artwork’s formal re-organization of traditional material 
also results from determinate negation, because it results in the transformation of 	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empirical material into aesthetic form. Such form displays non-violent synthesis, which is 
precisely what reality might look like were a state of reconciliation to be achieved. Thus 
Bubner unfairly treats the artwork as a mere object that must be subjected to the 
dialectical work of rationality. He subscribes uncritically to a Kantian division between 
passive matter and active reason.  
 Adorno writes: “History is inherent to aesthetic theory. Its categories are radically 
historical…”.569 In modernity, for example, the concept of taste is no longer acceptable as 
an aesthetic category: “Experience alone is in no position to legislate aesthetically 
because a boundary is prescribed to it by the philosophy of history. If experience crosses 
this limit it degenerates into emphatic appreciation”.570 The judgment of taste remains a 
subjective experience that cannot attend to the historical or social content of the aesthetic 
object, and the concept of taste has no critical or intellectual content—it is purely 
pleasurable and therefore easily exploited by society. Hence it must be discarded, for in 
an era of authoritarian propaganda, and capitalist illusion, the subject must have a method 
with which she can critically reflect upon the historical-social material that she is given. 
Historical experience determines which categories contain truth content and which fall 
into ideology. Adorno does not spell out that in order for the subject to determine the 
relevance of her experience, she must passively receive such experience as well as reflect 
upon it. The subject must become passive (so that she does not determine the artwork) 
and active (so that she reflects philosophically upon the work) at the same time. Hence 
interpretation must fulfill two functions at once: it must be critical while listening to 
ideological claims; it must philosophically reflect upon objectivity while remaining open 
to historical untruth.  
 Interpretation cannot be simply another method of fixing the artwork’s fluidity. If 
the subject attempts to categorize the work without listening to the experience within it, 
the experience decays into an exercise in conceptualization. The subject in that case fails 
to gain mimetic proximity to the work; as a result, she cannot reflect adequately on its 
historical inheritance. Adorno writes, “Highly mediated in itself, art stands in need of 	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thinking mediation…”.571 However, in order to reflect on the work—and not merely 
abstractly determine it—the subject must be receptive to the work’s inner composition. 
For this to occur, interpretation must be a species of metaphysical experience; this defines 
the subject’s relationship to the work, which remains immanent and transcendent to 
aesthetic truth: “To whoever remains strictly internal [to the artwork], art will not open its 
eyes, and whoever remains strictly external distorts artworks by a lack of affinity.”572 The 
subject should ideally become open enough that her determinative ego loses its rigidity 
and becomes able to adapt to the experiences within the work itself. Such openness 
requires a kind of strength that is not defined within the traditional Kantian framework.  
Now, let us examine why interpretation is valuable and necessary in aesthetic 
experience. First, Adorno’s concept of aesthetic interpretation, or philosophical 
reflection, involves thinking or cognitive activity, and so is not merely a species of 
phenomenological perception or immediate intuition. Because it involves cognition, 
interpretation may critique ideology, and avoids the naivety and superficiality of 
perception. Perception is inadequate because it is unable to uncover the different layers of 
historical truth and social ideology that compose an artwork. Interpretation thus 
overcomes some of the problems that adhere to Kant’s concept of aesthetic judgment: 
judgment analyzes the formal properties of artworks, but remains subjectively oriented, 
because it can only employ a priori categories; judgment tries to bridge the gap between 
freedom and nature (or, in Adorno’s language, enlightenment and myth), but fails to do 
so because it reinforces the dualism between universal and particular, as it ascends from 
experience to indeterminate concepts; judgment remains unable to uncover the historical 
experience sedimented in artworks, for it has no language for the difference between false 
and true experience, as it appears in the content of a work; finally, aesthetic judgment 
cannot know an artwork’s historical experience, because it is committed to an ideal of 
disinterested contemplation that is ahistorical and transcendent.  
 Second, although interpretation is a cognitive activity, it does not marginalize 
other kinds of human experience such as imagination, bodily experience, or emotional 
experience. Thus interpretation does not seek to use other kinds of experience 	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instrumentally. Even in reflective judgment, imagination’s possibility for exploring 
otherness is not realized, because it must cooperate with understanding, rather than 
respond independently to objectivity. Imagination may explore the various layers of 
objectivity without imposing subjective categories upon them. Thus, interpretation is 
philosophical and yet has roots in experience. 
Third, interpretation is necessary because the structure of modern art requires a 
new kind of aesthetic method. Modern artworks do not allow truth to be grasped through 
reflective judgment; in modernity, the subject must confront her own inability to ascend 
from particularity towards universality. Modern art’s truth content is always indirectly 
expressed—that is, the content appears obscure because it is new and brushes experience 
against the grain. Instead of conceiving of the work in terms of essence and appearance, it 
would be better to grasp it as surface and depth, which remain continuous with each other 
(not separate ontological substances) and yet are only grasped with difficulty.  
Fourth, Adorno famously argues that art’s value and right to exist is no longer self 
evident in modernity.573 This is because historical events have shaken the ground of 
tradition; philosophical values that were taken for granted—such as the faith in 
rationality, the apparently immutable moral law, humanity’s interminable progress 
toward emancipation, the divinity of human being, and subjectivity’s distance from 
objectivity—are now in doubt. It is noteworthy that many of the values that appear empty 
in the light of history could be reformulated as Kantian ideas of reason, which appear in 
works of art as aesthetic ideas. For Adorno, artworks justify their legitimacy through 
provoking society to critically and philosophically reflect. This practice is aesthetic 
interpretation. Hence interpretation is necessary partially because of art’s precarious and 
uncertain position in relation to society and history.  
In modernity, any aesthetic form has no guarantee of security or legitimacy. 
Because the traditional aesthetic forms and categories cannot be relied upon to produce 
truth, or to resist the social totality, the subject must try to reflect upon the relationship 
between the artwork’s form (which may either illuminate, transfigure, or obscure 
material) and its content (that material which tries to speak through the work, and which 
only appears as truth when the traditional categories are invested with new energy). This 	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is the reason why modern works constantly unsettle the conviction that aesthetic form 
may communicate ideas; and also why the subject must excavate the work in order to 
attain an experience of truth (that is, an experience of nonidentity, which does not allow 
successful knowledge, but rather shows the failure of reason).  
Fifth, any truth or knowledge gained through artworks is an achievement—that is, 
it is won through difficult intellectual and experiential labour. Such labour is necessary 
because an aspect of the modern artwork is autonomous from society. Maurice Merleau-
Ponty argues that bodily perception is sufficient to grasp an object’s essence. Critical 
Theory would respond, though, that an object’s truth is always changing with history, and 
so only reflective engagement with society may grant provisional (transient) insight into 
objectivity. In addition, subjects’ autonomy has been damaged; we have become nearly 
assimilated within society. The difficulty of achieving a critical perspective is evidence of 
this. In order to cognize art’s truth, subjects must try to resist their own integration, or 
reflect upon their lack of freedom. The subject cannot constitute the work in the same 
way that she is able to determine empirical objects. Hence, reflective engagement is 
necessary.  
Sixth, interpretation is not only subjective; if it is to succeed (which means that 
the subject fails to grasp the work fully, and realizes her own rational impotence and 
subjective frailty) it requires that the artwork present itself in a certain way to the 
observer, reader, or listener.574 Thus there is an objective aspect to experience that is not 
present in Kant’s conception of aesthetic judgment. Specifically, although the work’s 
truth is inseparable from its historical-social context, that context must appear through 
semblance. Thus, the knowledge of history is mediated by possibility. The new appears 
when the artwork critically expresses the past while opening future possibilities. The new 
forecloses any attempt to coercively determine objectivity. In order to comprehend these 
various strands of the artwork, the subject must employ interpretation. Determinative 
judgment is too reductive; moral judgment misses the autonomy of aesthetic experience; 
philosophical reflection alone remains isolated from sensuousness and the experience of 
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history and society; and Kantian aesthetic judgment is disconnected from actual empirical 
objectivity.   
Seventh, Kant claims that aesthetic judgment is isolated from sensibility, 
cognition, and morality. Aesthetic judgment’s isolation grounds its autonomy, and its 
disinterestedness. Thus although aesthetic judgment is mediated (that is, it is a process 
that involves free play, and which results in the feeling of pleasure, and so is not merely 
intuitive), it is not interpretive. Yet it is unclear what aesthetic experience consists in if it 
purifies experience of sensation, desire, philosophical reflection, and moral judgment, 
because an experience that subtracted those elements would be empty and formal, and 
meaningless in terms of human agency and metaphysical import. Kant might reply: Who 
said that art has anything to do with metaphysics or agency? It is merely a play of forms 
in judgment. However, in modernity, such a position is difficult to uphold, because the 
autonomy of the artwork depends upon resisting the conformity imposed by society and 
history. History is no longer external to artistic form and content; instead, it is inseparable 
from aesthetic experience. We have seen this in our discussion of Dada; the next chapter 
will examine the material content of Surrealism. Such inseparability entails that the 
subject must disentangle truth from falsity in order to avoid the ideological repetition of 
conformist patterns. The subject may only disentangle aesthetic experience through 
interpretation.  
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Chapter Five: Adorno’s Concept of Technique and Max Ernst’s Natural History Series 
 
To me, the great products of the new art almost always seem to have been those 
which still had tradition as an essential force within them and then negated it on 
their own strength. The great revolutionary artists of the period—such as Picasso, 
such as Braque, such as Schoenberg and so forth—were all within tradition, and, 
by locking horns with it, they essentially brought about something like an 
induction of tension. […] Where tradition no longer exists as an object, however 
sublimated, the power of true revolutionary art does not really exist.575  
 
Now, theory must prove that it is grounded in materiality. In this chapter I’d like to 
interpret several Surrealist artworks, and Surrealism as a revolutionary movement, in 
order to argue that Adorno’s concept of technique should be revised. The practice of 
interpreting artworks must be demonstrated rather than theorized in order to test theory’s 
relevance, and its aptitude to its object. That is, the object itself lays out the ground rules 
for theory’s principles and methods. In the same way, philosophy requires materiality, 
and thus aesthetic experience; and art’s agency becomes radical and critical through 
philosophical interpretation. Although some of Surrealism’s most powerful artworks 
were produced before the Second World War, the conditions for the historical catastrophe 
that culminated in the concentration camps were present, and festering, years before 
1945. Thus my analysis of Surrealism is continuous with the thesis that the Holocaust, as 
the historical experience of mass death and suffering, forces us to revise our 
philosophical and aesthetic methods that were assumed to have a priori validity.  
Adorno’s concept of technique manifests contradiction: its method conflicts with 
its aim. This contradiction demonstrates that society is itself irrational. On the one hand, 
technique participates in violence (the domination of nature) perpetrated by reason. On 
the other hand, technique, insofar as it presents a new way of forming material 
artistically, must negatively refer to utopian impulses, and must express nature’s 
suffering. In this way technique indirectly expresses truth content: the possibility that 
arises from actuality (or, unconscious nature that emerges from convention, or second 	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nature). How is technique able to attain, even negatively, its other? How can reason 
communicate with unreason? Technique must be constructed using irrational impulses as 
well as rational reflection. In this chapter, I argue for a conception of technique that 
differs from Adorno’s own definition. The advantage of this conception of technique is 
that it displays clearly the contradictory nature of the process of artistic production, which 
involves both conscious and unconscious elements; further, it points to a concrete 
illustration of Adorno’s concept of reconciliation, which does not signify simply Idealist 
identification, or that organic wholeness that phenomenology adores, but rather suggests 
that different elements may non-harmoniously co-exist with each other.  
We may prove the advantage of this new concept of technique by examining the 
Surrealists’ excavation of the unconscious. The Surrealists attempted to free the mind 
using a method that was both rational and irrational: automatic writing.576 Max Ernst’s 
techniques of frottage and grattage, while distinct from automatic writing, are still 
irrational means for unlocking the hidden expressive possibilities of subjectivity. Ernst’s 
‘Natural History’ series ought to be interpreted as a meditation on the dialectic between 
freedom and materiality. Thus I argue that Adorno’s concept of technique as a wholly 
rational procedure ought to be revised and amended in order to accommodate the 
discoveries of Surrealism in general, and Ernst in particular.577 Technique should be 
conceptualized as encompassing imaginative processes that seek to uncover and invent 
reality anew—something that rationality on its own cannot accomplish. This section is 
divided into several parts. First, I discuss Surrealism in general, and Ernst’s works in 
particular; second, I analyze Adorno’s concept of technique; finally, I propose a 
nonviolent synthesis of Critical Theory and Surrealism.578  	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Surrealism, Ernst, and Technical Magic 
The technique of automatic writing emerged from the objective historical conditions that 
affected the fears, desires, and goals of the Dadaists and Surrealists.579 Although Max 
Ernst was born in Germany, he experienced the intellectual milieu of Paris after the First 
World War. As Michael Richardson and Krzysztof Fijalkowski explain, “…[S]urrealism 
was born in the social, cultural and intellectual ferment that followed the First World 
War. […] Paris perceived itself as…the capital of French rationalism and the 
Enlightenment ideal…. With the ending of the war in 1918, such a view was, if not in 
tatters, at least tarnished. The war exposed the raw nerves of civilization itself…”.580 The 
First World War introduced human beings to trench warfare, nerve gas, machine guns, 
mass slaughter, and other modern horrors.581 Richardson and Fijalkowski continue: “the  
young people who were drawn to [S]urrealism at this time felt they had nothing to lose: 
the society in which they lived had nothing to offer them that could assuage their sense of 
rage, and we should not be surprised that one of their first organized activities was an 
enquiry into the possibility of suicide.”582   
 Automatism is a means for freeing the mind from the constraints of rationality: 
specifically, the natural desires of the ego to preserve its own activity regardless of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
proposes that Surrealist praxis and Critical Theory may work together—thus resisting and 
augmenting her advisor’s arguments. Her correspondence with Adorno provides a 
glimpse into the latter’s working life, Lenk’s research on Surrealism, and the political 
events of May 1968 in Paris.  
579 Cathrin Klingsohr-Leroy, Surrealism, Uta Grosenick (ed), (Koln, 2015), p. 8:  
“The artists who came together in Paris in the early 1920s shared a deep distrust of 
materialistic, bourgeois society, which, they believed, was responsible for the First World 
War and its terrible aftermath. Not only that, but with its smug, superficial way of life 
and its belief in the omnipotence of technological and scientific achievement, society had 
succumbed to a process of degeneration to which the only answer was a revolutionary 
new anti-art. […] Surrealism would not only embrace art and literature but would also 
play a part, as the first Manifesto put it, in ‘solving all the principal problems of life’. It 
would affect every aspect of experience and bring about social and psychological 
change.”  
580 Michael Richardson and Krzysztof Fijalkowski (eds. and trans), Surrealism Against 
the Current: Tracts and Declarations (London and Sterling: 2001), p. 2.  
581 Richardson and Fijalkowski, Surrealism Against…., p. 3.  
582 Richardson and Fijalkowski, Surrealism Against…., p. 3.  
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cost to objectivity.583 Automatism also attempts to present objectivity—or, according to 
Breton, the unconscious—without the distorting and harmful mediation of rationality.584 
The Dadaists (and, later, the Surrealists) were working against the spirit of the times, 
which sought to repress the suffering and destruction caused by the war, to regenerate 
bourgeois culture, and to force individuals to conform to conservative social values (such 
as religious devotion, patriotic sacrifice, love of family, and the entrepreneurial 
individual). Ernst, among many other avant-garde artists, recognized that the system 
could only be criticized by reflecting on the historical situation; through such reflection, 
the artist would produce an artistic method capable of presenting the current crisis, and 
thus also of recalling the past, which lay in ruins. It would not do to continue to use 
outworn or broken tools. The past could only be reflected upon indirectly, through a new 
and fragmentary optic. For Ernst, that optic came in several forms: frottage, grattage, and 
decalcomania.  
 Surrealism ought to be considered a method for resisting reification—whether 
cultural, psychological, or social. According to the second and third principles of the 
‘Declaration of January 27, 1925’,  
2. SURREALISM is not a new or easier means of expression, nor even a 
metaphysics of poetry;  
It is a total means of complete liberation of the mind 
and all that resembles it.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
583 “All of them [Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, and Marcuse] showed how reason was 
in collusion with power, as philosophy and science were with politics, and they all 
denounced the most formidable ideology, that of the supposed anti-ideological weapon 
which is reason itself. The realization of the rational is nothing other than that of world 
bureaucracy…. And it is the instrumental functional rationality of means alone which 
ineluctably leads us to this end…”. Bernard Caburet, ‘You Will Always Cherish Your 
Failures, Machine-Man’, in Dawn Ades, Michael Richardson, and Krzystof Fijalkowski 
(eds.), The Surrealism Reader: An Anthology of Ideas (London, 2015), pp. 89-90.  
584 “Automatic writing consisted of writing down as rapidly as possible, without revision 
or control by reason, everything that passed through the mind when the writer had been 
able to detach himself sufficiently from the world outside. This exercise was intended to 
lay bare the ‘mental matter’ which is common to all men, and to separate it from thought, 
which is only one of its manifestations”. Sarane Alexandrian, Surrealist Art (London, 
2012), p. 47. 
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3. We are determined to make a Revolution.585  
The fact that Surrealism is known primarily as an artistic style demonstrates how the 
possibilities of radical politics and philosophical thought have, in the twentieth century, 
been urgently expelled from the domain of art.586 The Surrealists wanted to destroy static 
functionality and considered automatic writing a revolutionary technique that would 
advance that aim. Maurice Blanchot writes: “With automatic writing, it is my freedom 
that triumphs.... The result is that these free words become centres of magical activity 
and, more than that, things as impenetrable and opaque as any human object withdrawn 
from utilitarian signification”.587 Automatic writing tries to allow the matter itself to 
speak, and to bypass the rational ego. The imagination is often defined as a merely 
passive vehicle for materiality. For instance, Breton declares:  
But we, who have made no effort whatsoever to filter, who in our works have 
made ourselves into simple receptacles of so many echoes, modest recording 
instruments who are not mesmerized by the drawing we are making, perhaps we 
serve an even nobler cause. Thus do we render with integrity the ‘talent’ which 
has been lent to us. You might as well speak of the talent of this platinum ruler, 
this mirror, this door, and of the sky, if you like.588  
Arguably, however, the imagination must also remain critical and reflective if it is to 
avoid falling into false (merely conventional) patterns of thought. Such reflexivity is 
deepened when the imagination imitates, rather than conceptually determines, an 
object.589 Thus the “freedom” Blanchot describes is not the Kantian freedom of pure 
subjectivity—it is closer to the potentiality expressed in objectivity.590 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585 Louis Aragon, Antonin Artaud, et al., ‘Declaration of January 27, 1925’, in 
Richardson and Fijalkowski, Surrealism Against…, p. 24. Signed by many prominent 
Surrealists in the early Paris group, including Ernst.  
586 See Bernstein, Against Voluptuous…, ‘Introduction’. As mentioned previously, 
Bernstein names this modern process the alienation of art from truth and morality.  
587 Caws, Surrealism…, p. 217. This passage is from Maurice Blanchot’s essay 
‘Reflections on Surrealism’ (1949) in his book The Work of Fire.  
588 Quoted in Johanna Malt, Obscure Objects of Desire: Surrealism, Fetishism, and 
Politics (Oxford, 2004), p. 28. From Breton, Manifestoes…, pp. 27-28. 
 
589 Gatt writes that Ernst’s orientation is divided between critique and dream: “Thus we 
find side by side an imagination that is drawn towards a dream world, towards the most 
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Although many of Ernst’s artworks might appear to be wholly isolated from 
political intention, their meticulous attention to the historical state of the artistic material, 
as well as the specific technique of articulation used, betrays an acute social awareness. 
As Werner Spies observes: “The contrast between utmost freedom in the act of creativity 
and utmost determinateness in the completed work plays a large part in Ernst’s art.”591 
We can observe this for ourselves in Ernst’s work entitled “La Roue de la lumiere” (The 
Wheel of Light) (Figure 3).592  
The picture is of an eye, opened wide, exquisitely textured and detailed. The 
eyelashes look dangerous: like the tendrils of a plant, or the spines of a fish that lives far 
beneath the ocean surface. The white part of the eye appears fractured, like fissured 
riverbed or broken rock; the coloured part looks as if it is rotating like a ‘wheel’, and the 
lines are perfectly, artificially, straight. The surrounding surface, which would be skin if 
it were part of a human face, is rough and flecked with shadow. Ernst has also divided up 
the background behind the eye into darkness and light—or earth and sky, perhaps to give 
the illusion of depth, or to confuse the viewer’s sense of proportion. The flesh at the front 
of the eye is egg shaped. The picture would impart the illusion of a human eye, except for 
the fact that the subject is set against what appears to be a torn sheet of paper or fragment 
of material, as if the artist was about to throw it away. Finally, the delicately shaded 
textures of the composition add to the strange atmosphere that pervades the picture. The 
object, or objects, that Ernst used to give the textures have disappeared and become 
invisible—although we can imaginatively associate the different textures with many 
different objects, such as snakeskin (dark ground), gently rolling waves (‘skin’ beneath 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
deranged states of mind, and a critical conscience that sees the need to control and 
comprehend the meaning of every step in this disturbing experience.” He continues: “So 
the painting is not a passive record of an event or a movement in the psyche, but a means 
to an end, an instrument of research in the quest for an understanding of the world.” Gatt, 
Twentieth-Century…, pp. 9, 12.  
590 Caws, Surrealism…, p. 217. 
591 Werner Spies, Max Ernst Frottages, translated by Joseph M. Bernstein (London, 
1969), v.  
592 Max Ernst, “La Roue de la lumiere” (The Wheel of Light), 1925, Frottage, pencil on 
paper, 25 x 42 cm [10 x 16.5 in]. Private Collection. Histoire naturelle, sheet 29. In Mary 
Ann Caws (ed), Surrealism: Themes and Movements (London, 2004), p. 64.  
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the eye), or a swirling whirlpool or abyss, or a setting sun (iris).593 The title also 
anticipates the mysterious and threatening sun-like forms that appear in Ernst’s later 
works, such as La Foret (The Forest), La roué du soleil (The Sun Wheel) or Foret-aretes 
(Fishbone Forest), all produced in the late 1920s.594  
Mary Ann Caws comments that Ernst’s picture was part of a series entitled 
Histoire naturelle (Natural History), “which was exhibited and published, with a preface 
by Jean Arp, in 1926”.595 Ernst used the frottage technique in 1920-21, but gave it up, and 
then rediscovered it in 1925.596 Briefly, frottage involves placing a sheet of paper, or 
canvas, on top of an object (such as a wood floor, a stone, a candlestick, or wallpaper) 
and then rubbing through the paper or canvas using a pencil, crayon, or charcoal. The 
resulting image will impart the texture and tactile contours of the hidden object while 
masking the complete details of its surface, as it appears visually. Caws continues: “In his 
text ‘Comment on force l’inspiration’, (‘How one can force inspiration,’ Le Surrealisme 
au service de la revolution, 6, 1933) Ernst described the frottage technique as a 
mechanism to intensify the ‘mind’s powers of irritability’”.597 Irritability signals a 
reaction to external stimuli, or forces that cannot be controlled. Ernst considers that the 
technique may be used to harness the subject’s unconscious as well as the potentiality 
present in everyday objects that has been stifled due to the dominance of utility.598  
Elizabeth Legge argues that Ernst synthesized, and transformed, various traditions 
from German and French history and art in his work (in addition to Freudian 
psychoanalysis): Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopedie; the tradition of constructing 
and painting Cabinets of Curiosities from the seventeenth century; Enlightenment science 
and mysticism; Romantic poets’ scientific interests (specifically Goethe and Novalis); 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
593 As Spies remarks, “…frottage was more than a technique…Frottage is bound up with 
a new objectivity. It creates this objectivity in that the structure Ernst rubs through is 
subordinate to a pictorial object that has nothing to do with that structure. Two planes of 
reality coincide.” Spies, Max Ernst Frottages, vi.  
594 Ulrich Bischoff, Max Ernst (1891-1976): Beyond Painting, translated by Judith 
Harrison (Koln and Bonn, 1991), pp. 40-41; Caws, Surrealism…, p. 65. .  
595 Caws, Surrealism…, p. 64.  
596 Caws, Surrealism…, p. 64.  
597 Caws, Surrealism…, p. 64.  
598 Spies comments that “[e]ven in frottage the impulse of the Dadaist is still discernable. 
He proceeds from a nonartistic reality”. Spies, Max Ernst…, viii.  
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and previous artists (such as Renard, Toulouse-Lautrec, Apollinaire, and Dufy).599 Legge 
intriguingly notes that Ernst’s plate “The Wheel of Light” refers to the female principle 
of imagination within God, as theorized by Jacob Bohme, as well as the seductive eyes of 
Gala Eluard, with whom Ernst had been romantically obsessed.600  
Here is Ernst’s own account of the origins of frottage:  
It all began with a memory from my childhood, when my bed used to stand 
opposite panels of imitation mahogany. When I was half-asleep, these panels 
would act as a kind of optical ‘provocateur’ and conjure up visions. I was staying 
at a small hotel at the seaside and it was a rainy night. While I was thinking back 
to my childhood, a vision befell me, forcing me to look at the floorboards full of 
marks and scratches in utter fascination. I decided to delve deeper into the 
symbolic content of this vision. In order to encourage my meditative and 
hallucinatory powers, I made a series of drawings from the floorboards by laying 
pieces of paper over them quite by chance and then rubbing them with a black 
pencil. When I looked at the resulting drawings…I was surprised by both a 
sudden increase in my visionary faculties and by the hallucinatory succession of 
contradictory and superimposed images which had the intensity and suddenness 
characteristic of memories of an earlier love.601  
 
Several commentators have noted that Ernst alludes to Proust’s novel In Search of Lost 
Time.602 The “intensity and suddenness” of Ernst’s experience proves the power of the 
imagination’s associations (since his experience is hallucinatory—that is, it is fantasy felt 
with the force of reality), and indicates that the artist is a spectator, astonished before his 
creation.603 Notice the passivity in Ernst’s narrative: “When I was half asleep…When I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599 Elizabeth Legge, ‘Zeuxis’s Grapes, Novalis’s Fossils, Freud’s Flowers: Max Ernst’s 
Natural History’, Art History, 16 (March 1993), pp. 147-172. 
600 Legge, ‘Zeuxis’s Grapes…’, p. 152.  
601 Bischoff, Max Ernst…, p. 34.  
602 Bischoff, Max Ernst…,  pp. 34-36; Spies, Max Ernst…,  xviii.  
603 Bischoff, Max Ernst..., p. 34. Spies concurs: “Frottage is Ernst’s contribution to 
automatism. […] As the creator devotes himself to this activity (or passivity), as he limits 
his own cooperation with increasing rigorousness, he himself finally becomes the 
onlooker”. Spies, Max Ernst…, viii.  
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was thinking back to…When I looked at the…”.604 The technique of frottage is not 
determined by rational considerations; instead, it is dictated by the irrational desire to 
make the inanimate animate, or to bring to life objects that have become dead through 
their reduction to utility. Even the fake “imitation mahogany” panels can reveal fantastic 
visions.605 Ernst also suggests that imagination and reflection (“my meditative and 
hallucinatory powers”), at least in artistic production, may both be provoked by 
visions.606 The technique of frottage tries to uncover, and make present, an imaginative 
reality that has been suppressed by those conventions that reduce objects to their social 
functions. Frottage also continues Rimbaud’s principle that human sensibility must be 
disarranged: Ernst’s “vision” refers not only to ocular perception, but indicates that 
different senses may work together, against their usual functions, in order to uncover the 
hidden potentialities beneath the real.607 The artist practicing frottage renders the tactile 
visual, and brings dynamism (rubbing) to rest in a single image (or, alternatively, frottage 
allows the motion present in stillness to rise to the surface). Thus Ernst’s method casts a 
magic spell over the materials, making them appear equal in the final image, as Spies 
argues: “The materials in question lose their independent character. Wood, string, leather, 
crumped paper, stale bread, thread—and whatever else is placed beneath the sheet—
undergo a transformation. Ernst equalizes the individual materials.”608 Not only are the 
materials equalized (as they are stripped of functionality and social value), they are also 
given a voice: it is the object that expresses itself, not the artist. The materials guide the 
artist’s hand—the artist is not a source but a vehicle.  
 Consider another work by Ernst, ‘Fishbone Forest’, constructed using a slightly 
different technique—grattage.609 Bischoff describes grattage in the following way: 
“Grattage (or, roughly translated, scraping) is a transferal of frottage to the medium of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
604 Bischoff, Max Ernst..., p. 34.  
605 Bischoff, Max Ernst..., p. 34.  
606 Bischoff, Max Ernst..., p. 34.  
607 “The Poet makes himself a seer by a long, immense and reasoned disordering of all 
the senses.” Arthur Rimbaud, Selected Poems and Letters, translated and with an 
introduction and notes by Jeremy Harding and John Sturrock (London, 2004), pp. 238-
239.  
608 Spies, Max Ernst…, xxiii. See also Zuidervaart, Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory…, p. 68. 
609 Bischoff, Max Ernst…, p. 41. See Figure 4. 
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painting.”610 Bischoff notes that grattage uses non-artistic “elements” to achieve its 
effect—for instance, instead of using a brush, Ernst uses other tools on the canvas.611 
Grattage involves subtraction and displacement, while frottage is a method of passive 
addition, since the artist is not in control of the patterns added to the surface of the picture 
(although Ernst, after the rubbing process, did draw over the patterns in order to produce 
recognizable images).612 In ‘Fishbone Forest’, three skulls, of unknown origin, appear on 
a sloping green hillside. The hillside is hemmed in by two tall, dark structures, which 
look metallic, and seem to be constructed by human beings. They create an atmosphere of 
claustrophobia, because they appear taller than the ring in the sky, and because they stand 
on either side of the image like guards. The green hill descends towards one of the pillars 
and out of sight, as if signaling the death of nature as it spirals towards monolithic 
civilized rationality. The ‘trees’ in the painting look, as the title says, like the spines of 
fish, and they impart an eerie silence and stillness to the work, as if the bones immobilize 
each other. Nothing seems to be moving. Many of Ernst’s painted works are divided 
between earth and sky, and some of the most apocalyptic have brilliant blue skies; in this 
painting, however, the red, orange and yellow colours remind the viewer of a furnace, or 
a hellish sunset which never ends.613 The orange and black ring in the sky, which could be 
either the sun, the moon, a dying star, or an alien planet, disorients the viewer, because 
we cannot tell the time of day, or what direction we are facing, from looking at the sky.614  
 
Adorno’s Concept of Technique: Reason Against Reason 
 
Adorno argues that artistic technique must be a critical form of rationality that exposes 
and negates the instrumental rationality practiced by society. Only reason has the power 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
610 Bischoff, Max Ernst..., p. 40.  
611 Bischoff, Max Ernst..., p. 40.  
612 Andre Breton, in a footnote to the first ‘Manifesto of Surrealism’, written in 1924, 
noted that paintings or drawings considered Surrealist must employ the method of 
tracing: “Here again it is not a matter of drawing, but simply of tracing. […] And, upon 
opening my eyes, I would get the very strong impression of something ‘never seen’.” 
Breton, Manifestoes…, p. 21.  
613 Bischoff, Max Ernst…, pp. 66-69.  
614 Bischoff, Max Ernst…, p. 42.  
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to heal its own wounds; no other faculty can exercise critique: “Art is rationality that 
criticizes rationality without withdrawing from it; art is not something prerational or 
irrational, which would peremptorily condemn it as untruth in the face of the 
entanglement of all human activity in the social totality.”615 Here, Adorno argues that 
artworks are totally rational, and that artworks must strip themselves of any illusion that 
they might harbour magical or irrational traces within themselves. For Adorno, 
irrationality leads directly to myth, which is nothing other than a static natural cycle that 
is unable to critically reflect upon its own activity. Myth repeats itself unceasingly 
because it is determined by nature—it does not have a history, unlike true, philosophical 
rationality, and aesthetic comportment (mimesis). Yet Adorno must recognize that 
aesthetic behavior—both artistic production and aesthetic reception—necessarily 
involves elements of irrationality: namely, imaginative mimetic comportment and felt 
somatic impulses that reason cannot control. The Surrealists traced these impulses back 
to the subject’s unconscious: to dreams and other irrational phenomena. While these 
phenomena may remain outside the control of reason, they should not be condemned as 
untrue, because their activity cannot be compared to that of instrumental reason. For 
instance, imagination, as used by the Surrealists, does not uncritically repeat conventional 
notions in a timeless vacuum; rather, it tunnels underneath the subject’s conventional 
rational framework in order to show her how nature has been harmed by reason. Thus the 
unconscious does not present pure or unsullied nature (which does not exist); rather, it 
presents damaged nature, which is still able to act differently from conventional reason.616 
Adorno would argue that irrational forces should not be relied on because they may easily 
lead to mythic archetypes that perpetuate unethical principles (for instance, the fascist-
nationalist mythology used by the Nazis). While this risk is genuine, and should not be 
ignored, the same risk is present in reason itself. That is, philosophical reason can easily 
be persuaded that only ahistorical, formal problems are worthy of academic 
consideration. We must always assume a critical stance, whether we are dealing with 
imaginative phenomena, philosophical or irrational cognition. Yet it does not help to 
completely dismiss one form of cognition entirely without recognizing its virtues.  	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 Adorno observes: “Cruelty is an element of art’s critical reflection on itself; art 
despairs over the claim to power that it fulfills in being reconciled.”617 Adorno recognizes 
that technique participates in violence insofar as it is inevitably a product of human 
culture and history. For instance, even automatic writing, as it was practiced by the 
Parisian Surrealist group, is unable to divorce itself entirely from the various conventions 
that structure human communication: syntax, the alphabet, grammar, and the cultural 
history of the French language. At the same time, technique, as we have seen, results 
from imaginative and mimetic impulses, and so expresses the suffering of the harmed 
object as well as the harming subject. Thus technique is not entirely rational: it is also 
grounded in irrational objectivity. In this way, technique redeems its compulsion to 
cruelty: it provides an image of dissonant identity which is passive, and not only active.  
 Adorno also claims that technical rationality differs qualitatively from 
instrumental rationality: “Art…is entwined with rationalization; this is the source of all of 
art’s means and methods of production…. Yet art mobilizes technique in an opposite 
direction than does domination.”618 This statement goes against Adorno’s other claim—
that artistic technique is necessarily violent. Arguably, art is only able to present nature’s 
suffering, and demonstrate that which rationality has suppressed, when it integrates 
unconscious objectivity and irrational impulses into its own methodology, rather than 
excluding them. Art integrates the unconscious and the irrational partially through 
technique that relies on imaginative and impulses—and not only on rationality, no matter 
how philosophical or critical.  
 Finally, Adorno admits that artworks are internally divided: they are both 
irrational and rational. Why should technique—a product of the artist’s cultural and 
historical lineage, as well as her irrational impulses, and of the rational judgment that 
applies the correct form to organize material—be any different? Adorno claims:  
Art is motivated by a conflict: Its enchantment, a vestige of its magical phase, is 
constantly repudiated as unmediated sensual immediacy by the progressive 
disenchantment of the world, yet without its ever being possibly finally to 
obliterate this magical element. Only in it is art’s mimetic character preserved, 	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and its truth is the critique that, by its sheer existence, it levels at a rationality that 
has become absolute.619 
Artworks’ semblance of magical autonomy from empirical society serves, Adorno 
continues, as an implicit critique of that society, because, according to functional 
rationality, anything that cannot be valued using social criteria (utility, functionality, and 
exchangeability) is considered worthless.620 In the same way, the irrational unconscious 
impulses that animate technique provide a critique of technique’s rational violence 
merely by standing outside of reason itself.621 Adorno also affirms that art expresses 
irrationality: “Artworks do not repress; through expression they help to make present to 
consciousness the diffuse and elusive without, as psychoanalysis insists, 
‘rationalization’.”622 How could rationality express that which is not rational (“the diffuse 
and elusive”)?623 If even aesthetic rationality is guilty of violence, how could it avoid 
repression?624 The only possibility is that irrational traces exist within the apparently 
rational structure of the artist’s technique, and the artwork, and that these traces 
themselves guide aesthetic rationality through mimesis.  
 Adorno maintains that artistic violence results from mimesis—the imitation of 
rational violence practiced by a society that reduces the living to the dead, and history to 
myth. Thus, in his eyes, artistic violence indirectly resists social violence: “The violence 
done to the material imitates the violence that issued from the material and that endures 
in its resistance to form.”625 The problem with this argument is that it threatens to result in 
a vicious circle that presents, but is unable to end or prevent, further violence. If the 
artwork can only imitate violence, without expressing any impulses that, while damaged, 
still point to otherness or difference, then there seems to be no escape—reification cannot 
be halted; the cycle of violence engulfs literally everything. If violence were the only 
reality present for artworks to imitate, they would all express one thing: death. Adorno 	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cannot believe this, because he holds that the semblance of utopia is also part of aesthetic 
experience, and that nonidentity shocks subjectivity, breaking the ideological spell.626 So 
the only way out of the crisis seems to be to allow irrationality a role in both artistic 
production and aesthetic experience.  
 
Transfigured Night: Surrealism’s Transformation of Critical Theory 
 
Now I will shift from a narrow to a broad perspective, so that we may understand the 
parallels between Surrealism and Critical Theory. Michael Lowy argues that Surrealism 
is a form of revolutionary Romanticism that seeks to re-enchant the subject’s relation to 
nature.627 Lowy writes: “Nostalgic for a lost paradise—real or imaginary—Romanticism 
is in opposition to the melancholic mood of despair, to the quantifying mind of the 
bourgeois universe, to commercial reification, to the platitudes of utilitarianism, and 
above all, to the disenchantment of the world.”628 While mere nostalgia would be 
regressive, Surrealism always tempers its longing with material engagement—that is, 
with the suffering and unconscious trauma present socially and individually. Lowy 
continues that, according to Breton, Surrealism seeks to revive art’s ancient origins in 
magic, in order to re-enchant the world.629 Such re-enchantment fights against the 
disenchantment perpetuated by capitalism and philosophical Idealism and also revives the 
repressed magical or mimetic aspect of artworks.630 Adorno agrees with Breton that 
artworks operate under a mimetic “taboo” that silences their magical origins.631 However, 
Adorno implicitly argues that, for the Surrealist project to succeed, it must overcome 
various obstacles: first, it must resist the violent appropriation of myth by fascism and the 
Nazis; second, it must not succumb to the illusion of positivity; third, it must carefully 
balance the artwork’s divided nature as both magical (mimetic) and rational 	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(constructive); and fourth, it must somehow internally critique or reflect upon its own 
inheritance. This last aspect is necessary if mythology is to avoid simply reproducing 
ideology, and if it is to be genuinely new.  
What might scholars of Critical Theory teach Surrealist artists and writers, and 
what may Surrealist artists and writers gain from scholars of Critical Theory? Is it 
possible to reconcile the two methods, which at first glance appear to be opposites? 
Arguably, the contradiction between the two methods teaches us something about the 
divided nature of the artwork, and about the collision between rationality and imagination 
in subjectivity. First, we will uncover what the Surrealist method might gain from the 
method of Critical Theory, as Adorno practices it in Aesthetic Theory. Second, we may 
turn to the blind spots of Critical Theory’s method, and learn what Surrealist thought and 
practice might impart to it.  
 In his essay on Surrealism, Blanchot writes:  
in automatic writing…the word and my freedom are now no more than one. […] 
Surrealists became well aware…of the strange nature of words: they saw that 
words have their own spontaneity. For a long time, language had laid claim to a 
kind of particular existence. It refused simple transparency, it was not just a gaze, 
an empty means of seeing; it existed, it was a concrete thing and even a coloured 
thing. Surrealists understood, moreover, that language is not an inert thing: it has 
a life of its own, and a latent power that escapes us.632  
Blanchot’s analysis is striking: language, when not communicative or instrumental 
rationality does not rein it in, is possessed by life; further, it is wholly “spontaneous,” and 
exceeds any attempt at determination.633 Thus automatic writing proceeds without any 
direction from the subjective ego, and, in the same way, Ernst’s technical methods are 
generated from his imaginative impulses, his sense of the requirements of the artistic 
material, and his ability to reflect on his imagination’s immanent direction. At the same 
time, there is a troubling principle operating in the above passage that never becomes 
quite explicit. It is that language operates as a spontaneous power that resists materiality 
and which may reconcile rational thought with its object. Blanchot assumes that, for the 	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Surrealists, language operates roughly as freedom does for Kant: as a realm that cannot 
be determined by material, sensuous, or historical considerations. While the unconscious 
may experience moments of autonomy from reason’s control, it cannot be autonomous 
from materiality, because the unconscious realm is receptive to, and takes its content 
from, the social, historical, and natural world that humans participate in and engage with 
every day (and every night, in dreams). Thus the unconscious, while it may be 
spontaneous to a degree, cannot be theorized as purely spontaneous, because that would 
negate the Surrealists’ attempts to uncover and critique objective reality through 
unconscious images and associations. It is the resistance between the rational and the 
unconscious that rises to the surface in dreams, and in nightmares—not the absolute 
isolation of either faculty.   
 In another passage, Blanchot states that, for the Surrealists, 
the reality of man is not of the nature of things that are. It is not given, it must be 
conquered; it is always outside of itself. […] Poetry and life are ‘elsewhere’…but 
‘elsewhere’ does not designate a spiritual or temporal region; elsewhere is 
nowhere; it is not the beyond; it signifies that existence is never where it is.634  
Blanchot observes insightfully that imagination is a visionary faculty that both listens to 
historical-social reality and displaces it at the same time; thus, utopia is always negatively 
present in poetic production—and in everyday experience. Blanchot argues that, for the 
Surrealists, poetry overcomes aesthetic alienation by acting as a diagnostic and healing 
force for subjectivity: it names a kind of comportment towards reality that listens to the 
revolutionary potential within objects. Blanchot alludes to Breton’s statement that 
“Existence is elsewhere.”635 We may interpret this line dialectically: existence (or 
empirical society) is always displaced; reality refers to otherness or difference, which in 
turn refers to reality. This is how everyday objects are appropriated and transformed in 
Dadaist and Surrealist art.  
It is telling however that Blanchot seems to read Breton’s principle ontologically 
rather than historically—that is, objects necessarily contain their own negation, and do 
not require historical possibility in order to gain a measure of redemption. Surrealist 	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artists, writers, and scholars should accept that modern historical conditions have 
damaged experience, and that myth cannot be simply regained (or exhumed) without a 
critical method of retrieval. Adorno’s concept of interpretation provides such a method. 
In accordance with Blanchot’s reading, Adorno’s notion of utopia should not be 
interpreted as a wholly transcendent or spiritual location, which would immediately reify 
and constrict the concept; rather, it ought to be read as a negative state of experience, or 
as a process (both for the individual and for the collective), in which subjectivity would 
be able to listen to materiality, to reflect upon it, and to imagine otherness without fear, 
without the desire for self-preservation, and without utilitarian considerations. While it 
may be impossible to represent this state, because of the historical and social mechanisms 
of repression, it may be negatively, or distortedly, presented in Surrealist art. In order to 
achieve this, the subject must feel otherness (unconscious nature) within herself—those 
chaotic forces that circulate within rationality.  
Georges Bataille’s essay on humankind and animality, while fascinating and 
provocative, also fails to view the subject’s relation to nature as historical and social; he 
instead views nature as a primarily spiritual and anarchic freedom that shatters rational 
discourse.636 Bataille agrees with Adorno that human beings have dominated nature.637 He 
writes that, when nature’s power suddenly asserts itself, we see “the black possibilities of 
non-sense…. This unlimited discharge belongs rather to the realm of dream: it defines a 
divine possibility. […] Its essence is to be sacred, terrible and ungraspable…[it] leads to 
death and goes beyond it.”638 Bataille wishes to resurrect the “unknown” that circulates 
within subjectivity.639  
 Yet Surrealist artists and writers must realize that Surrealism’s recourse to magic 
is itself determined by historical forces, and that it operates within rationalized social 
discourses. For example, institutionalized religion, industrial-capitalist civilization, and 
science all contributed to the repression of magical practices deemed irrational in 
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Enlightenment’s infancy.640 Further, magic itself was a method of dominating nature, as 
the Surrealists acknowledge.641 Thus any attempt to rehabilitate magic, or enchantment, 
or nature, must turn at the same time to history, to reason, and to disenchantment. This is 
one dialectical principle that scholars of Surrealism might learn from scholars of Critical 
Theory: nature is history, and history is nature.642 Scholars of Surrealism should 
acknowledge that the unconscious forces that Surrealism relies upon to produce freedom 
are embedded in social and historical contexts that never entirely disappear. 
How might Critical Theory amend its method so that it loses its antagonism 
towards Surrealism? Consider the following passage by Blanchot: 
Surrealists […] loose their fury on discourse; they take away from it any right 
usefully to mean something; fiercely they break discourse as a means for social 
relationships, for precise designation. […] language disappears as an instrument, 
but only because it has become subject. […] it is human freedom acting and 
manifesting itself. […] [The Surrealists argue that] language does not have to be 
used, that it does not have to serve to express something, that it is free, freedom 
itself.643  
Scholars of Critical Theory should acknowledge that subjectivity relies on imagination as 
a power or capacity for engaging with otherness (defined as encompassing nature and 
objectivity) in a non-rational, yet critical, and non-instrumental manner. Blanchot’s 
analysis in the passage above, that language possesses its own forcefulness and agency, 
suffers from his assumption that language is autonomous from social and historical 
forces; nevertheless, Adorno would accept that language’s capacity to mimetically 
express suffering occurs when the subject employs her fantasy, or imagination, to 
develop technical possibilities. Further, both Blanchot and Adorno agree that language 
must escape instrumental or pragmatic functionality.  
In addition, Adorno’s concept of utopia, although irreducibly negative, requires a 
moment of re-enchantment if it is to succeed in reviving the expressive-mimetic 	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dimension of subjective experience, and of the artwork. Otherwise utopia would simply 
signify false consciousness—the disenchanted world. If it is to avoid nihilism, Adorno’s 
concept of utopia must re-enchant experience. Thus there is a dialectic of disenchantment 
and re-enchantment in aesthetic experience. The re-enchantment inherent in utopian 
impulses is not identical to a conception of positive transcendence, which Adorno rightly 
condemns in Hegel as conservative, abstract, and as bound to a teleological conception of 
history. Re-enchantment looks for traces of possibility amid debility—for instance, the 
Surrealist practice of finding discarded or thrown away objects that emanate hidden 
historical and revolutionary forces.644 For this reason, the Surrealist model of re-
enchantment parallels Adorno’s concept of redemption: both seek to ignite and revive 
potentiality that otherwise would be lost or repressed. Such potentiality resides, hidden, 
in objects: in everyday objects for the Surrealists, and in aesthetic objects for the Critical 
Theorist. Thus Surrealism, and Adorno’s unique version of Critical Theory, both rely on 
a negative model of utopia. For Adorno, the object’s semblance of utopia is activated by 
its dialectic of critique and hope; for the Surrealists, the utopian promise arrives with the 
dialectic between the fantastic and the ordinary.  
For the Surrealists and for Adorno, the imagination is a radically passive faculty 
that is able to interpret and reconfigure material reality through reflecting on its fantastic 
possibilities. Reason cannot anticipate utopia; it can only reflect on given materiality, and 
has a limited capacity for future-oriented vision that is free from logical strictures. This is 
why the artwork, as well as aesthetic experience, must involve both mimetic 
comportment and constructive rationality. Thus imagination is necessary for 
philosophical reflection, aesthetic experience, and artistic production.  
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Critical Theory must make its dependence on imagination and unconscious 
expression explicit, and ought to reflect upon the relation between reason and 
imagination if is not to sublimate unconsciousness into consciousness—or mimesis into 
rationality. Such a move would be reactive rather than revolutionary. Conversely, 
Surrealism must acknowledge that its own historical conditions to some extent determine 
the effectiveness of its method of automatism or chance, and its adherence to the tradition 
of magic in art and culture. Both ought to remember Adorno’s observation that “...art is 
supposed to be, like love, spontaneous, involuntary; and unconscious.”645  
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Conclusion 
In the last section of Minima Moralia, entitled ‘Finale,’ Adorno writes: “The only 
philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to 
contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of 
redemption.”646 Although tradition, as we have discussed, must be negated in order to 
critically dispel its frozen content, it also must be considered “from the perspective of 
redemption”—that is, we must assume that the possibility of hope, or at least 
displacement, inheres in tradition through the historical experience of suffering.647 Thus a 
moment of animation inheres in philosophical critique. I have tried to examine how 
Adorno criticizes and redeems various aesthetic concepts in Kant’s third Critique, and 
how Aesthetic Theory addresses the balance between philosophical reflection, aesthetic 
experience, and history. It is necessary to achieve such balance if the relationship 
between subject and object is to avoid violence. From Hohendahl’s perspective, “For 
Adorno the concept of progress operates on two levels: a secular and a theological or 
metaphysical one for which the idea of redemption has to stand in…through the notion of 
redemption a force comes into play that humanity does not control...Human agency is not 
denied, but its scope is limited to human history.”648 Hohendahl’s account is not entirely 
accurate. We have seen that, for Adorno, metaphysical experience is not identical to 
theological experience; instead, it is firmly grounded in history. Thus, Adorno does not 
need to reply on a theological model of redemption, because redemption is not only 
“limited” to human history; rather, redemption for Adorno only properly arises when 
such history is acknowledged and experienced—with the full force of its materiality.649 
Only through experiencing and reflecting upon the suffering of the past, and the guilty 
practices that perpetuate such suffering, and which obscure humanity’s self-knowledge in 
the present, will redemption as a concept free itself from its own tradition of obscurantist 
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mysticism, and transform itself into a material force to be reckoned with—and one that 
gestures towards utopian futures.  
 Of course, not all scholars accept Adorno’s arguments. Thierry de Duve accuses 
Adorno of dogmatism; he claims that, “wherever Kant presupposes innate universal 
conditions of possibility, [Adorno] refer[s] to sedimented history and ingrained social 
habits instead”.650 Adorno recognizes that history has the power to reshape and distort 
experience, and that subjectivity should not be considered to be independent of 
objectivity: that is, culture, nature, history, and society. We have seen how, in particular, 
the history of the twentieth century presents the regressive decline of Enlightenment, 
which forces reason to become irrational. De Duve claims that Adorno often imposes a 
Hegelian reading onto Kant: “[Adorno's] aesthetic theory is fraught with Hegelian 
readings of Kantian issues...solvable antinomies interpreted as irresolvable 
contradictions, ideas of reason recast as moments of spirit, ethical imperatives rewritten 
as historical programs, and so on”.651 Yet this is only partially true. Adorno’s reception of 
Hegel is highly complex, and it would impossible to do justice to the topic here. Adorno 
is extremely critical of several key Hegelian concepts: the progressive or teleological 
nature of dialectic, the concept of spirit as an overarching narrative that captures 
particularity, and the idea that conceptuality, rather than materiality, adequately describes 
subjective experience.652 Adorno’s reception of Hegel is similar to his reception of Kant: 
the kernels of transcendence (that is, utopian truth content, which arises from historical 
circumstance but is not determined by it) must be disentangled from the web of 
immanence (that which, in any philosophy, is determined by historical circumstances). 
Adorno does not simply accept Hegel’s reading of Kant against Kant’s own account; if he 
did so, Adorno would fall prey to the accusation that he accepts a simplistic teleological 
or historicist view of history, in which each thinker automatically replaces the next in a 
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series of more progressive iterations.653 Adorno’s reading of Kant is motivated, as we 
have seen, by Adorno’s own concerns, which cannot be reduced to that of any other 
thinker.  
 We may also address another concern. How is it possible to employ the categories 
that emerge from the philosophical tradition while still critically examining the ways in 
which history has changed them? It is necessary for the modern subject to adopt a dual 
perspective towards traditional categories: we must be both critical and receptive at once. 
The model for this attitude may be found in aesthetic experience, in which the subject 
ideally loses her determinative ego, and all the resulting social conventions that oppress 
her, while also thinking through her own experience, and the object’s expression. This 
contradiction is also present in the subject’s relation to tradition, and the past:   
 
To insist on the absolute absence of tradition is as naïve as the obstinate insistence 
on it. Both are ignorant of the past that persists in their allegedly pure relation to 
objects; both are unaware of the dust and debris which cloud their allegedly clear 
vision. But it is inhuman to forget because accumulated suffering will be 
forgotten and the historical trace on things, words, colors and sounds is always of 
past suffering. Thus tradition today poses an insoluble contradiction. There is no 
tradition today and none can be conjured, yet when every tradition has been 
extinguished the march towards barbarism will begin.654 
To be ignorant of the past means to repress the materiality that determines the present—
of the scars and “accumulated suffering” that leaves its mark in experience.655 There is 
“no tradition today” because the official narratives that have reigned over art history (and 
the Western tradition generally) have lost their value and been proven false; on the other 
hand, it is “inhuman to forget” tradition (considered as particular and transient moments 
of the past) because when the suffering of the past is rendered invisible or considered 
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654 Adorno, ‘On Tradition’, p. 78. 
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worthless, real individuals are harmed in the name of abstract values.656 This is why the 
positivist method of clear and distinct perception (“allegedly clear vision”), which 
stretches from Cartesian rationalism in the seventeenth century to analytic philosophy in 
the twentieth century, is lacking in self-knowledge: it aims to “extinguish” the social-
historical traces left in language, in order to reduce it to a system of signs that function 
like mathematical formulae—that is, symbols that may be abstracted from the materiality 
that surrounds them.657 For this reason, philosophical thought must not abstract away 
from historical experience, which is present in the very methods and techniques that such 
thought employs to research its objects. As discussed earlier, automatic writing emerged 
from the ruins of the First World War, as a method of excavating the unconscious 
irrationality that grounds the subject’s apparent rationality.658 The Surrealists realized that 
it was necessary to engage with the forces that distorted and damaged rationality—even if 
that meant delving into irrationality itself. Thus, we should not assume that our methods 
are untainted by irrational prejudice, desire, fear, or immoral considerations; rather, we 
ought to reflect on how historical and social experience has affected our perspective—
even that perspective that we consider to be the most philosophical, rational, moral, 
humane, and transcendent. For instance, the urgency of the present climate crisis should 
provoke us to imagine a different relationship to nature than one of domination and 
destruction.659    
Why isn’t Adorno’s inheritance of Kant simply conservative, or a blatant attempt 
at restoration rather than revolution? Adorno avoids conservatism because he wants to 
wholly transform the old concepts—and not simply to reform them. Adorno returns to 
traditional concepts; however, he perceives that that which has been discarded has the 
most likely potential to be carried forth into the future, and transformed into something 
new.  
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659 Christina Gerhardt, ‘The Ethics of Animals in Adorno and Kafka’, New German 
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 Let us briefly return to the first quote in the Introduction: “One must have 
tradition in oneself, to hate it properly”.660 Now we can reflect on the meaning of what 
Adorno might mean. ‘Hatred’ may be re-described as a form of negation. I have argued 
that the critical salvaging of the past (that is, the philosophical and aesthetic tradition) 
constitutes one of the invisible actions that Aesthetic Theory performs. We may use our 
analysis of Adorno’s reception of Kant to reconfigure the meaning of negation.  
The concept of negation has often been conceived of in explicitly spatial terms. 
For instance, Hegel’s threefold structure of cancellation, preservation, and transformation 
or raising up (Aufhebung) suggests that negation is matter of shifting, retaining, and 
restructuring a pattern or knowledge, or an object. Yet negation, at least as Adorno 
conceives of it, should be described using temporal metaphors, such as repression or 
forgetting, presencing or occurring, and anticipatory reconstitution. If we think of 
negation in these terms, we gain several important insights. We learn that negation is not 
simply about erasure, because the repressed object never disappears completely—in the 
same way that tradition, while it may appear differently, grounds the past, the present, 
and the future. We also learn that negation does not merely preserve the object in a static 
state; instead, it brings the object to awareness, and thus alters the experience of the 
subject, and the object itself. Finally, negation involves acting on the subject’s experience 
of the future, and thus involves the possibility of possibility itself—that is, of utopia, 
conceived negatively, as Adorno, as well as the Dadaists, and Surrealists, did.  
 Krebber has perceptively observed that concepts in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory are 
not static; rather, they function dialectically, akin to liquefied objects that gradually 
metamorphose as Adorno’s argument progresses. Thus philosophical concepts, conceived 
dialectically, are always shifting and never stable; to hold them in view is to realize that 
one’s own position is constantly unsettled by historical and social reality.661 We have 
seen, through examining the historical sediment expressed in Adornian concepts, that 
such concepts correspond, at least in part, with Kantian aesthetic concepts. We can now 
see, further, that Kant’s own concepts have no stable reference point—or solid ground—
where we should locate their origin, in order to understand them once and for all. Rather, 	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historical analysis can only proceed on the assumption that its perspective is, like those 
objects it seeks to examine, ever-shifting, fragile, and fluid.  
Another advantage of our analysis of Aesthetic Theory’s Kantian inheritance is 
that it demonstrates how, in responding to various Kantian concepts, Adorno develops 
some of the central components in his own philosophical architecture. For instance, Joel 
Whitebook notes that “[t]he only way to solve the problem [of identity thinking’s 
coercion, JNK]—this is Adorno's main anti-Kantian claim—is to reintroduce the moment 
of nature that was 'eliminated in this abstraction [from empirical reality].' He calls this 
moment 'the addendum.'”662 In other words, Adorno pursues his own solution to Kant’s 
idealism, which reduces the particular to a mere moment of the universal; he does not 
follow Hegel, Schopenhauer, or Schelling in attempting to reduce nature or sensuousness 
to an aspect of conceptuality or Spirit. While some commentators assume that Adorno’s 
critique of identity thinking is a response to Hegel alone, Whitebook and other scholars 
point out that Kant remains a crucial target.663 Whitebook also argues that Adorno’s 
materialism is indebted to Freud in that the latter’s conception of freedom, instead of 
being grounded in spontaneity, as it is for Kant, is grounded in “the drives”, or natural 
materiality.664 For both Adorno and Freud, the self must free itself from the internal 
mechanisms of repression that seek to authoritatively silence any dissenting voices—such 
as the subject’s animal nature, or her sensuous experience. Whitebook notes that, 
according to Kantian philosophy, “...the unity of the self must necessarily be coercive”.665 
Kant might respond that such coercion is necessary in order to impose organization on a 
chaotic aggregate of impulses and inclinations; however, in the context of 
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Enlightenment’s distortion and misrecognition of its own internal nature, such coercion 
results in harmful violence towards the self, as well as towards external otherness.   
Finally, we can see that Kant's Critique of Judgment contains certain concepts that 
need to be re-considered and revised in light of the historical and social events that 
characterize modernity. Kant's ideas concerning aesthetics must be challenged because 
they no longer may be assumed to be true for subjects' aesthetic experience. In some 
cases, Kant's ideas have lost their value or truth; in others, Kant's ideas promote an ideal 
for aesthetic experience that should be abandoned.  
Adorno's approach to aesthetics is ethically important because it allows subjects 
to experience objectivity and truth-content, and to break through, briefly, the ideological 
veil that obscures the subject's experience. Kant's concept of aesthetic judgment seeks to 
establish the subject's control over an aesthetic object through the feeling of pleasure and 
aesthetic ideas, which are subjective impositions that do not arise from the material and 
historical determinations of the object. It is vital for subjects to experience nonidentity, 
and to reflect upon truth-content, because they impart that which is not captured through 
social ideology. Nonidentity and truth-content also allow the subject to resist fixed and 
deadening categories that distort the true image of the world. It is immoral to accept an 
untrue image of the world because such an image causes the mutilation of objects and the 
repression of subjective impulses—impulses that might trace the history of objects in 
order to understand their mediated nature.666  
At last, we can try to answer some of the questions we raised in the Introduction. 
The relationship between art and philosophy is determined by history, and the need to 
both express and radicalize historical experience. Art requires philosophical mediation if 
it is to avoid uncritically repeating reality; philosophy requires art in order to ground 
itself in materiality, which is especially necessary after the natural-historical crises of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. We have also learned, through analyzing Adorno’s 
concept of interpretation, that art and philosophy are not polar opposites. Rather, their 
processes are mediated through each other: art has its own agency, and it is imperative 
that philosophical thought listens to material experience. History is present to experience 	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in different ways: in the altered material that artworks develop; in the categories available 
to philosophical thought; in the everyday social habits that we assume to be second 
nature; and in our orientation to the future, to the present, and to the past. It is only 
possible to stop ourselves from blindly reproducing the past by attending to, and 
reflecting upon, the historical experience within our subjectivity, and in objectivity. In 
this way we might avoid myth, and gain a glimpse—even a very brief, negative, 
illumination—of true enlightenment. The traditions of the past may only ‘continue’, in a 
critical and enlightened sense, when they have been thoroughly reflected upon—negated 
and transformed—and when their false moments have been brought to a standstill. This 
task is of course endless—and converges with the infinity of philosophical inquiry, 
aesthetic production, and interpretation. 
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Figure 1 
 
Hans Arp 
Untitled (The Entombment of the Birds and Butterflies: Head of Tzara), 1916-17 
Painted wooden relief 
40 x 32.5 x 9.5 cm (16 x 13 x 4 in) 
Collection, Kunsthaus, Zurich 
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Figure 2 
 
Kurt Schwitters 
Das Unbild (The And Picture), 1919 
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Collage/assemblage 
35.5 x 28 cm (14 x 11 in) 
Collection, Staatsgallerie, Stuttgart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Max Ernst 
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La Roue de la Lumiere (The Wheel of Light), 1925 
No. 29 of the Histoire naturelle series,  
Frottage, pencil on paper, 
26 x 43 cm (10 1/4 x 16 15/15) 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
Max Ernst 
Foret-aretes (Fishbone Forest), 1927 
Oil on canvas,  
54 x 65 cm, 
Galerie Beyeler, Basle  
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